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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Drew Williams and Michael Thompson met for the first time in a 
convenience store at 1:30 AM on a July night. Drew, a junior at the state 
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university, worked in the store to earn additional money. Michael also 
wanted additional money, but he did not want to work very hard to get it. 
Michael came into the store and looked around. Not seeing anyone else, 
he walked up to the counter, pulled out a pistol, and told Drew that he 
wanted all his cash. Drew argued briefly, assessing whether he could 
overpower the somewhat smaller Michael—but the pistol in Michael’s 
hand more than evened the odds. “Don’t shoot me,” he said. “You can 
have everything in the register.” Drew opened the cash register drawer 
and began taking bills out and putting them on the counter.  
“The ones underneath the coin tray as well,” Michael said. Drew lifted 
the coin tray and pulled out a small handful of 20s and one $100 bill and 
put them on the counter beside the rest of the cash. 
“Now,” said Michael, “open the safe.” 
“I don’t know how to open the safe,” Drew said. “I don’t have the 
combination.” He pointed at a sign that said, “Store personnel do not have 
the combination to the safe.” 
Michael looked at the sign, looked back at Drew, and pulled the 
trigger, shooting Drew in the chest. 
Drew died before the ambulance got him to the hospital.  
The police could find no witnesses, but the store had a surveillance 
camera, and the recording showed everything that happened, including a 
full-frontal image of Michael’s face. 
Exposed to breathless stories in the media and press about police use 
of face-recognition technology, viewers and readers might imagine that 
the police could run the surveillance image of Michael through a face-
recognition computer system, obtain a match to an individual known to 
be Michael, arrest him, haul him into court, and show the jury the 
computer match, likely resulting in conviction. 
That very rarely happens—yet. Instead, law enforcement investigators 
take the output of the face-recognition system, —usually in the form of 
several potential matches, scored as to probability—and use them as the 
basis for further investigation. They may use the computer-generated 
matches as a photo array1 to present to witnesses. They may use meta-
data about the subjects in the matches to determine who had opportunity, 
means, and motive to commit the crime. They may take fingerprints or 
DNA samples from suspects identified from face-recognition and search 
them against databases. 
A good bit of hysteria exists about face-recognition technology and 
its potential to turn the United States into “a surveillance state like 
 
 1. A photo array is an arrangement of photographs presented to a witness, to see if she can 
identify the image of the perpetrator from among them. E.g., Small v. State, 180 A.3d 163, 169–
73 (Md. Ct. App. 2018) (describing construction and use of a photo array). 
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China,” given that half the population already has images of its faces in 
one database or another.2 
Despite their rhetorical excesses, aimed at getting attention and 
strengthening fundraising, some of the alarmists identify important 
benchmarks for the evolving law of face-recognition in criminal 
procedure. Most significantly, they argue that the law of evidence, 
particularly hearsay rules, and the Constitution, especially the Sixth 
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, should be interpreted to entitle a 
criminal defendant to know if face-recognition technology was used to 
build the case against him. He should be entitled, they argue, to know 
how the technology was used if it was. If the technology played a 
significant role in singling out the defendant for investigation, the 
defendant should be entitled to probe its role and, if the role was 
substantial, to probe the reliability of the technology used.  
The commentators are right about all of this, so far. On the other hand, 
if face-recognition technology played only a minor role in the 
investigation, and if other evidence is sufficient independently to identify 
the defendant as the perpetrator, the defendant should not be able to turn 
the trial into a generalized debate on the evils of face-recognition 
technology as a threat to personal privacy. 
Face-recognition technology promises enormous improvements in 
identifying criminals, while reducing the incidence of wrongful 
accusations. But fears of its potential misuse, fueled by speculation 
amounting to little more than science fiction, is leading to calls for its 
outright prohibition, which have been embraced by many state 
legislatures. This is not the solution. The solution is a broader 
understanding of how the technology works and greater transparency 
through criminal discovery, so that those accused of crimes based in 
whole or in part on the technology have a meaningful opportunity to test 
its accuracy through the adversary process. The same techniques that 
allow a criminal defendant to challenge eyewitness identification should 
be available to challenge computer identification. 
The objection still exists that, even if a wrongfully accused defendant 
is officially acquitted, she has been put to great expense, reputational 
injury, and psychological trauma by accusation and arrest. This is true of 
any criminal accused, however, whether face-recognition technology 
played any role in the accusation. The remedy lies in existing measures 
to test probable cause for arrest, to afford pre-trial release through the 
bond presentment process, and to vindicate through grand juries and 
preliminary hearings. 
 
 2. See John Palfrey, The Ever-Increasing Surveillance State, GEO. J. INT’L AFFS. 
(Mar. 2, 2020), https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2020/03/02/the-ever-increasing-surveillance-state/ 
[https://perma.cc/UDG6-WCUF] (explaining how, similarly to China, the United States collects 
a significant amount of biometric information about its citizens). 
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This Article looks beneath the surface of attacks on face-recognition 
technology and explains how it can be an exceptionally useful tool for 
law enforcement, complementing traditional forensic evidence such as 
fingerprints and DNA. It punctures myths about the technology and 
explains how existing rules of criminal procedure, developed for other 
kinds of forensic evidence, are readily adaptable to face-recognition. It 
opposes across-the-board restrictions on use of face-recognition 
technologies and advocates a more sophisticated set of guarantees of 
defendant access to the information necessary to probe reliability of 
computerized face-matches. Defendants must have reasonable access to 
the details of the technology and how it was used so that they have a 
meaningful opportunity to inform the factfinder of doubts about 
reliability. 
Part II explains the technology, starting with machine learning, which 
enables a computer to represent faces digitally based on their physical 
characteristics, so that they can be matched with other faces. This part 
also explains how shortcomings in the algorithms or training database of 
faces can produce errors, both positive and negative, in identification. 
Part III explores existing and potential uses of face-recognition in law 
enforcement, placing the technology into the context of traditional police 
investigations.  
Part IV summarizes the relatively sparse caselaw and the much fuller 
literature on face-recognition technology, in particular, evaluates claims 
of threats to privacy, and analyzes legal principles developed for 
analogous conventional criminal investigative and proof methods. 
Part V constructs a legal framework for evaluating the probativeness 
of face-recognition technology in criminal prosecutions, develops 
strategies, and offers actual cross examination questions to guide defense 
counsel in challenging face-recognition technology. 
Part VI acknowledges that some specific uses of the technology to 
scan crowds and streams of people may need judicial control and suggests 
a draft statute to assure such control. 
II.  TECHNOLOGY OF FACE-RECOGNITION 
Face-recognition is an instance of pattern matching, which also 
includes voice recognition, natural language processing, text to speech 
conversion, auto-correction in word processing programs, and many 
video and audio compression algorithms. 
Most of these types of pattern matching benefit from the use of 
machine learning techniques. The quality of what the machines learn 
depends on the size and representativeness of the exemplars fed into the 
machines during the learning process through a training database. The 
accuracy of the production system, —which, in the face-recognition 
context, seeks to match a probe image against entries in an enrolled 
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database—depends on the robustness of the statistical algorithms used to 
extract the distinguishing features. 
A.  Machine Learning 
In machine learning, a large number of samples are processed by a 
digital computer.3 Some of the samples contain the target image, and 
others contain something else. Thus, a robocowboy might be trained to 
recognize cattle by presenting hundreds of thousands of images of 
different kinds of animals, tagging only those that represent cows, bulls, 
steers, and calves.4 Machine-learning techniques can be used to 
accommodate the challenges associated with recognizing the target 
image despite different orientations, different lighting conditions, and 
different backgrounds.5 Machine learning works at multiple layers in 
face-matching applications. It learns what a face is; it learns how to 
reorient a facial image so that it more easily can be compared with others; 
it learns what features uniquely define a face; and it refines algorithms 
that can apply these steps to an arbitrary set of facial images in production 
systems. 
The techniques work by scanning the lines of an image, much as a 
laser printer or office scanner does, and looking for discontinuities in 
brightness and color. A model of an image then can be constructed to 
identify the locations of those discontinuities.6 Then, statistical 
techniques, enabled by a complex hierarchy of neural networks7 
 
 3. See U.S. Patent No. 20140105467A1, at paras. 0017–26 (identifying preceding face-
recognition patents). 
 4. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The 21st Century Cowboy: Robots on the Range, 43 U. ARK. 
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 149 (2020) (exploring feasibility of robot cowboy who herds cattle; 
describing machine learning aimed at recognition of cattle).  
 5. This involves the second step in most typologies: alignment. See Adrian Rosebrock, 
Face Alignment with OpenCV and Python, PYIMAGESEARCH (May 22, 2017), https://www.py 
imagesearch.com/2017/05/22/face-alignment-with-opencv-and-python/ [https://perma.cc/8V6L-
UQPX] (explaining alignment). 
 6. A line connecting the discontinuities represents an “edge” in the image, such as the edge 
of a cheek in a human face. See Image Processing with Python: Edge Detection, DATA 
CARPENTRY, https://datacarpentry.org/image-processing/08-edge-detection/ [https://perma.cc/ 
5CHT-VRJC] (last modified Aug. 3, 2020) (explaining edges and edge detection in image 
processing). 
 7. See Divyansh Dwivedi, Face Recognition for Beginners, TOWARDS DATA SCIENCE 
(Apr. 28, 2018), https://towardsdatascience.com/face-recognition-for-beginners-a7a9bd5eb5c2 
[https://perma.cc/EBJ9-HTYU] (explaining how neural networks can facilitate use of statistical 
techniques such as Principal Component Analysis, Linear Discriminant Analysis, Independent 
Component Analysis, Discrete Cosine Transforms, Gabor Filters, and Markov Models for face-
recognition); ARUN ALVAPPILLAI & PETER NEAL BARRINA, Face Recognition USING MACHINE 
LEARNING (2017), http://noiselab.ucsd.edu/ECE285/FinalProjects/Group7.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
UU7L-GZ9D] (brief but formal paper on face-recognition algorithms). 
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implementing statistical algorithms, can compare the location of different 
types of discontinuities between images, and, thus, identify images that 
are most similar. The indicia of similarity are the particular facial features 
that discriminate a cow from a wolf—or one face from another.8 
The “machine-learning” label applies to the process of identifying the 
distinguishing features that have statistical significance.9 There is nothing 
magical about the analysis: it is factor analysis,10 which has been used as 
a social science methodology for more than 100 years.11 What has 
changed is computing power, the availability of digital storage, cheap 
digital cameras, and an enormous inventory of digital representations of 
faces. 
The foundational layer examines a large inventory of images of faces 
(the training database) to learn what a face is.12 This process is much like 
the one described for the robocowboy learning how to recognize a cow. 
The statistical model of a face then is tagged to identify those features 
that vary from one face to another, such as: spacing of the eyes, height of 
the forehead, thickness of the lips, width of the nose, coloration, and so 
on. Facial features could be identified and tagged in advance, by a 
knowledge engineer questioning people on how they recognize faces and 
 
 8. Adam Geitgey, Machine Learning is Fun! Part 4: Modern Face Recognition with Deep 
Learning, MEDIUM (July 24, 2016), https://medium.com/@ageitgey/machine-learning-is-fun-part 
-4-modern-face-recognition-with-deep-learning-c3cffc121d78 [https://perma.cc/266R-YDKX] 
(explaining the feature extraction step and that some commentators call this step identifying 
"landmarks"). 
 9. One popular method is the Viola/Jones approach. E.g., Paul Viola, The Viola/Jones 
Face Detector (2001), https://www.cs.ubc.ca/~lowe/425/slides/13-ViolaJones.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/Q9LD-JF2E] (explaining method with slides); Paul Viola & Michael Jones, Rapid Object 
Detection Using a Boosted Cascade of Simple Features (2001), https://www.cs.cmu.edu/ 
~efros/courses/LBMV07/Papers/viola-cvpr-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/SL2P-YTW6] (describing a 
popular method of machine learning; more formal paper). 
 10. E.g., Factor Analysis, STATISTICS SOLUTIONS, https://www.statisticssolutions.com/ 
factor-analysis-sem-factor-analysis/ [https://perma.cc/9R9X-LB74] (last visited Jan. 11, 2021) 
(describing that factor analysis is a technique used to condense large amounts of variables into a 
lower amount of factors). 
 11. See generally Robert Cudeck, Factor Analysis in the Year 2004: Still Spry at 100, in 
FACTOR ANALYSIS AT 100: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 1 (Robert 
Cudeck & Robert C. MacCallum, eds. 2007). 
 12. This is the “detection” step. See Oleksii Kharkovyna, An Intro to Deep Learning for 
Face Recognition, MEDIUM: DEEP LEARNING (June 26, 2019), https://laptrinhx.com/an-intro-to-
deep-learning-for-face-recognition-3710804757/ [https://perma.cc/KZ2P-78VK] (identifying 
detection, alignment, feature extraction, and feature matching to database) as the steps in face-
recognition); U.S. Patent No. 20140105467A1, at paras. 0009–15 (background of the invention, 
describing Detection, Alignment, Normalization, detection, alignment, normalization, 
representation, and matching steps in pattern matching); Geitgey, supra note 8 (describing and 
illustrating the steps with examples of actual faces of celebrities; providing links to Python 
programs that execute the algorithms). 
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know that an image is a face instead of something else. Human brain 
research shows that human beings pay most attention to eyes, 
cheekbones, nose, mouth, eyebrows, and texture and color of skin, when 
recognizing faces.13 
Machine learning, however, does a better job because it identifies 
features, e.g., symmetry, that distinguish one face from another, which 
may escape the conscious notice of an individual observer, no matter how 
skilled. “The most appropriate approach is to enable the computer to 
determine the characteristics that need to be collected.”14 
At the conclusion of this layer of processing, the program has a 
template for a face. It now can take the image of a new face (the probe 
face) and determine the values for each of the facial features that have 
differentiating effects.15 Most programs work with about 100 reference 
points that comprise individual features.16 Then the computer software 
compares the faceprint of the probe face to the faceprints in the enrolled 
database.17  
The most important measurements for face-recognition 
programs are the distance between the eyes, the width of the 
nostrils, the length of the nose, the height and shape of the 
cheekbones, the width of the chin, the height of the forehead 
and other parameters. After that, the obtained data are 
 
 13. Kharkovyna, supra note 12; see Brendan F. Klare et al., Suspect Identification Based 
on Descriptive Facial Attributes, IEEE INT’L JOINT CONF. ON BIOMETRICS, https://ieeexplore. 
ieee.org/abstract/document/6996255 [https://perma.cc/S4QT-MMYR] (describing matching 
algorithm developed using crowd-sourced specification of 46 face attributes as basis for machine 
learning, by the co-founder and CEO of Rank One Corp.). 
 14. Kharkovyna, supra note 12. 
 15. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,859,921 (issued Jan. 12, 1999) (describing apparatus that 
takes a facial image, corrects for lighting differences, and detects eyes). 
 16. See U.S. Patent No. US20140105467A1, at para. 0009: 
There are about 80 nodal points on a human face. A few of the nodal points that 
are measured by the FACEIT software are: distance between eyes; width of nose; 
depth of eye sockets; cheekbones; jaw line; and chin. These nodal points are 
measured to create a numerical code that represents the face in a database. This 
code is referred to as a faceprint and only fourteen to twenty-two nodal points 
are necessary for the FACEIT software to complete the recognition process. 
 17. See Scott Jeffrey Klum, Facesketchid: A System for Facial Sketch to Mugshot Matching 
3 (2014) (Master’s Thesis, Michigan State University), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/ 
download?doi=10.1.1.458.9523&rep=rep1&type=pdf (describing different methods for 
generating composite images: artists sketch from witness identification, computer-generated 
composition from witness description, and artist sketch based on surveillance photo). 
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compared with those available in the database, and, if the 
parameters coincide, the person is identified.”18  
The feature measurements can be expressed as a “feature vector,” or 
“faceprint,” which represents a particular face.19 The process concludes, 
as the quote says, with an additional layer of processing: comparing the 
features of a probe face with the features of faces in the database.20 
As the discussion suggests, two different databases generally are used: 
the training database and the database of enrolled users. The training 
database likely would not relate to an ultimate law enforcement 
application. It would comprise an extremely large set of faces that are 
selected to represent the demographic characteristics of a population. 
This database is used for learning features that distinguish different faces. 
The database of enrolled users, in the law enforcement context, would 
contain faces of persons that might be of interest: from mugshots, driver’s 
license photos, or passport photos. The actual matching is done between 
the probe photo and the enrolled user database. 
Application in the law enforcement context is obvious. An unknown 
subject can be identified by matching a picture of his face with those in 
an enrolled database. 
B.  Bases for Comparisons 
Face-matching involves comparing probe images against a database 
containing face images. Two databases are relevant to face-recognition: 
a training database and an enrolled database. Machine-learning 
algorithms are applied to the training database to find the features that 
identify a face and distinguish it from all others. This step develops the 
values to be used in the algorithms comprising a production face-
matching system. The enrolled database is used in production systems to 
determine if the probe image matches an entry in the enrolled database, 
thereby permitting the system to output identifying data of the person 
with the matching face. 
1.  Probe images 
Face-recognition, like the other two popular biometric techniques—
involving fingerprints and DNA—depends upon a high-quality starting 
 
 18. Kharkovyna, supra note 12; see also Divyansh Dwivedi, Face Recognition for 
Beginners, TOWARDS DATA SCIENCE (Apr. 28, 2018), https://towardsdatascience.com/face-
recognition-for-beginners-a7a9bd5eb5c2 [https://perma.cc/D4RD-LGTM] (presenting computer 
program in the Python language that performs the basic steps). 
 19. U.S. Patent No. 20140105467A1, at para. 0034 (explaining feature vector). 
 20. See, e.g., id. (method and system for matching unknown facial image to image of 
celebrity by finding, comparing, contrasting, and identifying similar facial characteristics). 
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point: a clear image of a fingerprint, a sufficient quantity of 
uncontaminated DNA, or the image of a face at an orientation and with 
sufficient resolution that its features can be identified and measured. The 
most common limitation on useful computerized face-recognition is a 
poor quality21 probe image, which often is the case with surveillance 
video. The most significant limitation on automated fingerprint matching 
is the poor quality of latent prints.22 The most significant limitation on 
computerized DNA matching is the unavailability of a sufficient quantity 
of uncontaminated DNA to be the probe. 
2.  Training Databases 
Acceptable accuracy for face-recognition requires a large number of 
digitized images of faces—in the hundreds of thousands or millions.23 
Only with a sufficiently large sample of different faces in the leaning 
database can the algorithm learn which features distinguish the different 
faces.24 But this only needs to be done once. After the program has 
learned the distinguishing landmarks, it then can assign values to them 
for all the faces in an enrolled database, and then the system is ready to 
perform a search with respect to a probe face. The program simply takes 
the measurements of landmarks in the probe face and compares those 
with the corresponding measurements for each face in the enrolled 
database. It is not necessary to re-evaluate the training database each time 
a search is run.  
Criteria for images to be included in the training database are quite 
different from the criteria for those to be included in the enrolled 
database. The training database is better if it includes the widest possible 
variety of faces, in the widest possible variety of orientations, lighting, 
and background. It also must include a variety of facial expressions, such 
as smiles, squints, and frowns. 
The face-recognition system needs to learn how to identify an image 
comprising a face, and it needs a variety of visual backgrounds to be able 
to do that. It needs to handle faces in profile as well as full front 
orientation. It must not be stymied by different lighting conditions. The 
 
 21.  “Poor quality,” as the term is used in this Article, refers to more than the technical 
quality of an image—lighting, resolution, and focus. It refers also to factors that might obscure 
the subject’s face, such as wearing a hood or a mask; the shot being taken from an angle rather 
than straight on; or rapid movement, which blurs the image in single frames comprising the video. 
 22. In criminal justice usage, “latent” means found in the field, as at a crime scene, rather 
than in a controlled environment, as with fingerprints taken as a part of the booking process. 
Latent does not refer, as in common usage, to whether the prints are apparent or hidden, requiring 
special techniques to expose them.  See United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 982–983 (10th Cir. 
2009) (explaining difference between latent and known fingerprints). 
 23. Klum, supra note 17, at 21–25 (describing training process for face-recognition 
algorithm). 
 24. The bigger the database, the greater the likelihood that it will contain a matching face. 
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machine learns how to normalize an image identified as a face, so that the 
production system can match the full-frontal equivalents of a diversity of 
orientations, lighting conditions, and expressions. 
The training database also must include diverse sexes, ages, races, and 
ethnicities. A system trained only with African American faces is not 
going to do very well in recognizing Caucasian or Asian faces. A system 
developed from a training database without many Asian faces in it will 
do worse when identifying Asian targets. One that does not have many 
elderly faces will not do a good job recognizing older faces. The best 
training databases are as diverse in racial and demographic characteristics 
as the population. 
With more diverse demographics, and greater variety of lighting 
conditions, orientations, and expressions, the training database will 
produce more robust algorithms—the quality of the eventual matches 
obtainable from their use will increase.  
A number of commercial vendors and research labs have already 
created training databases that enable the deployment of commercial 
products into the marketplace that search and match faces, using enrolled 
databases specified by the customer.  
3.  Enrolled Databases 
The enrolled database has a different purpose and, therefore, must be 
designed differently from the training database. The enrolled database 
should contain high-quality images of known persons.25 The most 
common enrolled databases used in law enforcement are state collections 
of mugshots, driver’s license photographs, and federal collections 
passport photographs, or more.26 The images in these databases typically 
are full frontal (most mugshots also include a profile), have standard 
lighting, and the subject bears a serious expression. Search images easily 
can be expressed as a faceprint vector that unambiguously represents each 
face. A robust face-matching algorithm can take an equally high-quality 
probe image and determine if it matches. Then, the reliability of the face-
matching depends only on the quality of the probe image. 
Clearview AI, discussed in Section III.A, stands out from other 
products in that it also uses faces “scraped” from Facebook and other 
social media.27 
 
 25. But see discussion infra Section III.A regarding unknown to many-unknown matching.  
 26. Federal databases might be more comprehensive because, often, as a condition to 
receiving funds, agencies must report and provide data to the Feds. “The Feds almost always had 
access to better interstate data for this type of thing.” E-mail from Zach Beaver, Esq., former 
Indiana State Police Sergeant, to author (June 8, 2020) (on file with author). 
 27. Scraping is the process of automatically searching the Internet, copying everything 
recognized as an image of a face, and storing it in the database. See generally What Is Web 
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Facebook simplifies its search by initially searching a new face only 
through the database of the friends of the person posting the new image.28 
In other words, the enrolled database for each search is small, and the 
probe face is highly likely to be in the database. Facebook’s training 
database, conversely, is huge, comprising a substantial portion of all 
Facebook users. 
4.  Searching 
Computers do not search databases by comparing every element of an 
entry of the search term with every element of each entry in the database. 
That would take far too long. Instead, search algorithms construct indices 
of the database entries, construct a similar index for the search term, and 
search for a match.29 Once an index match is found, the algorithm may 
then go deeper and search for a match of data elements among a much 
more limited set of entries that all have the same index. The process is 
much like an index used by a large law firm, which presents a user with 
alphabet entries corresponding to the first letter of a lawyer’s last name.  
Index-based searching risks false negatives if the true match was mis-
indexed. Superficially, criminal defense counsel is not concerned with 
false negatives because that means a potential guilty party got away. But 
if she defends on the ground that someone else did it, a face-match with 
someone else would be extremely valuable. 
C.  Accuracy 
The National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) 
commissioned a series of tests and reports on face-recognition products.30 
 
Scraping?, SCRAPINGHUB, https://www.scrapinghub.com/what-is-web-scraping/ [https://perma 
.cc/S5AR-NCN7] (last visited Dec. 2, 2020). 
 28. See discussion infra Section IV.C (explaining the Facebook face-matching algorithm). 
 29. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., DIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW § 1.03[C][1] (6th ed. 2020) 
(explaining the need for index-based searching in Internet routers); Tim Miller, How Does 
Indexing Work, CHARTIO, https://chartio.com/learn/databases/how-does-indexing-work/ [https:// 
perma.cc/95DT-HHE9] (last visited Dec. 2, 2020) (explaining the need for indexes to make 
searches more efficient); Kenneth R. Moses, Automated Fingerprint Identification System, in 
FINGERPRINT SOURCEBOOK 6–29 (Alan McRoberts ed., 2011), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ 
nij/225326.pdf (explaining the need for indexing in automated fingerprint matching systems). 
 30. See Facial Recognition Technology (Part III): Ensuring Commercial Transparency & 
Accuracy: Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Reform of the H. Comm., 116th 
Cong. 54 (2020) (statement of Charles H. Romine, Director, Information Technology Laboratory, 
National Institute of Standards and Technology, United States Department of Commerce), 
https://www.nist.gov/speech-testimony/facial-recognition-technology-part-iii-ensuring-comm 
ercial-transparency-accuracy [https://perma.cc/SR8K-RXVT] (reporting on results of NIST 
program for testing reliability of commercial face-recognition products and summarizing errors 
associated with race and demographic groups). 
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Overall, the tests and reports showed error rates as low as 0.2%.31 
Experimentation with monkeys (simulating human experts) suggests that 
automated face-recognition systems can be more accurate than humans 
in some situations.32  
Accuracy at this level can reduce wrongful convictions because the 
technology is more accurate than lineups,33 in-court identifications, or on-
scene descriptions identifying suspects as perpetrators of crimes. 
The reliability of a face-matching algorithm depends importantly on 
the number of landmarks representing each face. If a system represents a 
face only by the distance between the pupils of the eyes, it would not be 
at all reliable, no matter how many faces are in its database. Too many 
different faces have similar distances between the eyes. Reliability 
improves as additional distinguishing features are added.  
As with any statistical analysis, the computer programs applying them 
can report measures of reliability, e.g., 99% certainty that the face is a 
match or, say, only a 55% probability.34 
The NIST report gave advice on use of face-recognition products that 
is pertinent to the criminal justice context: 
While publicly available test data from NIST and 
elsewhere can inform owners, it will usually be informative 
to specifically measure accuracy of the operational 
algorithm on the operational image data, perhaps employing 
biometrics testing laboratory to assist. Since different 
algorithms perform better or worse in processing images of 
individuals in various demographics, policy makers, face-
recognition system developers, and end users should be 
 
 31. Patrick Grother et al., Ongoing Face Recognition Vendor Test (FRVT) Part 2: 
Identification, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2018/NIST 
.IR.8238.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZH6V-NBPX] (detailing recognition accuracy for 127 algorithms 
from 45 developers; concluding that “with good quality portrait photos, the most accurate 
algorithms will find matching entries, when present, in galleries containing 12 million individuals, 
with error rates below 0.2%; finding that face-recognition has undergone an industrial revolution, 
with algorithms increasingly tolerant of poor quality images). 
 32. Kharkovyna, supra note 12; P. Jonathon Phillips et al., Face Recognition Accuracy of 
Forensic Examiners, Superrecognizers, and Face Recognition Algorithms, 115 PROCEEDINGS 
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6171 (2018), https://www.pnas.org/content/115/24/6171 [https://perma.cc/ 
J7XJ-PAN6] (reporting empirical data showing computerized face-recognition better than the 
median expert human). 
 33. A lineup is a live presentation of multiple individuals to a witness. The witness looks at 
the participants, sometimes hears them speak, and potentially identifies a perpetrator. Lineups are 
typically conducted in controlled environments such as a police station. E.g., What Are the Rules 
for Police Lineups?, HG.ORG, https://www.hg.org/legal-articles/what-are-the-rules-for-police-
lineups-35166 [https://perma.cc/3FSW-26DD] (last visited Dec. 3, 2020). 
 34. See U.S. Patent No. 20180373958A1 (filed Aug. 30, 2018) (describing statistical 
method for reporting reliability of computerized face-match). 
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aware of these differences and use them to make decisions 
and to improve future performance. We supplement this 
report with more than 1200 pages of charts contained in 
seventeen annexes that include exhaustive reporting of 
results for each algorithm. These are intended to show the 
breadth of the effects, and to inform the algorithm 
developers.35 
A separate NIST report evaluated the variability of accuracy with 
different demographic groups.36 It reported “a wide range in accuracy 
across developers, with the most accurate algorithms producing many 
fewer errors.” 
Additionally, the report stated the following: 
With domestic law enforcement images the highest false 
positives are in American Indians, with elevated rates in 
African American and Asian populations; the relative 
ordering depends on sex and varies with algorithm. We 
found false positives to be higher in women than men, and 
this is consistent across algorithms and datasets. This effect 
is smaller than that due to race. We found elevated false 
positives in the elderly and in children; the effects were 
larger in the oldest and youngest, and smallest in middle-
aged adults.37 
Specific changes in algorithms can reduce bias.38 Lower reliability of 
particular products for certain ethnic groups and ages should be fodder 
for effective cross examination. Competent counsel who understands the 
technology can perform effective cross examination of the proponents of 
the identification. 
D.  Speed of Processing 
Computers are fast, but they still require finite amounts of time to do 
their work. Computer scientists estimate how long an application will 
take to produce its output by quantifying the duration of each step in the 
program and multiplying it by the number of times that step must be 
performed. Analyzing a new face requires computing the 100 or so 
landmarks and organizing them in a vector comprising the face-map. The 
 
 35. PATRICK GROTHER ET AL, Face Recognition Vendor Test (FRVT) Part 3: Demographic 
Effects, 8280 NISTIR 3 (Dec. 2019), https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2019/NIST.IR.8280.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XJ6M-QM8B]; see also Klum, supra note 17, at 32; id. at 38 (describing 
surveillance-photo to composite to matching results for Tamerlan Tsarnaev). 
 36. See GROTHER ET AL., supra note 35. 
 37. GROTHER ET AL., supra note 35, at 2. 
 38. ALEXANDER AMINI ET AL., Uncovering and Mitigating Algorithmic Bias through 
Learned Latent Structure, AIES (Jan. 2019), https://www.aies-conference.com/2019/wp-content/ 
papers/main/AIES-19_paper_220.pdf [https://perma.cc/479D-N556]. 
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time necessary for each computation must be multiplied by the number 
of landmarks—100 in this example. 
Once the new face has been processed, it can be used as a probe image 
and compared with each of the images in an enrolled database. The time 
required for the search is directly proportional to the number of faces in 
the enrolled database. If multiple probe images are used, the search time 
increases in direct proportion to the number of probe images: searching 
for a match of three probes takes three times as long as a search for a 
match of one probe. 
Thus, practical face-matching is not an instantaneous process, a 
characteristic limiting its application to large groups, the application that 
most concerns privacy watchdogs. 
III.  USES IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 
Eventually, face-recognition technology will be powerful enough that 
a law enforcement agency can use face-recognition by itself to identify a 
perpetrator and to persuade a jury to convict him. For now, however, the 
technology is not that powerful. It is understood best as a complement to 
other forensic techniques, especially other biometric techniques such as 
fingerprint and DNA matching. Often, a computerized face-match is the 
first step for follow-up investigations involving showing potential 
matches to witnesses, searching fingerprint databases, and seeking DNA 
matches. The FBI’s description of its enrolled database states: 
“Candidate photos returned to the law enforcement agency are 
provided as investigative leads only and are not positive identification. 
Although facial recognition technology has become increasingly 
accurate, authorized users of the NGI-IPS are prohibited from relying 
solely on the candidate photos to conduct law enforcement action.”39 
The following Sections explain how law enforcement uses of 
computerized face-matching work in traditional investigative settings. 
About a fourth of the law enforcement agencies in the United States 
use face-recognition technology.40 A 2019 law enforcement foundation 
study of face-recognition technology identified nineteen different uses, 
generally falling into three categories: 
  
 
 39. Erin M. Prest, Privacy Impact Assessment: NGI-Interstate Photo System, FBI 2 
(Oct. 29 2019), https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/pia-ngi-interstate-photo-system.pdf/view 
[https://perma.cc/NV6A-N4CJ] (describing system that includes 38 million photographs for use 
by law enforcement face-recognition systems). 
 40. Jillian Slaight & Ryan LeCloux, 3 WIS. POL’Y PROJ., no. 4, Mar. 2020, at 1, 4–5, 
https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/misc/lrb/wisconsin_policy_project/facial_recognition_privacy_
3_4.pdf [https://perma.cc/8KA7-Z2ML]. 
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• field use 
• investigative use41 
• custodial and supervisory use42 
Specifically, the nineteen uses include: (a) narrowing the field of 
suspects down to a manageable number; (b) exonerating the falsely 
accused; (c) identifying the mentally ill; (d) helping return children to 
their parents; and (e) determining the identity of deceased persons.43 Such 
applications of the technology involve different permutations of 
matching.  
A.  Permutations 
Distinguishing the permutations of types of matching is useful in 
classifying law enforcement uses of computerized face-matching as well 
as relating those uses to the capabilities and limitations of the 
technology.44 The following permutations exist: 
One unknown to many knowns (1U: nK). This is the permutation used 
to identify an unknown suspect when his image is available from 
surveillance video or an on-scene snapshot. 
One known to many knowns (1K: nK). This permutation would be 
useful in identifying an imposter. If the goal is to verify the identity of 
the known person, one should use the one-known to one-known 
permutation. 
 
 41. The IJIS catalog emphasizes these applications: 
• matching surveillance photos with entries in a correctional mugshot 
database to identify suspects in a $5,000 Home Depot theft.  
• matching online profiles against DMV photos to identify suspects for 
a sexual assault.  
• apprehending a fugitive by comparing a photo of the suspect in 
disguise and comparing it with entries in a booking photo database 
containing more than 4 million images.  
• Identifying a suspect in a theft during a date by comparing a candid 
shot on a cellphone with a statewide mugshot database. 
IJIS INSTITUTE AND IACP LAW ENFORCEMENT IMAGING TECHNOLOGY TASK FORCE, LAW 
ENFORCEMENT FACIAL RECOGNITION USE CASE CATALOG 11–15 (2019), https://www.ijis.org/ 
resource/collection/93F7DF36-8973-4B78-A190-0E786D87F74F/Law_Enforcement_Facial_ 
Recognition_Use_Case_Catalog.pdf. 
 42. Id. at 15. 
 43. Id. at 7. 
 44. See generally id. at 4 (distinguishing identification, one-to-one analysis, from discovery, 
one to many analysis). 
2020] FACE-RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY 57 
 
Many unknowns to one known (nU: 1K). This permutation would be 
useful in scanning a stream or a crowd of persons for a known person—
a fugitive, a suspect, or an intelligence target. 
Many unknowns to many unknowns (nU: nU). This permutation 
applies if the user is scanning a stream or a crowd of persons for the 
presence of anyone who may be a suspect, or an intelligence target, 
because of the frequency with which she appears, without having anyone, 
in particular, in mind. This permutation is also useful in a database 
management context, in which two databases are being joined and the 
user wants to include only those records that are different between the 
two. The content of the images does not matter, only whether they are 
different. 
Many knowns to one known (nK: 1K). This permutation is useful in a 
housekeeping function to determine whether a new image is already 
present in a database. The same utility exists for the reciprocal, one 
known to many knowns. 
One known to one known (1K: 1K). This is the permutation useful for 
verifying the identity of someone who claims to be someone, as at a 
checkpoint or registration desk. 
One unknown to many unknowns (1U: nU). This permutation has 
fewer obvious uses. It might be helpful for an intelligence agency seeking 
to determine leadership at mass demonstrations, or for an anti-gang unit 
of a law enforcement agency to determine gang leadership. If the same 
face shows up in imagery of every event, it is likely possible that the 
owner of the face has a leadership position.45 
B.  Narrowing the Class of Suspects 
Any criminal investigation must define a class of suspects. In some 
cases, the task will be easy: the perpetrator is caught in the act or is still 
on the scene with witnesses around. In other cases, the perpetrator has 
fled, and the police must talk to witnesses and perform various kinds of 
crime-scene forensic analysis to determine who might have committed 
the crime. When surveillance imagery is available, face-recognition can 
play a key role in this process. The investigator obtains a probe image 
from the surveillance recording, and inputs it into an automated face-
matching system. The system outputs one or more—usually several—
potential matches, assigning probabilities to each. This may result in a 
match with a single individual with high reliability. That may be enough 
 
 45. The difference between this permutation and the nU: nU permutation is that, in the 1U: 
nU scenario, a specific candidate already has been identified. 
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to establish probable cause for arrest46 and eventually to obtain a 
conviction. In other cases, however, the program indicates reasonably 
close matches with several faces. That is not enough, by itself, to establish 
probable cause to believe that any one of them committed the crime. It is, 
however, a useful step forward in the investigation: investigators can 
focus their attention on only a handful of individuals and use 
conventional techniques to figure out which one of them is responsible.47 
Most law enforcement agencies do not consider a positive match from 
current face-recognition technology to constitute admissible evidence. 
Instead, they use the computerized matches as an “investigative lead” for 
additional investigative steps. Presenting the results to witnesses is 
considered in the next Subsection. The enrolled database has metadata 
associated with each photograph, which usually includes a name, address, 
age, known occupations, and criminal history. The investigator can rule 
out some of the potential face-matches based on their location, and other 
circumstances, such as incarceration at the time of the crime. If the crime 
occurred in the tidewater region of Virginia, in Lancaster County, 
someone who is known not to venture far from a lifelong home in the far 
western part of the state, near Lee County, is an unlikely suspect. Types 
of crimes involved, derived in from suspects’ criminal histories, also may 
also be useful. 
C.  Supplementing Eyewitness Identification 
When witnesses exist, information from them is valuable in narrowing 
the search further. If the witness says that the perpetrator was a young 
black male, seventy-year-old white females can be excluded from the 
computer-generated photo array.48 
Then, computer-generated potential matches can be included in a 
lineup, or if the witness is shown only the top match, in a show up.49 
 
 46. But see Douglas A. Fretty, Face-Recognition Surveillance: A Moment of Truth for 
Fourth Amendment Rights In Public Places, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 430, 458 (2011) (arguing that 
face-matching algorithm with substantial failure rate cannot give rise to probable cause for 
detection or search). 
 47. Interview with Zachary Beaver, Esq., former Indiana State Police Sergeant (June 10, 
2020) (describing use of Indiana State Police face-recognition capability). 
 48. The reliability of the computerized face-matching system would be questionable, of 
course, if it selects a seventy-year-old white female as a potential match for a young black male. 
 49. A show up is the appearance of an individual before a witness in the field, as when 
police officers arrest a suspect and bring her to a witness to see if the witness can identify her. 
Clare Garvie, Garbage In, Garbage Out: Face Recognition on Flawed Data, GEO. L. CTR. ON 
PRIV. & TECH. (May 16, 2019), https://www.flawedfacedata.com/ [https://perma.cc/8A39-45FU]; 
State v Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 902–03 (N.J. 2011) (“Showups are essentially single-person 
lineups: a single suspect is presented to a witness to make an identification. Showups often occur 
at the scene of a crime soon after its commission.”); People v. Sammons, 949 N.W.2d 36, 80 n.1 
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Either lineup or show up can be accomplished by presenting the 
computer-generated images to the witnesses, or the subjects of the 
suggested matches can be rounded up physically (if they can be found 
and induced to cooperate) and presented in conventional face-to-face 
fashion. If a witness picks the defendant out of a computer-generated 
array of faces, there is no reason that the analysis legally should be any 
different from that applied to conventional lineups. 
Suggestiveness is a potential issue in these computer-generated 
lineups and show ups, just as it is in their conventional equivalents.50 If a 
witness is shown only one computer-selected image, the witness’s 
corroboration may be so closely tied to the computerized face-recognition 
match that it lacks independence.51 
In some cases, the police may be motivated to commission an artist’s 
sketch of a suspect’s face based on a combination of surveillance imagery 
and witness descriptions. The sketch might then be used as a probe image 
against an enrolled database. Reliability of the computerized match 
would depend on: (a) the resolution of the surveillance image; (b) the 
accuracy of the witness descriptions; (c) the accuracy of the artist’s 
rendition; and (d) the robustness of the matching algorithms. 
D.  Corroboration by Other Forensic Techniques 
Once a computerized face-match has identified someone as a person 
of interest, that person’s fingerprints can then be compared to a 
fingerprint database. The same thing can be done with DNA—if probable 
cause exists to obtain the DNA. A match of either the fingerprints or the 
DNA corresponding to the face-match would be strongly corroborative. 
E.  Field Identification 
In some cases, the police may detain a subject who refuses to identify 
himself or who provides an identification that the police suspect is false. 
Face-recognition technology can be useful in this setting because it 
enables the police to verify the subject’s identity. This would involve one-
known to one-known matching. 
The IJIS Catalog provides examples of useful one-to-one matching: 
matching an unknown face with one other face. This might be the case, 
for example, if a suspect claims she is not the person shown in a 
 
(Mich. 2020) (quoting Showup, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019)) (“A showup is ‘[a] 
police procedure in which a suspect is shown singly to a witness for identification.’”). 
 50. See discussion infra Section IV.E (analyzing caselaw on suggestiveness of lineups and 
show ups). Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 118, 132–33 (1967) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that corporeal lineups are more reliable than photograph arrays and that any method is 
more reliable if it presents multiple subjects rather than only one). 
 51. Sammons, 949 N.W.2d at 44–46 (extensively criticizing show ups as inherently 
suggestive, although not banning them altogether). 
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surveillance video. Face-recognition techniques can be applied both to 
the surveillance image and a newly created image of the suspect. In some 
cases, this has proven useful in situations where a perpetrator has worn a 
disguise or concealed her identity in other ways. Of course, the utility of 
this application requires reasonably good images for comparison. If the 
surveillance photos show someone wearing a facemask, a later, clean 
facial image of the suspect will be of little use. 
Verification of identity is another one-to-one application. It is useful 
wherever a legitimate need exists to confirm that someone is who she 
says she is, for example passport control at national borders or for facility 
entry. No database is required for this application, simply two images: 
one taken at the time of registration, such as a driver's license, and the 
other taken at the moment of identification. This obviously involves one-
to-one matching. It is used to activate iPhone 10 and above.52 
The police might also use the subject’s photograph as a probe image 
against an enrolled database, in one-unknown to many-knowns matching, 
to see if the subject is perhaps wanted on outstanding warrants or parole 
violations. This might occur as part of traffic stops, for example. An 
officer taking a driver’s license to do a quick check can use the 
photograph on the driver’s license as a probe image and run it against 
various enrolled databases. He could then match the known to unknowns 
for crimes without a suspect. This could be especially useful for incidents 
committed by out-of-state perpetrators with out-of-state licenses—but 
only if the officer has access to out-of-state enrolled databases. 
Another example of one-to-many matching is an effort to identify a 
subject outside the criminal prosecution context, for example, a disabled 
person found wandering, a lost child, or a corpse. Similarly, in the context 
of an arrestee or other person of interest, who refuses to give his name or 
to provide any other information, face-recognition can be used to 
establish identity.  
F.  Booking Arrestees 
One of the purposes of the post-arrest booking process is to determine 
if the arrestee is wanted for crimes other than the one for which he was 
arrested. Face-recognition can become a regular part of the booking 
process for arrestees. After an arrestee’s mug shot is taken, that 
photograph can be used as a probe photo against a many-known enrolled 
 
 52. Glenn Fleishman, Face ID on the iPhone X: Everything You Need to Know About 
Apple’s Facial Recognition, MACWORLD (Dec. 25, 2017), https://www.macworld.com/article/ 
3225406/face-id-iphone-x-faq.html [https://perma.cc/8DAY-7EK9] (describing how users 
unlock the iPhone 10). 
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databases. If a possible match occurs, it can easily be confirmed with 
fingerprints, and, if doubt still exists, with DNA.53 
The same process could be used for traffic and other “Terry” stops,54 
if face-recognition systems are fast enough that the “stop” does not turn 
into an “arrest.”55 In this way, face-recognition software would 
supplement the usual “wants and warrants” radio check.56 
G.  Scanning Crowds to Find Fugitives 
Real-time face surveillance involves scanning crowds or streams of 
unknown people, looking for matches with fugitives, suspects, or 
intelligence targets. This is the most expansive use of face-recognition 
technology and of many-to-many matching. It involves scanning the 
faces of everyone in a crowd or stream of individuals, with each face 
being compared with those in the database. This might be used, for 
example, to detect fugitives or undocumented migrants. The technical 
limitations on this kind of use relate mainly to the speed of processing. If 
the application must process faces present in long lines at a security 
checkpoint, a face-recognition application that takes significant time for 
each face is unacceptable. Over time, however, the technology will get 
faster, and this application will become more feasible. Commentators 
have expressed concern with police body cameras’ ability to acquire 
images of random faces,57 and use of the technology at the 2001 Super 
Bowl.58 
A modification of this application involves scanning not every face in 
a crowd or line, but only certain faces that have some indication 
warranting interest. 
 
 53. All inmates in Indiana are required to have a picture and fingerprints taken, and all 
violent crimes and felonies require a DNA sample. Beaver, supra note 26. 
 54. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–22 (1968) (holding that an investigatory “stop and 
frisk” is a Fourth Amendment seizure and search but does not require the probable cause necessary 
for an arrest; specific and articulable facts giving rise to reasonable suspicion suffice). 
 55. See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 358 (2015) (analyzing whether extending 
a Terry stop by seven or eight minutes to allow time for a dog sniff violated the Fourth 
Amendment, unless reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity existed); id. at 350 (quoting 
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)) (“A seizure justified only by a police-observed 
traffic violation, therefore, ‘become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably 
required to complete th[e] mission’ of issuing a ticket for the violation.”). 
 56. See United States v. Martinez-Cortes, 566 F.3d 767, 771 (8th Cir. 2009) (approving 
detention long enough to do wants and warrants check). 
 57. Katelyn Ringrose, Law Enforcement’s Pairing of Facial Recognition Technology with 
Body-Worn Cameras Escalates Privacy Concerns, 105 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 57, 58 (2019) 
(describing risk of general scanning of faces by police officers wearing body cameras). 
 58. Alexander T. Nguyen, Here’s Looking at You, Kid: Has Face-Recognition Technology 
Completely Outflanked the Fourth Amendment?, 7 VA. J.L. & TECH. 2, *1 (2002) (describing use 
of face-recognition system to scan 100,000 ticketholders at the 2001 Super Bowl). 
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H.  Artist Reconstructions 
Sometimes artist reconstructions based on witness descriptions are 
used as the probe photos.59 Compusketch is a commercial program, 
available since 1987, that creates face sketches from witness interviews. 
It is faster than a human artist and does not require a high level of skill in 
the user.60 A police department might interview a witness to create a 
Compusketch image and use it as the probe image in a face-recognition 
system.  
When an artist reconstruction is used as a probe image for a face-
recognition system, testing the reliability of any resulting face-match 
requires testing the reliability of the sketch, whether made by a human 
artist or by a sketching computer program. The question is: how faithfully 
does the sketch represent the description given by a human witness? The 
reliability of the description is a separate question. 
I.  Law Enforcement Products in the Marketplace 
Several commercial face-recognition products are marketed to law 
enforcement agencies and make the following claims: 
• NEC Corp. is a Japanese corporation that advertises, 
“NEC’s technology can match a subject’s face from 
images with resolutions as low as 24 pixels, even if 
the subject is on the move, or the face partially 
concealed by hats, scarves or glasses, or head angle. 
It also facilitates video surveillance in crowded, 
poorly lit areas at unmatched speed and volume in 
real time.”61 
• Idemia advertises:  
Face Expert enables trained forensic 
investigators, analysts, and detectives to 
solve crimes thanks to automatic face 
finding and tracking of photos or videos. 
Faces from images or videos can be 
matched against a database to identify a 
wanted or missing person. Once facial 
images are matched, analysts can link a 
suspect to a crime. The application 
provides the ability to navigate within the 
database to capitalize on information from 
 
 59. See Garvie, supra note 49; Klum, supra note 17. 
 60. See R. Bocklet, Suspect Sketches Computerized for Faster Identification, 35 LAW & 
ORDER, no. 8, Aug. 1987, at 61. 
 61. Face Recognition, NEC, https://www.nec.com/en/global/solutions/biometrics/face/ 
index.html [https://perma.cc/W47X-V7A3] (last visited Jan. 7, 2021). 
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previous searches. It can also help match 
recently booked offenders with unsolved 
cases. Easy to use and powerful, the system 
enables users to deal with cases using still 
images, videos, and difficult to process 
images. Its 3D modeling tool reconstructs 
a facial image from multiple partial views, 
while the image processing enhances poor 
quality pictures and non-frontal views.62  
Idemia reports that it scored well on NIST tests and 
is the “leading” provider of law enforcement 
solutions in the United States.63 
• Facefirst advertises “instant identification, smarter 
patrols, and safer streets.”64 It offers “mobile face-
recognition,” and reassures potential users that “face-
recognition doesn’t profile.” Use of it “minimize[s] 
lawyers and negative press.”65  
• Rank One Computing66 advertises face-recognition 
algorithms for law enforcement, refined to eliminate 
demographic bias. Its chief engineer, Scott Klum, 
has authored several academic papers on use of face-
recognition algorithms.67 Its algorithms were used in 
the program featured in the New York Times 
misidentification story reviewed in SectionVI.B. 
• Vigilant Solutions Facesearch,68 offers, “Images and 
analytics power investigations.” 
 
 62. Face Expert, IDEMIA, https://www.idemia.com/face-expert [https://perma.cc/3ZD6-
JN3B] (last visited Jan. 7, 2021). 
 63. Idemia Facial Recognition Algorithm Outperforms Other U.S. Government Agency 
Providers at Recent NIST Test, IDEMIA (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.idemia.com/press-release/ 
idemia-facial-recognition-algorithm-outperforms-other-us-government-agency-providers-recent-
nist-test-2019-03-26 [https://perma.cc/5XDJ-HAC3].  
 64. How to Calculate Face Recognition ROI for Law Enforcement, FACEFIRST, 
https://www.facefirst.com/blog/face-recognition-roi-law-enforcement [https://perma.cc/PK2X-
2832] (last visited Jan. 7, 2021). 
 65. What is the True Cost of a False Arrest for Law Enforcement Officials?, FACEFIRST, 
https://www.facefirst.com/blog/law-enforcement-cost-false-arrest-far-just-bad-press/ [https:// 
perma.cc/UNH3-AKEX ] (last visited Jan. 7, 2021). 
 66. Company Overview, RANK ONE COMPUTING, https://www.rankone.io/company/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZB9B-LF8F] (last visited Jan. 7, 2021). 
 67. Id.; see Klum, supra note 17; Klare et al., supra note 13. 
 68. Vigilant FaceSearch Identity Matching and Verification, MOTOROLA SOLUTIONS 
https://www.motorolasolutions.com/en_us/products/command-center-software/analysis-and-
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• Animetrics advertises software algorithms that allow 
law enforcement agencies to enhance probe photos 
incident to submitting them to databases.69 
• Clearview AI70 has stirred up the most controversy. 
It matches photographs taken on the spot against 3 
billion images from Facebook, YouTube, Venmo, 
and other websites.71 
BuzzFeed reported on use of Clearview by Illinois law enforcement: 
In Illinois, most of the more than 105 entities that used 
Clearview were local police departments. The two 
departments with the most searches, according to company 
data reviewed by BuzzFeed News, were the Macon County 
Sheriff’s Office, which had run nearly 2,000 searches as of 
late February, and the Naperville Police Department, which 
had scanned nearly 1,700 photos. . . . Several federal 
agencies’ field offices in the state, including the Chicago 
offices of the FBI and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms and Explosives, also used Clearview, according to 
data seen by BuzzFeed News.72 
In Mutnick v. Clearview AI, Inc.,73 David Mutnick sued, on behalf of 
a class, for an injunction against Clearview AI, arguing that its use 
violated the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA).74 
Clearview AI moved to dismiss the action as moot, after it cancelled all 
its contracts with anyone except law enforcement agencies and stopped 
using the system altogether in Illinois.75 
 
investigations/vigilant-facesearch-facial-recognition-system.html [https://perma.cc/V5RJ-6E6P] 
(last visited Jan. 7, 2021). 
 69. ForensicaGPS, ANIMETRICS, http://animetrics.com/?content=products/forensicaGPS 
[https://perma.cc/ML8R-TBXM] (last visited Jan. 7, 2021). 
 70. CLEARVIEW.AI, https://clearview.ai/ [https://perma.cc/7TY4-6BZ9] (last visited Jan. 7, 
2021) (advertising “Available now for Law Enforcement”). 
 71. Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company that Might End Privacy as We Know It, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-
facial-recognition.html [https://perma.cc/ZA6A-ZNXF] (describing Clearview AI). 
 72. Ryan Mac, et al., Clearview AI Has Promised To Cancel All Relationships With Private 
Companies, BUZZFEEDNEWS (May 7, 2020, 6:50 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ 
ryanmac/clearview-ai-no-facial-recognition-private-companies [https://perma.cc/Q4XQ-7X5K]. 
 73. No. 20-cv-512, 2020 WL 4676667 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 2020). 
 74. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/1 (LexisNexis 2020). 
 75. Defendants' Memorandum of Law, Mutnick, 2020 WL 6131216 (May 6, 2020) (No. 20-
cv-512) (opposing injunction and arguing that case is moot because of change in business 
practices to omit private entities as customers and to omit data on Illinois residents); Nick Statt, 
Clearview AI to Stop Selling Controversial Facial Recognition App to Private Companies, THE 
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Presumably, this represented an economic decision by Clearview AI 
that it was better off continuing to earn revenue from law enforcement 
uses outside Illinois rather than to risk a shutdown of its operation 
altogether. The case remains pending awaiting action on the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss. Facebook settled another class action under the same 
statute for $550 million earlier in 2020.76 
Many developmental tools using the popular programming language, 
Python, are available on the Web.77 This would enable more sophisticated 
agencies to develop their own computerized face-matching systems, 
using third party components, including training databases. 
IV.  LEGAL ANALYSIS 
The analytical framework for assessing the legality of computerized 
face-recognition in criminal prosecutions involves the following 
possibilities: 
• The law may limit collection of images of faces by 
law enforcement agencies;78  
• The law may limit the use of matches resulting from 
her computer comparison of facial images; 79 
• The law may limit law enforcement agencies’ use of 
computer software to match faces; 80 
• The law may limit the use of a computerized matches 
as evidence at trial because it violates the 
Confrontation Clause; 81 
 
VERGE (May 7, 2020, 8:29 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/5/7/21251387/clearview-ai-
law-enforcement-police-facial-recognition-illinois-privacy-law. 
 76. Jay Peters, Facebook to Pay $550 Million to Settle Privacy Lawsuit over Facial 
Recognition Tech, THE VERGE, (Jan. 29, 2020, 7:17 PM), https://www.theverge.com/ 
2020/1/29/21114358/facebook-550-million-settle-lawsuit-facial-recognition-technology-illinois 
[https://perma.cc/DH4Z-QR4A]. Section IV.C, infra, analyzes the Illinois statute and the 
Facebook case. 
 77. See Adrian Rosebrock, Face Recognition with OpenCV, Python, and Deep Learning, 
PYIMAGESEARCH (June 18, 2018), https://www.pyimagesearch.com/2018/06/18/face-recognition-
with-opencv-python-and-deep-learning/ [https://perma.cc/M5KG-6EUR] (providing tutorial and 
executable Python modules for face recognition). 
 78. See infra Section IV.D.4. 
 79. See infra Section IV.F.4. 
 80. See infra Section IV.C. 
 81. See infra Section IV.D.1. 
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• The law may limit use of computerized face-matches 
as evidence at trial because such evidence is 
inadmissible hearsay; 82 
• The law may limit the use of computerized face-
matches as evidence at trial because it violates the 
Fourth Amendment or broader privacy interests; 83 
• The law may limit the use of computerized face-
matches as evidence at trial because its probative 
value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect; 84 and 
• The law may limit the use of a computerized face-
match evidence at trial because the process 
producing such matches is unreliable.85 
Each of these possibilities depends upon the interplay of common law 
rights to privacy and against trespass, federal and state statutes focused 
on privacy—or on face-recognition software more specifically, on the 
rules of evidence, and on the Fourth and Sixth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution and their counterparts in state constitutions. 
The law of face-recognition in criminal procedure is still being 
crystallized. A much broader debate about the appropriate role of 
biometric identification techniques in a free society has implications for 
and has motivated some proposals for statutory restrictions on police use. 
But these have been reduced to statutory form in only a few places. 
Evaluating commentators’ proposals should depend on a careful 
assessment of how computerized face-recognition implicates privacy 
interests. 
Caselaw addressing computerize face-recognition in criminal 
prosecutions is sparse, unlike the more robust caselaw addressing the 
techniques in the commercial context. 
Pertinent caselaw from analogous identification techniques is 
abundant, however, and one can synthesize from this body of law basic 
principles to be applied to face-recognition. Fingerprint matches and, 
more recently, DNA matches are regularly used in criminal investigations 
and prosecutions. The touchstones for validating their reliability and 
justifying reliance on them can be adapted to computerized face-
recognition. 
The following Subsections begin by summarizing the caselaw and 
commentary on computerized face-recognition. Then they move to probe 
the claim that computerized face-recognition in the criminal justice 
 
 82. See infra Section IV.D.1. 
 83. See infra Section IV.D.4. 
 84. See infra Section IV.D.3. 
 85. See infra Section IV.E.1. 
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context infringes personal privacy interests, the hallmark of Fourth 
Amendment analysis, including its exclusionary rule for violations. 
Then, the Section evaluates federal and state statutes, following by 
application of Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause law to 
computerized face-recognition, and follows that analysis by its Fourth 
Amendment counterpart. Finally, the Section analyzes the abundant 
caselaw on other forms of identification based on appearance and 
physical artifacts to synthesize some touchstones to judge whether 
computerized face-matching has sufficient reliability to support a 
conviction. 
A.  Caselaw and Commentary 
Caselaw on the use of computerized face-recognition evidence in 
criminal cases is sparse. In Blane v. Division of Motor Vehicles,86 the 
Delaware common pleas court rejected an appeal from a driver’s license 
suspension. The court approved use of primitive face-recognition 
software to determine that the appellant had fraudulently applied for a 
driver’s license by pretending to be someone else.87 
United States v. Gibson88 rejected a speedy trial claim by a defendant 
who was arrested almost 15 years after he was indicted, based on face-
recognition technology applied to a driver’s license and passport 
application.89 
In another case, Hutcherson v. State,90 the court expressed doubt about 
the reliability of the technology. The Arkansas supreme court denied a 
habeas corpus petition by an inmate seeking application of face-
recognition technology to a video recording, which, he claimed, would 
show that he was not the perpetrator of an armed robbery.  
While appellant refers to advances in facial-recognition 
technology, he does not demonstrate that the new technology 
is accepted in this state or that it is substantially more 
probative than that available at the time of trial, that the 
videotape is available with an unbroken chain-of-custody, or 
that the tape reveals facial features capable of being 
enhanced through the application of a particular technology. 
In short, he has not established that there is new technology 
 
 86. No. CPU5-10-001253, 2011 WL 13175124 (Del. C.P. June 30, 2011). 
 87. Id. at *3–*4; accord, United States v. Badiane, 725 Fed. App. 828, 831–35 (11th Cir. 
2018) (allowing testimony of past passport fraud, based on face-recognition software). 
 88. No. 8:00-cr-442-T-27AEP, 2016 WL 845272 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 4, 2016). 
 89. Id. at *2. 
 90. 2014 Ark. 326, 438 S.W.3d 909. 
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that would exclude him as the perpetrator of the robbery of 
the Texaco station.91 
Law-review92 and popular-press and media commentary,93 on the 
other hand, is abundant, and mostly negative. 
B.  Privacy Concerns: Separating the Wheat from the Chaff 
The upwelling alarm about data privacy focuses on any capture of 
 
 91. Hutcherson, 438 S.W.3d at 913. 
 92. E.g., Blake A. Klinkner, Facial Recognition Technology, Biometric Identifiers, and 
Standing to Litigate Invasions of Digital Privacy, 42 WYO. LAW. 44 (2019); Mark Lanterman, 
Facial Recognition Technology Brings Security & Privacy Concerns, 74 BENCH & B. MINN. 12 
(2017); John Nawara, Machine Learning: Face Recognition Technology Evidence in Criminal 
Trials, 49 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 601 (2011); Fretty, supra note 46; Nguyen, supra note 58; Kevin 
Davis, Face Time, 103-Oct A.B.A. J. 16 (2017); Robert H. Thornburg, Face Recognition 
Technology: The Potential Orwellian Implications and Constitutionality of Current Uses Under 
the Fourth Amendment, 20 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUT. & INFO. L. 321 (2002); Claudia Cuador, From 
Street Photography to Face Recognition: Distinguishing Between the Right to Be Seen and the 
Right to Be Recognized, 41 NOVA L. REV. 237 (2017); Bridget Mallon, Every Breath You Take, 
Every Move You Make, I’ll Be Watching You: The Use of Face Recognition Technology, 48 VILL. 
L. REV. 955 (2003); Mohammed Osman & Edward Imwinkelried, Facial Recognition Systems, 
50-3 CRIM. L. BULL. Art. 11 (2014); Christopher W. Savage., Washington Enacts First-In-Nation 
State Law Regulating Governmental Use of Facial Recognition, 32 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 
21 (2020); Elias Wright, The Future of Facial Recognition Is Not Fully Known: Developing 
Privacy and Security Regulatory Mechanisms for Facial Recognition in the Retail Sector, 29 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611 (2019). 
 93. E.g., Kashmir Hill, Wrongfully Accused by an Algorithm, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/24/technology/facial-recognition-arrest.html [https://perma. 
cc/YSL3-QJF7]; Karen Weise & Natasha Singer, Amazon Pauses Police Use of Its Facial 
Recognition Software, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/10/ 
technology/amazon-facial-recognition-backlash.html [https://perma.cc/8MZF-DP5R]; Shira 
Ovide, A Case for Banning Facial Recognition, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2020), https://www.ny 
times.com/2020/06/09/technology/facial-recognition-software.html [https://perma.cc/4UPJ-EP48]; 
Davey Alba, A.C.L.U. Accuses Clearview AI of Privacy ‘Nightmare Scenario,’ N.Y. TIMES, May 
20, 2020, at B3; Julia Horowitz, Tech Companies Are Still Helping Police Scan Your Face, CNN 
(July 3, 2020, 8:36 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/03/tech/facial-recognition-police/index 
.html [https://perma.cc/69T6-9RZU]; Brian Fung, Democratic Lawmakers Propose Nationwide 
Facial Recognition Ban, CNN (June 25, 2020, 1:37 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/25/tech/ 
facial-recognition-legislation-markey/index.html [https://perma.cc/M3WH-2PTN]; Clare Duffy, 
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personally identifiable information and any use of it.94 Much of the 
opprobrium directed at Facebook seems motivated by the ubiquity and 
quality of its face-matching. Publicly expressed concerns extend to law 
enforcement uses that pose no more of a privacy threat than fingerprints 
or DNA matching; yet fingerprints and DNA are regular features of the 
criminal justice system. Indeed, some states have enacted statutes that 
limit or prohibit use of face-matching by law enforcement.95 
Figuring out where face-recognition fits in the law should begin with 
an assessment of the particular risks to privacy that the different 
applications present, followed by an evaluation of prescriptions already 
adopted for other personally identifying data such as fingerprints and 
DNA. Then, those privacy risks should be balanced against public 
benefits from use of particular technologies. It is not clear to this author 
how public welfare is served by allowing a robber to go undetected or a 
fugitive to remain at large. The legitimate concern is prosecution of the 
wrong subject and face-recognition reduces the chances of that. 
Working through the application typology developed in Section III, 
one can see privacy concerns are attenuated or nonexistent with respect 
to many of the applications, and that they are likely outweighed by law 
enforcement interests in most of the other applications.  
Verification of identity is an easy case. The subject has voluntarily 
allowed his photograph to be taken when he got his driver’s license or 
applied for a passport, and he is voluntarily allowing his image to be 
recorded again at the point where he presents himself to verify his 
identity. Some take the position that one should not constantly have to 
identify himself as he moves about in a free society. The author, for 
example, resents having to present a photo ID when he checks into a 
hotel. But the invasion of privacy occurs, not because of the face-
recognition technology, but because of the identification requirement 
itself. If the invasion is greater than should be tolerated in a free society, 
the identification requirement should be eliminated, not the particular 
technology used for it, as many voting rights advocates argue.96 
A different set of considerations arises with applications intended to 
identify an unknown person who is present, as with a disabled person, a 
child, a corpse, or someone who has been detained by law enforcement 
officers and refuses to identify himself. When the lack of identification is 
 
 94. See Brian Fung, The Unlikely Activist Behind the Nation’s Toughest Privacy Law Isn’t 
Done Yet, CNN (Oct. 10, 2019, 10:12 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/10/tech/alastair-
mactaggart/index.html [https://perma.cc/GG24-AX5N] (reporting on crusade of California 
privacy activist Alastair Mactaggart). 
 95. See KELSEY Y. SANTAMARIA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46541, FACIAL RECOGNITION 
TECHNOLOGY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT: SELECT CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS (2020) 
(finding states have regulated law enforcement's use of facial recognition technology).  
 96. See ACLU, Oppose Voter ID Legislation - Fact Sheet (May 2017), https://www.aclu 
.org/other/oppose-voter-id-legislation-fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/LH7H-NS9U]. 
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the result of unwillingness, the target has unambiguously asserted a 
privacy interest. Identifying him nevertheless invades that interest. 
Whether the law should allow the invasion involves competing interests 
no different from those involved in any law enforcement stop: whenever 
an agent of law enforcement stops someone and asks for identification, 
or goes further and takes fingerprints or a DNA sample. There is no 
reason that the law enforcement privilege of matching a face when the 
target is a suspect, should be different from the privilege to demand a 
driver’s license, fingerprints, or DNA. The interest of a perpetrator in not 
being identified is clear. So, on the other hand, is the public interest. 
The law requiring reasonable suspicion for law enforcement stops and 
requiring probable cause for arrests is highly developed, the intrusion on 
liberty interests resulting from accurate identification of faces does not 
seem to be significantly greater than the deprivation occasioned by the 
stop or the arrest itself. 
The greatest and most legitimate privacy concerns arise from the 
many applications for crowd searching. When such applications are fully 
deployed, it will no longer be possible to hide in a crowd. That will be 
the last straw in eliminating anonymity that is available in urban society, 
and which has been available, in some fashion, for centuries. In the 19th 
century, if one developed an unsavory reputation—even to the point of 
having outstanding arrest warrants—one could go West and easily 
establish a new identity without much fear of being discovered. With 
current technology, however, the time required to do computerized face-
matching for a crowd or stream of people passing a checkpoint97 is likely 
to deter its routine use.  
This analysis suggests that the core concept of legal limitations on 
face-recognition might center on the core concept of limitations on 
electronic surveillance. For wiretaps and access to stored records alike, 
law enforcement agents must identify a particular target and justify their 
interest in him. It is certainly not permissible under the Fourth 
Amendment simply to listen in on every voice communication or to read 
every email. Even the NSA’s notorious Stellar Wind does not do this; it 
analyzes traffic patterns, not content. 
Fingerprint and DNA technologies limit privacy because they make it 
difficult for someone to start over with a new identity—a common 
practice in the Old West. Frustrating that goal of anonymity or 
pseudonymity, however, depends on the availability of cost-effective 
one-unknown to many-known matching, which has been possible with 
both types of biometric information only for a little more than a decade. 
 
 97. See discussion supra Section II.D (explaining how to calculate face-matching 
processing speeds). 
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Face-matching technology limits privacy by making it impossible for 
someone to hide in a crowd. Frustration of that privacy interest likewise 
depends upon the efficacy of one-unknown to many-known matching. 
Privacy interests have only an attenuated relationship to Confrontation 
Clause analysis. A potential witness whom the defense claims right to 
confront has a privacy interest in not being bothered or compelled to 
reveal information. Privacy, however, is at the core of a Fourth 
Amendment analysis, after United States v. Katz.98 
C.  Federal and State Statutes 
Currently, no federal statutes limit law enforcement the use of face-
recognition.99 Several states and municipalities restrict the use of face-
recognition technology by the private sector100 and, less often, law 
enforcement agencies.101 Proposed legislation is springing up all over the 
place.102  
Washington S.B. 6280103 is a paradigm of a statute directly addressing 
face-matching by law enforcement. It regulates the use of face-
recognition technology by state and local government. The statute 
requires that uses of face-recognition computer software be reported to 
the legislative body with jurisdiction over the agency user.104 This 
reporting presumably occurs once, before the product is used at all, and 
not for each match. 
Once notification is given the user-agency must prepare an 
“accountability report”, including the name of the system and its general 
capabilities;105 statements about the data inputs and outputs;106 
description of proposed use of the system, including what decisions are 
associated with it; and a “clear use and data management policy.” The 
 
 98. 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (replacing “trespass” analysis with “privacy” analysis for 
Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure law). 
 99. But see Ringrose, supra note 57, at 64–65 (speculative and summary suggestion that 
federal Video Privacy Protection Act could require compartmentalizing video imagery collected 
by police body cameras). 
 100. Slaight & LeCloux, supra note 40, at 11–12 (citing various local and state government 
bans on face-recognition technology). 
 101. Id. at 14 (Criminal Procedure section summarizing state bills that would limit use of 
face-recognition evidence in criminal trials). 
 102. Id. at 13 (summarizing proposed face-recognition legislation applicable to law 
enforcement agencies); see also Zeb Zankel, San Francisco Bans Facial Recognition Technology 
Amidst Wave of Government Scrutiny, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP: PRIV. & SEC. BLOG (May 
23, 2019), https://www.dwt.com/blogs/privacy--security-law-blog/2019/05/san-francisco-bans-
facial-recognition [https://perma.cc/ZGQ7-2QJR]. 
 103. 2019 WA S.B. 6280 S.B. 6280, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2020). 
 104. Id. at § 3(1).  
 105. Id. at § 2(1). 
 106. Id. at § 3(2)(b)(i). 
 
72 JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY LAW & POLICY [Vol. 25 
 
report must include description of the agency’s training procedures,107 its 
testing procedures,108 and information on the rate of false matches and 
how the agency will address them.109 The agency must allow public 
review and comment on the accountability report and update it every two 
years and submit it to the legislative authority.110  
An agency using face-recognition software to make decisions with 
legal effects must “ensure that those decisions are subject to meaningful 
human review.”111 
It requires vendors to make available an Application Programming 
Interface (API) that permit tests of “accuracy and unfair performance 
differences across distinct subpopulations.”112 The API requirement, 
however, does not require the vendor “to disclose proprietary data.”113  
The statute requires disclosure to criminal defendants of “their use of 
a facial recognition service on a criminal defendant.”114  
A judge issuing a surveillance warrant must report the facts to the state 
administrator for the courts.115  
An agency may not use face-recognition to engage in “ongoing 
surveillance, conduct real-time or near real-time identification, or start 
persistent tracking,” unless it obtains a warrant, unless exigent 
circumstances exist, or unless it obtains judicial authorization for limited 
purposes such as locating or identifying a missing or deceased person.116  
The statute declares that a single match from a computer system does 
not constitute probable cause for arrest or warrants.117 Additionally, 
agencies may not use face-recognition based on a sketch118 nor 
substantively manipulate a probe image.119 
Elsewhere, more general biometric privacy statutes are being applied 
to face-recognition. BIPA120 is one of the most stringent statutes in the 
country limiting computerized face-recognition. In 2020, Facebook 
settled a class action lawsuit brought under the statute for $550 million,121 
 
 107. Id. at § 3(d)(vii). 
 108. Id. at § 3(e) 
 109. Id. at § 3(f). 
 110. Id. at § 3(3)–(4). 
 111. Id. at § 4. 
 112. Id. at § 6(1)(a). 
 113. Id. at § (6)(b). 
 114. Id. at § 8. 
 115. Id. at § 8(3). 
 116. Id. at § 11(1). 
 117. Id. at § 11(5). 
 118. Id. at § 11(6). 
 119. Id. at § 11(7). 
 120. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/1 (LexisNexis 2020). 
 121. Peters, supra note 76. 
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after the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed 
class certification and standing.122  
The court described Facebook’s face-recognition capability: 
In 2010, Facebook launched a feature called Tag 
Suggestions. If Tag Suggestions is enabled, Facebook 
may use facial-recognition technology to analyze whether 
the user’s Facebook friends are in photos uploaded by that 
user. When a photo is uploaded, the technology scans the 
photo and detects whether it contains images of faces. If 
so, the technology extracts the various geometric data 
points that make a face unique, such as the distance 
between the eyes, nose, and ears, to create a face signature 
or map. The technology then compares the face signature 
to faces in Facebook’s database of user face templates 
(i.e., face signatures that have already been matched to the 
user’s profiles). If there is a match between the face 
signature and the face template, Facebook may suggest 
tagging the person in the photo.123 
The plaintiffs claimed that Facebook violated “sections 15(a) and 
15(b) of BIPA by collecting, using, and storing biometric 
identifiers. . . from their photos without obtaining a written release and 
without establishing a compliant retention schedule.”124The court of 
appeals affirmed the district court’s finding of standing,125 and its 
certification of the class.126 
Remarkably enough, one district court concluded that the inclusion of 
the victim’s DNA in a law enforcement database violated the Fourth 
Amendment, because of DNA database restrictions in a state statute.127 
Paradoxically, Illinois also has a marijuana statute that encourages the 
use of face-recognition technology.128 Other states have broadened their 
privacy statutes to include biometric data, but those statutes do not 
usually regulate law enforcement agencies.129 
 
 122. Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264, 1277 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 123. Id. at 1268. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 1274. 
 126. Id. at 1277. 
 127. See United States v. Davis, 657 F. Supp. 2d 630, 665 (D. Md. 2009) (holding that 
retention of defendant’s DNA in database, obtained in a separate case where he was a victim, 
violated his Fourth Amendment guaranteed privacy interests). 
 128.  Slaight & LeCloux, supra note 40, at 11 (discussing Ill. statute requiring face-
recognition in marijuana outlets). 
 129. See, e.g., Stop Hacks & Improve Electronic Data Security Act (SHIELD Act), 2019 
N.Y. Laws 117 (2019) (detailing safeguards created to prevent data breaches, though not limiting 
law enforcement use of face-recognition technology). 
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D.  Constitutional Limitations 
The Constitution circumscribes the use of computerized face-
recognition evidence in two respects, under the Confrontation Clause and 
under the Fourth Amendment limitations on searches and seizures. The 
Confrontation Clause comes into play because evidence of a 
computerized face-match arguably constitutes hearsay, and to admit it 
violates the Confrontation Clause because it denies the defendant an 
opportunity to cross examine the originator of the evidence. The Fourth 
Amendment comes into play because obtaining the image of a suspect's 
face may be a search.  
1.  Confrontation Clause 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees 
that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him.”130 This Confrontation 
Clause guarantee applies to the states.131 That right has been broadened 
by the courts to exclude evidence that has not been subjected to cross 
examination to test its reliability. Thus, as interpreted by the courts, the 
Confrontation Clause is similar to the common law rule excluding 
hearsay: an out of court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted therein. Both proceed from the belief that cross examination is 
the best test of reliability of evidence, and both define their scope in terms 
of what is an out of court “statement” offered later to “prove the truth of 
the matter asserted therein.” The scope of hearsay exclusions is broader 
than the scope of confrontational coverage, however. They both apply to 
out of court statements offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted 
therein, but the Supreme Court has held that states may prohibit hearsay 
evidence more broadly than the Confrontation Clause does.132 
For example, consider the situation where the police interview a 
witness and the witness says, “I saw the defendant kill the victim.” If the 
police later offer to testify as to the statement, without the witness being 
present in court, a classic case for exclusion is hearsay is presented. The 
witness statement was made out of court and is being offered to prove the 
proposition that the defendant killed the victim. The defendant does not 
have the opportunity to confront the witness, because she is not in court. 
One can apply this example to the computerized face-recognition 
context. A state police intelligence unit runs a probe image from a 
surveillance video recording against an enrolled database. The system 
produces several possible matches. The police take the most probable 
 
 130. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 38 (2004). 
 131. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407–08 (1965). 
 132. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (“[N]ot all hearsay implicates the Sixth Amendment’s core 
concerns.”); id. at 68–69 (States remain free to adapt hearsay rules.). 
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match and charge the defendant based on it. What the computerized face-
match system “says” is a possible match is an out of court statement. If 
that match, itself, is offered into evidence, it is being offered to prove the 
truth of the proposition that the defendant was the perpetrator. So, 
denying the defendant the opportunity to cross examine the computerized 
face-matching procedure violates the rule against hearsay and, probably, 
the Confrontation Clause. 
When the witness makes an in-court identification, the Confrontation 
Clause is not violated, because the witness is available for cross 
examination. It is only when the identification is made out of court that 
questions under the Clause arise. In State v. Allen,133 the North Carolina 
intermediate court held that allowing evidence of an out of court 
identification based on a photo array violated the Confrontation Clause, 
but this was a harmless error because of other evidence implicating the 
defendant.134Evidence can escape Confrontation Clause requirements for 
an opportunity to cross examine when they are not testimonial,135 or when 
they are not offered to prove the truth of the matter they assert.136 
The Supreme Court presented United States v. Wade,137 as a right to 
counsel case. A criminal defendant has a right to counsel at critical stages 
of an investigation or prosecution focused on him. The lineup in Wade 
was such a crucial event that also implicated the right to confront. Having 
counsel at a particular stage affords an opportunity to confront witnesses 
and other evidence. In Wade, the Supreme Court linked the right to 
counsel at pre-trial proceedings such as lineups with the right to 
confront.138 The right to counsel, like the right to confront witnesses, is 
 
 133. 614 S.E.2d 361 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005). 
 134. Id. at 367. 
 135. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51–52 (describing Sixth Amendment application to “testimonial” 
out of court statements; observing that some excludable hearsay statements would not be 
testimonial). 
 136. The Confrontation Clause excludes hearsay, which is an out of court statement offered 
“to prove the truth of the matter asserted” therein. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).  
 137. 388 U.S. 218, 223–24 (1967). 
 138. Id. at 226–27. 
[T]he principle of Powell v. Alabama and succeeding cases requires that we 
scrutinize any pre-trial confrontation of the accused to determine whether the 
presence of his counsel is necessary to preserve the defendant's basic right to a 
fair trial as affected by his right meaningfully to cross examine the witnesses 
against him and to have effective assistance of counsel at the trial itself. It calls 
upon us to analyze whether potential substantial prejudice to defendant's rights 
inheres in the particular confrontation and the ability of counsel to help avoid 
that prejudice. 
Id. at 227. 
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contained in the Sixth Amendment.139 Subsequent case law uses Wade in 
the context of confrontation clause controversies as much as right to 
counsel controversies. Indeed, a “Wade hearing”140 provides an 
opportunity to confront pre-trial identification procedures. 
But it is not that simple and is not that favorable for the accused. For 
one thing, there is a substantial body of caselaw that holds that out of 
court computerized analysis is not subject to the hearsay rule of the 
confrontation clause, either because it is not a “statement” or because it 
is not directly used as evidence. Similar treatment of computerize face-
matching matches is likely, especially because, under current practice in 
the current state of technology, it is rare for the prosecution to offer the 
computer match directly as evidence.141 Instead, the prosecution uses the 
computer face-match as a lead to obtain other evidence, including, most 
prominently, live witness identification in court or through more 
conventional out of court procedures such as lineups. 
Confrontation Clause analysis is muddied by several decisions 
holding that computer-generated evidence is not hearsay, because it does 
not involve human intervention. These cases reason that only human 
adjustments to variables and human-selected options in running computer 
programs should be subject to cross examination.142 
This is not the right conclusion. The validity of computer-generated 
evidence usually depends on the appropriateness of decisions made by 
the computer programmer. Even a simple spreadsheet summation 
function may produce the wrong answer if the designer of the spreadsheet 
has input the wrong equation. In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,143 the 
Supreme Court rejected the argument that there “is a difference, for 
Confrontation Clause purposes, between testimony recounting historical 
events, which is ‘prone to distortion or manipulation,’ and the testimony 
at issue here, which is the ‘resul[t] of neutral, scientific testing.”144 In 
holding that the Confrontation Clause required an opportunity to cross 
examine a state expert who vouched for analysis showing a drug to be 
cocaine, the Court discussed the possibility of flawed forensic tests and 
 
 139. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  
 140. Section IV.E.2, infra, explains “Wade hearings.” 
 141. See discussion supra Part III. 
 142. E.g., State v. Kandutsch, 799 N.W.2d 865, 879 (Wis. 2011) (citing State v. Armstead, 
432 So. 2d 837, 840 (La. 1983)) (“Computer-generated records do not implicate any of [Laurence 
Tribe’s four testimonial] ‘infirmities’ when the evidence is not the product of human 
intervention.”); see also id. (footnote omitted) (“A record created as a result of a computerized or 
mechanical process cannot lie. It cannot forget or misunderstand. Although data may be lost or 
garbled as a result of some malfunction, such a malfunction would go to the weight of the 
evidence, not its admissibility.”). 
 143. 557 U.S. 305 (2009). 
 144. Id. at 317 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 29). 
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the need for cross examination to ferret out such flaws.145 
In dissent, Justice Kennedy argued, 
The Confrontation Clause is not designed, and does not 
serve, to detect errors in scientific tests. That should 
instead be done by conducting a new test. Or, if a new test 
is impossible, the defendant may call his own expert to 
explain to the jury the test’s flaws and the dangers of 
relying on it. And if, in an extraordinary case, the 
particular analyst's testimony is necessary to the defense, 
then, of course, the defendant may subpoena the 
analyst.146 
The majority holding the opposite view implies that the Confrontation 
Clause, indeed, empowers cross examination of scientific evidence. But 
that only gets a defendant so far. When the computer-generated matches 
themselves are not offered as evidence, challenging the technology faces 
additional hurdles. First, and most significantly, a motion to exclude the 
computer-generated matches is not available because they are not being 
offered into evidence.147 
As this Article explains repeatedly, law enforcement face-recognition 
products do not produce a single match, but instead produce an array of 
possible matches, with probabilities assigned to each image in the 
array.148 Because of that limitation on the technology, law enforcement 
agencies use face-recognition products merely as a first or intermediate 
step in identification.149 They present the array output from the computer 
program to a human witness for more definitive identification.150 In some 
cases, the persons identified in the array are physically brought into the 
presence of the witness for a traditional lineup. In that case, the software 
is used to select the members of the lineup. In either event, it is the witness 
identification that is introduced in evidence, not the computer-generated 
array itself. 
 
 145. Id. at 318–19. But see Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 51 (2012) (distinguishing 
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, because scientific results in those cases were introduced into 
evidence). 
 146. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 337. 
 147.  Kaitlin Jackson, Challenging Facial Recognition Software in Criminal Court, THE 
CHAMPION, July 2019, at 14, 17–18, https://www.nacdl.org/getattachment/548c697c-fd8e-4b8d-
b4c3-2540336fad94/challenging-facial-recognition-software-in-criminal-court_july-2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JU8E-2DZY]. 
 148. See supra text accompanying note 39; Jackson, supra note 147, at 17–18 (FBI 
description of use). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 17–18. 
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Therefore, the Sixth Amendment right to confront is involved only 
indirectly, if at all. The challenger does have an opportunity to confront 
the witness who made an identification by her own perceptions from 
whatever the computer program generated. The challenger must sustain 
the proposition that the Sixth Amendment extends, not only to the witness 
testimony, but also to the basis for that testimony. 
2.  Excluding Basis of Testimony Under Williams v. Illinois 
That argument flies in the face of Williams v. Illinois.151 In that case, 
a split Supreme Court held that admitting expert testimony based on 
third-party lab DNA results did not violate the Confrontation Clause. 
Justice Alito’s plurality opinion set the stage for the outcome in its first 
paragraph: 
In this case, we decide whether Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004), precludes an expert witness from 
testifying in a manner that has long been allowed under the 
law of evidence. Specifically, does Crawford bar an expert 
from expressing an opinion based on facts about a case that 
have been made known to the expert but about which the 
expert is not competent to testify? We also decide whether 
Crawford substantially impedes the ability of prosecutors to 
introduce DNA evidence and thus may effectively relegate 
the prosecution in some cases to reliance on older, less 
reliable forms of proof.152 
The Court summarized what happened: 
In petitioner’s bench trial for rape, the prosecution 
called an expert who testified that a DNA profile produced 
by an outside laboratory, Cellmark, matched a profile 
produced by the state police lab using a sample of 
petitioner's blood. On direct examination, the expert 
testified that Cellmark was an accredited laboratory and 
that Cellmark provided the police with a DNA profile. The 
expert also explained the notations on documents admitted 
as business records, stating that, according to the records, 
vaginal swabs taken from the victim were sent to and 
received back from Cellmark. The expert made no other 
statement that was offered for the purpose of identifying 
the sample of biological material used in deriving the 
profile or for the purpose of establishing how Cellmark 
handled or tested the sample. Nor did the expert vouch for 
 
 151. 567 U.S. 50 (2012). 
 152. Id. at 56. 
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the accuracy of the profile that Cellmark produced. 
Nevertheless, petitioner contends that the expert’s 
testimony violated the Confrontation Clause as interpreted 
in Crawford.153 
The case did not involve matching by the third-party lab—matching 
was done by the state police lab personnel who testified. The third-party 
lab simply produced a DNA profile from the sample sent by the state 
police, which sample then was compared by the state police with its DNA 
database. 
On cross examination, Lambatos, the state’s expert, 
confirmed that she did not conduct or observe any of the 
testing on the vaginal swabs, and that her testimony relied 
on the DNA profile produced by Cellmark. Id. at 59. She 
stated that she trusted Cellmark to do reliable work because 
it was an accredited lab, but she admitted she had not seen 
any of the calibrations or work that Cellmark had done in 
deducing a male DNA profile from the vaginal swabs. Id. at 
59–62.154 
The defense objected, based on lack of foundation for the expert 
testimony.155 The Court, noting Bullcoming v. New Mexico156 and 
Melendez–Diaz,157 held that introducing scientific evidence to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted therein, without producing the “authors” for 
cross examination, violated the Confrontation Clause.158 
The Court then proceeded to explain the purpose of the historical 
practice of allowing expert witnesses to testify based on hypothetical 
questions. The hypothetical questions avoided the need to prove the facts 
underlying the expert’s opinion.159 “Modern rules of evidence continue 
to permit experts to express opinions based on facts about which they lack 
personal knowledge, but these rules dispense with the need for 
hypothetical questions.”160 
The Court narrowed the Confrontation Clause problem. Expert 
Lambatos’s reference to vaginal swabs violated “petitioner’s 
confrontation right because Lambatos lacked personal knowledge that the 
profile produced by Cellmark was based on the vaginal swabs taken from 
the victim.”161  
 
 153. Id. at 56–57. 
 154. Id. at 62. 
 155. Id. at 61. 
 156. 564 U.S. 647 (2011). 
 157. 557 U.S. 305 (2009). 
 158. Williams, 567 U.S. at 65–66. 
 159. Id. at 67–69. 
 160. Id. at 69. 
 161. Id. at 72. 
80 JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY LAW & POLICY [Vol. 25 
 
The Court acknowledged a significant workaround to the general 
immunity of lab results forming the basis of expert testimony, referring 
to FED. R. EVID. 703: 
Under that Rule, ‘basis evidence’ that is not admissible 
for its truth may be disclosed even in a jury trial under 
appropriate circumstances. The purpose for allowing this 
disclosure is that it may “assis[t] the jury to evaluate the 
expert’s opinion.” Advisory Committee’s 2000 Notes on 
Fed. Rule Evid. 703, 28 U.S.C. App., p. 361. The Rule 703 
approach, which was controversial when adopted, is based 
on the idea that the disclosure of basis evidence can help the 
factfinder understand the expert’s thought process and 
determine what weight to give to the expert’s opinion. For 
example, if the factfinder were to suspect that the expert 
relied on factual premises with no support in the record, or 
that the expert drew an unwarranted inference from the 
premises on which the expert relied, then the probativeness 
or credibility of the expert's opinion would be seriously 
undermined.162 
Independently, the Court articulated a further important exception to 
the Sixth Amendment, even if the lab evidence had been introduced at 
trial. This was so because the lab results were not generated “for the 
purpose of proving the guilt of a particular criminal defendant at trial.”163 
Justice Kagan dissented:164 
Under this Court’s prior analysis, the substance of the 
report could come into evidence only if Williams had a 
chance to cross examine the responsible analyst. 
But that is not what happened. Instead, the prosecutor 
used Sandra Lambatos—a state-employed scientist who had 
not participated in the testing—as the conduit for this piece 
of evidence. Lambatos came to the stand after two other state 
analysts testified about forensic tests they had performed. 
One recounted how she had developed a DNA profile of 
Sandy Williams from a blood sample drawn after his arrest. 
And another told how he had confirmed the presence of 
(unidentified) semen on the vaginal swabs taken from L.J. 
All this was by the book: Williams had an opportunity to 
cross examine both witnesses about the tests they had run. 
But of course, the State still needed to supply the missing 
link—it had to show that DNA found in the semen on L.J.’s 
vaginal swabs matched Williams’s DNA. To fill that gap, the 
 
 162. Id. at 78. 
 163. Id. at 84. 
 164. Id. at 118 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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prosecutor could have called the analyst from Cellmark to 
testify about the DNA profile she had produced from the 
swabs. But instead, the State called Lambatos as an expert 
witness and had her testify that the semen on those swabs 
contained Sandy Williams’s DNA: 
[quoting testimony] . . .   
And so it was Lambatos, rather than any Cellmark 
employee, who informed the trier of fact that the testing of 
L.J.’s vaginal swabs had produced a male DNA profile 
implicating Williams. 
Have we not already decided this case? Lambatos’s 
testimony is functionally identical to the “surrogate 
testimony” that New Mexico in Bullcoming, which did 
nothing to cure the problem identified in Melendez–Diaz 
(which, for its part, straightforwardly applied our decision in 
Crawford). Like the surrogate witness in Bullcoming, 
Lambatos “could not convey what [the actual analyst] knew 
or observed about the events ..., i.e., the particular test and 
testing process he employed.165 
She continued with a hypothetical: 
Consider a prosaic example not involving scientific 
experts. An eyewitness tells a police officer investigating an 
assault that the perpetrator had an unusual, star-shaped 
birthmark over his left eye. The officer arrests a person 
bearing that birthmark (let’s call him Starr) for committing 
the offense. And at trial, the officer takes the stand and 
recounts just what the eyewitness told him. Presumably the 
plurality would agree that such testimony violates the 
Confrontation Clause unless the eyewitness is unavailable 
and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross 
examine him. Now ask whether anything changes if the 
officer couches his testimony in the following way: “I 
concluded that Starr was the assailant because a reliable 
eyewitness told me that the assailant had a star-shaped 
birthmark and, look, Starr has one just like that.” Surely that 
framing would make no constitutional difference, even 
though the eyewitness’s statement now explains the basis for 
the officer’s conclusion. It remains the case that the 
prosecution is attempting to introduce a testimonial 
statement that has no relevance to the proceedings apart from 
its truth—and that the defendant cannot cross examine the 
person who made it. Allowing the admission of this evidence 
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would end-run the Confrontation Clause, and make a parody 
of its strictures. 
And that example, when dressed in scientific clothing, is 
no different from this case. The Cellmark report identified 
the rapist as having a particular DNA profile (think of it as 
the quintessential birthmark). The Confrontation Clause 
prevented the State from introducing that report into 
evidence except by calling to the stand the person who 
prepared it. See Melendez–Diaz, 557 U.S., at 310–311, 129 
S. Ct. 2527; Bullcoming, 564 U.S., at ––––, 131 S. Ct., at 
2709–2710. So the State tried another route—introducing 
the substance of the report as part and parcel of an expert 
witness’s conclusion. In effect, Lambatos testified (like the 
police officer above): “I concluded that Williams was the 
rapist because Cellmark, an accredited and trustworthy 
laboratory, says that the rapist has a particular DNA profile 
and, look, Williams has an identical one.” And here too, that 
form of testimony should change nothing. The use of the 
Cellmark statement remained bound up with its truth, and 
the statement came into evidence without any opportunity 
for Williams to cross examine the person who made it. So if 
the plurality were right, the State would have a ready method 
to bypass the Constitution (as much as in my hypothetical 
case); a wink and a nod, and the Confrontation Clause would 
not pose a bar to forensic evidence.166 
Justice Kagan’s dissent noted that the fragmented character of the 
court’s decision eliminates clear guidance from the three-person Alito 
plurality, and the concurring opinions of Justice Breyer and Justice 
Thomas each offer a different rationale for why the defendant was not 
entitled to cross examine the authors of the lab report.167 That lack of 
clarity has enabled state courts to craft their own paths. State v. Watson168 
is a good example. The New Hampshire Supreme Court embraced Justice 
Kagan’s observation, and limited Williams to its facts.169 It held that the 
defendant could cross examine the principal author of a lab report.170 
On the other hand, the New Hampshire Supreme Court implicitly 
embraced Justice Breyer’s argument about the practical limitation on 
allowing cross examination of everyone who participated in generating 
lab reports.171 As Justice Breyer observed, most sophisticated forensic 
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investigations involving DNA evidence involve participation by multiple 
technicians and experts. Concluding that lab results are not admissible 
without allowing cross examination of each person would significantly 
impede the utility of technological evidence that ordinarily is valuable for 
fact-finding.172 
The Watson court thus drew the line at mandating the availability of 
everyone participating in laboratory analysis once the principal 
investigator had testified and been made available for cross examination.  
[T]he report in this case, from a private laboratory, was 
admitted through the testimony of Isenschmid, the forensic 
toxicologist who issued and signed it and who was available 
for cross examination. 
. . . .  
In this case, Isenschmid reviewed ‘all the documentation’ 
in the case, including the chain of custody, and ensured that 
all of the information had been correctly entered into the 
NMS computer system. Isenschmid personally reviewed the 
‘actual instrument data’ and made sure that the data were 
accurately entered into the NMS computer. Further, he 
‘actually reviewed all of the testing results.’ He also issued 
and signed the toxicology report that described the testing 
results and testified that the report accurately reflected his 
findings and conclusions. His ‘participation in preparing the 
report and developing the substantive conclusions contained 
therein was real and direct.’173 
The Watson court noted, “[a]lthough contrary authority exists, we 
note that our decision today comports with those of at least seven federal 
courts and 21 state courts, which, in opinions issued since 2012, have 
found no Confrontation Clause violation under similar circumstances.”174 
A further limitation on extending the holding in Williams broadly is 
the limited nature of the laboratory investigation in that case, combined 
with indicia of reliability other than cross examination of the lab 
investigators.175 Constructing a DNA profile from the samples submitted 
to the lab was a relatively narrow and mostly straightforward task 
routinely done in the industry. The chain of custody of the sample 
submitted to the lab was established by in-court testimony, which 
adequately tested the possibility that the lab analyzed a sample belonging 
 
 172. See Williams, 567 U.S. at 89 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 173. Watson, 185 A.3d at 858 (distinguishing Bullcoming and Melendes-Diaz). 
 174. Id. at 859 (footnotes omitted). 
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to someone else.176 The in-court testimony of the state police expert 
established that contamination of the sample used in the analysis would 
have been readily apparent in the results. Given this, cross examination 
would not have had much value in probing reliability. The remaining non-
transparency of the laboratory process was covered by the business 
records exception to the hearsay rule: reliable because routinely relied 
on.177 
Computerized face-recognition analysis is quite different from the 
laboratory analysis that escaped cross examination in Williams. Face-
matching methodologies are not yet in routine use: they are both quite 
new and are currently being proven. This makes the business records 
exception a poor fit. 
Moreover, multiple decisions must be made in developing and using 
computerized face-matching software. Each decision requires specialized 
expertise and judgments about costs and benefits. Designers make 
decisions about which algorithms to use based on an understanding of the 
marginal utility of the algorithms and their error rates. Designing and 
maintaining the database similarly requires expertise and judgments 
about what images should be included in the database to make it 
representative of the relevant population. The users of the database also 
must determine the threshold quality standards for an image before it can 
be included in the database. These matters go far beyond the relatively 
routine decisions made in extracting the DNA profile from one sample. 
Each of these judgments affects the overall reliability of a resulting 
match, and the argument is strong that an opponent of the evidence should 
be able to probe each of the elements of the matching process through 
cross examination. 
On the other hand, the plurality’s conclusion in Williams that the 
laboratory test results were not testimonial,178 agreed to by Justice 
Thomas179 and Justice Breyer,180 would apply as well to one unknown to 
many knowns face-matching, not intended initially to prove that anyone 
committed a crime. Normally, the purpose of a one unknown to many 
knowns face-matching is to identify someone who may have committed 
a crime, not to prove that the person committed it. 
The Cellmark report is very different [from the reports in 
Melendez–Diaz and Bullcoming]. It plainly was not 
prepared for the primary purpose of accusing a targeted 
 
 176. See Williams, 567 U.S. at 74 (finding little room for argument that sample came from 
any source other than the victim’s vaginal swabs). 
 177. See id. at 99 (Breyer, J., concurring) (referring to business records exception to hearsay 
rule). 
 178. See id. at 84 (plurality opinion). 
 179. Id. at 103–04 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 180. Id. at 93 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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individual. In identifying the primary purpose of an out of 
court statement, we apply an objective test.  We look for the 
primary purpose that a reasonable person would have 
ascribed to the statement, taking into account all of the 
surrounding circumstances. 
Here, the primary purpose of the Cellmark report, viewed 
objectively, was not to accuse petitioner or to create 
evidence for use at trial. When the ISP lab sent the sample to 
Cellmark, its primary purpose was to catch a dangerous 
rapist who was still at large, not to obtain evidence for use 
against petitioner, who was neither in custody nor under 
suspicion at that time. Similarly, no one at Cellmark could 
have possibly known that the profile that it produced would 
turn out to inculpate petitioner—or for that matter, anyone 
else whose DNA profile was in a law enforcement database. 
Under these circumstances, there was no ‘prospect of 
fabrication’ and no incentive to produce anything other than 
a scientifically sound and reliable profile.  
The situation in which the Cellmark technicians found 
themselves was by no means unique. When lab technicians 
are asked to work on the production of a DNA profile, they 
often have no idea what the consequences of their work will 
be. In some cases, a DNA profile may provide powerful 
incriminating evidence against a person who is identified 
either before or after the profile is completed. But in others, 
the primary effect of the profile is to exonerate a suspect who 
has been charged or is under investigation. The technicians 
who prepare a DNA profile generally have no way of 
knowing whether it will turn out to be incriminating or 
exonerating—or both.181  
This lack of focus on a particular individual was crucial to the 
Supreme Court’s analysis of testimonial purpose and is true, as well, of 
the one unknown to many knowns face-matching analysis. 
The conflicted character of the reasoning in Williams, however, makes 
its application to face-recognition uncertain, even in federal court. 
Application of the case and its reasoning is even less certain in state 
courts, where protections of the right to cross examine may differ from 
those of the Sixth Amendment. State courts also may feel freer to test the 
limits of the Williams case, as they did in Watson. 
3.  Computerized Face-Matching as Basis for Testimony 
The plurality in Williams observed: “This conclusion will not 
prejudice any defendant who really wishes to probe the reliability of the 
 
 181. Id. at 84–85 (internal citations omitted). 
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DNA testing done in a particular case because those who participated in 
the testing may always be subpoenaed by the defense and questioned at 
trial.”182 So, finding a computerized face-match to be outside the 
Confrontation Clause does not resolve the question whether the defense 
has independent access to it for cross examination. 
Federal Rule of Evidence 705 requires experts to disclose, on cross 
examination,  facts or data that underlie the expert’s opinion.183 Many 
state evidence rules have similar requirements.184 Rule 703 makes the 
basis of an expert’s opinion admissible, even if it is not independently 
admissible, to aid the fact finder in evaluating the expert’s testimony.185 
The requirement that the court balance probative value against prejudicial 
effect is relaxed when the basis is introduced by a party opposing the 
expert.186 The commentary to the original, 1975 version of the rule 
encourages its use to decide admissibility based on “the validity of the 
techniques employed rather than to relatively fruitless inquiries whether 
hearsay is involved.”187 The quoted language is explicitly related to 
public opinion poll evidence, but its logic extends to any kind of basis 
evidence, including computerized face-recognition. 
“Opinions are valueless as evidence without exploration of the 
underlying facts and rationale showing the path from the facts to the 
opinion,” as one court said.188  
Bauer v. Bayer A.G.,189 is a good example of the kind of judicial 
scrutiny of the basis for an expert’s opinion that is permissible. The case 
involved a products liability claim against an insecticide manufacturer by 
beekeepers who claimed the product killed their bees. The court excluded 
the defendant’s expert testimony because the testing protocol relied on 
by the expert was not shown to have “adequate scientific support,”190 
although expert testimony is generally allowed when it is based on the 
type of data on which experts reasonably rely:191 
The reliability of the initial ADPEN analysis is 
undermined by the unexplainable level of imidacloprid 
found in the control sample (153.6 ppb), especially 
considering that the control sample was assumed clean and 
 
 182. Id. at 58–59. 
 183. FED. R. EVID. 705. 
 184. FED. R. EVID. 705 advisory committee note to 1972 proposed rules. 
 185. FED. R. EVID. 703. 
 186. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee note to 2000 amendments. 
 187. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee note to 1972 proposed rules. 
 188. United States v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 416 F. Supp. 316, 325 (D.N.J. 1976). 
 189. 564 F. Supp. 2d 365, 374–75 (M.D. Pa. 2008). 
 190. Id. at 368. 
 191. Id. at 376. 
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devoid of any imidacloprid. Dr. William Leimkuehler, in a 
detailed critique, remarked that a finding of such a 
concentration in the control sample suggests a molecule 
other than imidacloprid was being measured. Dr. Scott–
Dupree affirmed, stating that some type of problem was 
present in the test method. Dr. Mayer, likewise, was at a loss 
to explain such a high level of imidacloprid in the control: 
“It’s unexplained. I can’t explain it. I mean it happened.”192  
The record contained extensive testimony by witnesses on both sides 
regarding the reliability of the underlying tests. 
4.  Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits searches and seizures not supported 
by probable cause, or not authorized by a warrant supported by probable 
cause. The scope of Fourth Amendment protection is determined by an 
individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy”—or a property interest 
protected against trespass.193 One has a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in his DNA while it is still contained within his body, but not in the 
fingerprints that he leaves everywhere. People do not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their appearance, including their faces, which 
are usually exposed for the world to see.194 
Thus, Fourth Amendment analysis of the big three types of biometric 
evidence differs. Superficially, an argument that collecting facial images 
for use either as probe images or for inclusion in a training or enrolled 
database is frivolous. Such collection may, however, violate state 
statutory law, such as the Illinois statute considered in Section IV.C. It 
also may be subject to Fourth Amendment limitations when it divests 
subjects of anonymity by revealing their patterns of activity. 
 
 192. Id. at 377. 
 193. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–09 (2012) (holding that placement of 
GPS tracking device was a search under the Fourth Amendment because it was trespassory; 
explaining duality of reasonable-expectation-of-privacy and property bases for protection); 
Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 8–9 (2013) (holding that dog sniff on front porch was a Fourth 
Amendment search because it was a trespass). 
 194. Justice Scalia emphasized the point in his dissent in Maryland v. King:§ 
Is not taking DNA samples the same, asks the Court, as taking a person’s 
photograph? No—because that is not a Fourth Amendment search at all. It does 
not involve a physical intrusion onto the person, and we have never held that 
merely taking a person’s photograph invades any recognized “expectation of 
privacy.” Thus, it is unsurprising that the cases the Court cites as authorizing 
photo-taking do not even mention the Fourth Amendment. 
569 U.S. 435, 476–77 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
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Fourth Amendment analysis is considerably different for DNA and 
face-matching. Obtaining a subject’s DNA is a Fourth Amendment 
search, and thus unconstitutional unless performed pursuant to a warrant 
or is otherwise reasonable. If the officer obtains DNA from a blood 
sample, a urine sample, or a saliva sample, then the Fourth Amendment 
applies. On the other hand, if the DNA has been left behind, on a drinking 
cup or eating utensils, obtaining a DNA sample from those sources is not 
a search. 
Capturing someone’s image is not a search because one has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in one’s unconcealed face. So, if the 
police officer is near a suspect and takes his picture with a cell phone, 
that act does not encounter Fourth Amendment limitations.195  
Obtaining fingerprints, like obtaining photographs of faces, may not 
involve searches, although detention of a subject long enough to get 
fingerprints or a photo may involve a Fourth Amendment seizure. 
a.  Acquiring DNA 
Both DNA-matching and face-matching involve biometric evidence 
and computerized searching. But obtaining DNA evidence involves more 
intrusion than taking someone’s photograph. 
In Maryland v. King,196 the Supreme Court held, 5-4, that a post-arrest 
DNA swab was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The defendant 
was arrested for another offense and, as part of the routine booking 
procedure, a sample of his DNA was obtained by swabbing the inside of 
his cheeks. The DNA matched a sample in a state DNA database that was 
taken from a rape victim six years prior to the arrest. The Maryland Court 
of Appeals reversed his conviction for rape, holding that the DNA swab 
was an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment.197 
The Supreme Court agreed that taking the DNA swab constituted a 
Fourth Amendment search.198 The search was reasonable, however, 
because it was: (1) incident to an arrest; (2) a routine part of the booking 
process; and (3) strictly limited by the applicable state statute.199 Both the 
majority and dissenting opinions in Maryland v. King noted the 
 
 195. But see Fretty, supra note 46 (arguing that Fourth Amendment protects commercially 
held databases of faces, such as Facebook’s from governmental search); Nguyen, supra note 58, 
at *34–53 (arguing that reconceptualized Fourth Amendment and First Amendment right of 
anonymity can limit police use of face-recognition technology). 
 196. 569 U.S. 435 (2013). 
 197. Id. at 439–41 (giving factual and procedural history). 
 198. Id. at 446 (noting that caselaw treats drawing blood, scraping fingernails, and 
breathalyzer tests as Fourth Amendment searches; holding that a buccal DNA swab is also a 
Fourth Amendment search). 
 199. Id. at 449–50; see also id. at 465 (detailing statutory restrictions). 
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ubiquitous use of DNA matching as a criminal investigation tool.200 The 
modesty of the intrusion was an important element in the Court’s 
reasonableness analysis.201 Balanced against the modest intrusion was the 
government’s interest in confirming the identity of an arrestee and 
obtaining an accurate criminal history.202  
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Ginsberg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, 
dissented.203 His principal concern was the majority’s refusal to require 
an individualized suspicion focused on the target of the search.204 He 
rejected the justification that the DNA was used only to identify the 
suspect, arguing that it was instead used to search for evidence that the 
arrestee had committed crimes other than those for which he was 
arrested.205 He noted that the DNA search that occurred involved 
matching the defendant’s sample against the “unsolved crimes” database, 
not a broader database of all convicts and arrestees, further belying the 
identification purpose.206 Some states, such as Vermont, disagree with the 
Maryland v. King conclusion and hold that DNA searches violate state 
constitutions.207  
The DNA cases make it clear that taking a mugshot incident to an 
arrest and using it as a face-recognition probe image is reasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment: taking a picture is not a search at all; the intrusion 
is minimal; and the need for identification the same. The evolving DNA 
caselaw also contains the seeds of possible restrictions on searching 
enrolled databases, and the statutory limitations on collection and use of 
DNA samples in the Maryland v. King and post-Maryland cases are 
plausible models for similar limitations on face-recognition. 
b.  Acquiring Fingerprints 
The Fourth Amendment plays a weaker role with respect to fingerprint 
evidence than it does with respect to DNA evidence. That is because 
obtaining DNA from an unwilling subject is more intrusive than 
obtaining fingerprints—an arguable proposition—and because the 
expectation of privacy in one’s DNA is greater than in one’s fingerprints. 
One leaves replicas of one’s fingerprints on everything he or she touches. 
 
 200. Id. at 445–46 (describing CODIS, a national U.S. standard for comparing DNA, 
resulting in high reliability of matches, on the order of 1 in 100 trillion). 
 201. Id. at 462. 
 202. Id. at 450–56. 
 203. Id. at 466 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 204. Id. at 469–70; see also id. at 448 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted) (“[T]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, not 
individualized suspicion.”). 
 205. Id. at 469–70 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 206. Id. at 473–74. 
 207. See State v. Medina, 102 A.3d 661, 683 (Vt. 2014). 
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That is less true with DNA, although one does leave DNA traces on 
cigarette butts, drinking cups, and eating utensils.208 
The law of fingerprints is relevant to developing the law of 
computerized face-matching because: (a) fingerprints, like facial images, 
are biometric evidence; (b) obtaining fingerprints, if it constitutes a 
search at all, requires no more than Terry reasonable suspicion; (c) 
fingerprint matches generally are admitted into evidence; (d) fingerprint 
matching is, at least partially, automated; and (e) rules for authenticating 
and cross examining fingerprint evidence are highly developed. 
Fingerprinting of arrestees generally is accepted as legal,209 although 
Justice Scalia noted, in his dissent, in Maryland v. King, that “our cases 
provide no ready answer” to the question whether taking fingerprints 
constitutes a search. “The ‘great expansion in fingerprinting came before 
the modern era of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,’ and so we were 
never asked to decide the legitimacy of the practice.”210 
In Hayes v. Florida,211 the Supreme Court applied Davis v. 
Mississippi212 to hold that transporting a suspect to the police station and 
detaining him there to obtain fingerprints without probable cause or a 
warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment 
violation occurred because of the seizure of the suspect, not because 
fingerprinting is a search. The Court hedged, however: “None of the 
foregoing implies that a brief detention in the field for the purpose of 
fingerprinting, where there is only reasonable suspicion not amounting to 




 208. In Commonwealth v. Arzola, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that 
obtaining a DNA sample from a bloodstain on a shirt that had been lawfully seized did not 
constitute a search. 26 N.E.3d 185, 191–92 (Mass. 2015) (comparing it to use of latent 
fingerprints; suggesting that more extensive analysis of DNA might be a search because it would 
invade a reasonable expectation of privacy); see also State v. Williford, 767 S.E.2d 139, 144 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 2015) (holding that search of DNA extracted from cigarette butt was not a search, 
distinguishing King and citing cases from other states). 
 209. King, 569 U.S. at 458 (restating longstanding conclusion that fingerprinting is 
reasonable because it is part of the usual administrative steps incident to arrest). 
 210. Id. at 479 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the early fingerprinting cases were decided 
before the Fourth Amendment was made applicable to the states). 
 211. 470 U.S. 811 (1985). 
 212. 394 U.S. 721 (1969). 
 213. Hayes, 470 U.S. at 816. 
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Under the reasoning of Terry v. Ohio,214  
There is thus support in our cases for the view that the 
Fourth Amendment would permit seizures for the purpose of 
fingerprinting, if there is reasonable suspicion that the 
suspect has committed a criminal act, if there is a reasonable 
basis for believing that fingerprinting will establish or negate 
the suspect's connection with that crime, and if the procedure 
is carried out with dispatch. Cf. United States v. Place, 
supra. Of course, neither reasonable suspicion nor probable 
cause would suffice to permit the officers to make a 
warrantless entry into a person's house for the purpose of 
obtaining fingerprint identification.215  
Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment, expressing doubt about 
on-site fingerprint detentions: 
If the police wanted to detain an individual for on-site 
fingerprinting, the intrusion would have to be measured by 
the standards of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and our 
other Fourth Amendment cases. Yet the record here contains 
no information useful in applying Terry to this hypothetical 
police practice. It would seem that on-site fingerprinting 
(apparently undertaken in full view of any passerby) would 
involve a singular intrusion on the suspect’s privacy, an 
intrusion that would not be justifiable (as was the pat down 
in Terry) as necessary for the officer's protection. How much 
time would elapse before the individual would be free to go? 
Could the police hold the individual until the fingerprints 
could be compared with others? The parties did not brief or 
argue these questions, the record contains nothing that is 
useful in their resolution, and (naturally enough) the courts 
below did not address them.216 
c.  Acquiring Photographs 
This caselaw persuasively supports the proposition that law 
enforcement officers are privileged to stop a person long enough to take 
a picture of his face—a process that would involve a much briefer 
 
 214. 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968) (allowing stop and frisk on reasonable suspicion, less than 
probable cause). 
 215. Hayes, 470 U.S. at 817. 
 216. Id. at 818–19 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment); see also Beaver, supra note 26 
(“Our [Indiana State] Troopers . . . [who] had access to portable fingerprint scanners . . . could 
scan databases within minutes. I never used one but my impression was they [took] less than 10 
minutes or so to get a return, if any, though you’d have to have one on scene, and extending a stop 
to get one there may exceed what is allowed by the 4th Amendment.”). 
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detention than stopping him long enough to fingerprint him. Mugshots 
are a common source of a probe image for face-matching systems. If 
capturing such an image qualified as a Fourth Amendment search, the 
Constitution would limit face-matching just like it limits DNA matching. 
However, taking a mugshot is not a Fourth Amendment search. 
The Supreme Court, in Maryland v. King, approved the use of 
photography as a tool of criminal investigation.217 “Police had been using 
photography to capture the faces of criminals almost since its 
invention.”218 Justice Scalia noted in his dissent that taking a person’s 
photograph is not a Fourth Amendment search at all, because it does not 
involve a physical intrusion into a person and because it does not invade 
any recognized expectation of privacy.219 
d.  Patterns of Movement 
A more sophisticated argument under the Fourth Amendment 
considers the expectation of privacy in facts that, while discretely public, 
collectively reveal aspects of one’s life that traditionally were not open to 
public knowledge. Cell phone tracking information falls into this 
category and thus is clothed with a reasonable expectation of privacy, 
according to Carpenter v. United States.220  
A person does not surrender all Fourth Amendment 
protection by venturing into the public sphere. To the 
contrary, what one seeks to preserve as private, even in an 
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally 
protected.221 
Allowing government access to cell-site records 
contravenes that expectation. Although such records are 
generated for commercial purposes, that distinction does not 
negate Carpenter’s anticipation of privacy in his physical 
location. Mapping a cell phone’s location over the course of 
127 days provides an all-encompassing record of the 
holder’s whereabouts. As with GPS information, the time-
stamped data provides an intimate window into a person's 
life, revealing not only his particular movements, but 
through them his familial, political, professional, religious, 
 
 217. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 451 (2013) (noting generally accepted processes of 
comparing booking photograph with sketch artist images and showing photos to witnesses, and 
matching fingerprints). 
 218. Id. at 456–57. 
 219. Id. at 477 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 220. 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217–19 (2018) (holding that venturing into public sphere does not 
negate expectation of privacy in movements revealed by historical cell site data); see also United 
States v. Elmore, 917 F.3d 1068, 1074 (9th Cir. 2019) (applying Carpenter and finding no 
probable cause). 
 221. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.  
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and sexual associations. These location records hold for 
many Americans the privacies of life. And like GPS 
monitoring, cell phone tracking is remarkably easy, cheap, 
and efficient compared to traditional investigative tools. 
With just the click of a button, the Government can access 
each carrier’s deep repository of historical location 
information at practically no expense. 
In fact, historical cell-site records present even greater 
privacy concerns than the GPS monitoring of a vehicle we 
considered in Jones. Unlike the bugged container in Knotts 
or the car in Jones, a cell phone [is] almost a “feature of 
human anatomy.”222 
A face is a feature of human anatomy. It follows its owner 
everywhere. Logically, one can extend the reasoning in Carpenter to 
faces captured from people who are in a crowd or a queue and relatively 
anonymous there. To take their pictures and use the pictures to identify 
them divests these people of the anonymity of which they had a 
reasonable expectation. But one must be meticulous in drawing the 
analogy between computerized face-recognition and access to cellphone 
location records. Is it the mere taking of a photograph of a stranger’s face 
that constitutes the search? Probably not. That does not compromise 
anonymity or privacy. It is the subsequent use of the captured image to 
search a database that identifies the individual. Even then, no pattern of 
movement or conduct is revealed unless an individual is repeatedly 
identified by his face and accordingly tracked for a significant period of 
time. 
e.  Incident to Arrests 
When fingerprints, DNA, or photographs are obtained after an arrest, 
probable cause for the arrest has already been determined.223 Thus, 
whether a separate warrant is necessary for post-arrest searches presents 
a slightly different question from pre-arrest searches. A regular part of 
the booking process whenever someone is arrested involves taking a 
mugshot. Even if that is a search, it is incident to an arrest. If the arrest is 
lawful, the search is lawful. 
E.  Challenging Reliability of Traditional Witness Identification 
The law of conventional pre-trial identification procedures is relevant 
to computerized face-matching because computerized face-matching, 
with the current state of the technology, is used pre-trial rather than 
 
 222. Id. at 2217–18 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 223. King, 569 U.S. at 448 (noting that post-arrest obtaining of DNA involves situation 
where probable cause already is established). 
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providing a face-match that is directly introduced into evidence. 
Accordingly, the legal doctrines giving defendants an opportunity to go 
behind the in-court witness identification to probe the effect of pre-trial 
identification procedures including lineups, show ups, and photo arrays, 
is material to a defendant’s argument that he should be able to go behind 
in-court witness identification to probe computerized face-matches that 
were shown to the witness before trial. 
Beyond that, the concept of suggestiveness—the heart of challenges 
to witness identification based on pre-trial procedures—can be used as 
one of several techniques for scrutinizing computerized face-matching. 
This Section analyzes the case law involving suggestiveness and 
applies it to computerized face-matching. It considers the threshold 
requirements for, and the content of, “Wade hearings,” which afford 
defendants an adversarial opportunity to challenge pre-trial identification 
techniques, which logically include computerized face-matching. Then, 
the ection briefly considers the law involved when a computerized face-
match is not shown to a witness but used instead to generate a wanted 
poster. 
Challenges to witness identification based on pre-trial techniques such 
as lineups, show ups, and photo arrays obviously are relevant to 
formulating challenges to pre-trial computerized face-matches. Two 
other kinds of forensic evidence also inform consideration of 
computerized face-matches as evidence: fingerprint matches and DNA 
matches. With all three, as with computerized face-matches, the 
fundamental question is whether they are sufficiently probative to be 
shown to the factfinder.224 They differ, however, in indicia of their 
probativeness. A DNA match results from out of court use of 
sophisticated chemical analysis. Fingerprint matches depend on out of 
court human analysis of physical artifacts of fingerprint patterns, 
increasingly aided by computer routines. The points that indicate a match 
can be illustrated easily in court by diagrams. DNA matches and 
fingerprint matches are admitted into evidence only when they are 
presented by an expert witness who introduces and explains them and is 
subject to cross examination about the out of court processes. In contrast, 
the role of lineups, show ups, and photo arrays are frequently obscured 
because the witness who participated in them comes into court and makes 
a new, live identification of the defendant. 
Computerized face-matching most closely resembles the lineup, show 
up, and photo array category because both ask whether a face produced 
 
 224. Subordinate inquiries over reliability, authentication, hearsay exclusion, and the 
overarching question of relevancy all have to do with probativeness. Relevancy weighs 
probativeness against prejudicial effect. Authentication enforces probativeness by insisting that 
evidence be what it is claimed to be. Hearsay exclusions reject evidence whose probativeness 
cannot be tested in court by cross examination. Reliability is just another word for probativeness. 
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out of court is likely to be the face of the defendant, but like traditional 
face-identification, and unlike fingerprints and DNA, the prosecution 
may introduce face identification evidence by live witness testimony 
without reference to the out of court process.  
In United States v. Wade, however, the Supreme Court pointed out an 
important difference between witness identification and fingerprints, 
blood, clothing, and hair samples.225 For all of these except witness 
identification, 
[k]nowledge of the techniques of science and technology 
is sufficiently available, and the variables in techniques few 
enough, that the accused has the opportunity for a 
meaningful confrontation of the Government’s case at trial 
through the ordinary processes of cross examination of the 
Government’s expert witnesses and the presentation of the 
evidence of his own experts.226  
The Court was concerned with whether the constitutional right to 
counsel extended to the pre-trial investigatory stages of a prosecution. It 
held that it does extend to face-recognition, but not to fingerprint, blood, 
clothing, and hair matching evidence. (DNA matching was not in general 
use when the Supreme Court decided Wade). The Court’s logic was that 
scientific evidence is more reliable than witness identification. 
Computerized face-matching differs from the traditional categories of 
scientific evidence in two important ways. First, its techniques are less 
generally known and the variables in techniques large enough that the 
consensus that backs up good practice in fingerprint and DNA analysis is 
lacking regarding computerized face-matching. Second, computerized 
face-recognition differs from fingerprint and DNA identification in that 
computerized face-recognition deals with artifacts that can be evaluated 
by an ordinary human being. Fingerprint identification requires training 
and skill in singling out the features of fingerprints that distinguish them 
from others. This is not something within the ken of ordinary people, and 
it is not something that can be done without the aid of a microscope and 
pre-recorded fingerprints. DNA identification requires knowledge of how 
genetic material is arranged and the particular sequences that collectively 
make a sample from an individual unique. None of this is within the 
knowledge possessed by ordinary citizens, and it relies on data that can 
be perceived only with the aid of sophisticated chemical analysis. 
Not so with face-recognition; everyone looks at facial features and 
identifies faces dozens or hundreds of times a day. While most people 
would not be very articulate about how they know that a face belongs to 
 
 225. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227–28 (1967). 
 226. Id. at 227–28. 
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a particular person, they instinctively process facial artifacts with great 
accuracy. 
These important differences between face-recognition and the two 
other most used forms of forensic identification have large implications 
for reliability of evidence introduced in court. First, they make it more 
difficult to cross examine the proponent of computerized face-matching. 
Second, computerized face-matching process may not even be in 
evidence, a lay witness has made an allegedly independent identification. 
Undermining the reliability is the possibility that computerized face-
matching has been used to construct matches that are then presented to a 
human witness to ratify. Only the testimony of the human witness is 
introduced into evidence and subject to cross examination. How the 
material from which the witness worked was constructed is not offered 
in court and likely is immune from cross examination. Depending on the 
criminal discovery rules in a particular jurisdiction, the use of 
computerized face-matching may not even be revealed or disclosed to the 
defendant. On the other hand, the defense’s right to cross examine a 
witness about lineups, show ups, or photo arrays implies that a defendant 
should similarly be able to cross examine with respect to computer-
generated arrays. 
Still, the combination of computerized face-matching and witness 
testimony enhances reliability. Human intervention between the 
computerized matching and the identification imposes a reality check on 
the computer process. A human witness may look at the image that the 
computerized algorithm thinks represents a match and say, “No. That’s 
not the guy. It does not look anything like him.” Such lay testimony is 
unavailable as a reality check against fingerprint or DNA evidence. The 
intervention of the computer algorithms between the event and the in-
court witness identification removes the possibility of human bias that so 
often taints conventional, lineups, show ups, and photo arrays. 
Because eyewitness identification is notoriously unreliable,227 the law 
has developed a variety of techniques to expose instances in which its 
accuracy is questionable. Those tools for evaluating reliability include all 
the methods accepted for challenging witness identification based on 
lineups, show ups, and photo arrays. When computerized face-matching 
algorithms are used as a foundation for witness identification, their use 
 
 227. “The identification of strangers is proverbially untrustworthy.” Id. at 228 (quoting Felix 
Frankfurter, The Case of Sacco and Venzetti, THE ATLANTIC, Mar. 1927, https://www.theatlantic 
.com/magazine/archive/1927/03/the-case-of-sacco-and-vanzetti/306625/ [https://perma.cc/S4Q7 
-UEK4]) (holding that defendant is entitled to be represented by counsel at lineup); accord State 
v. Guilbert, 49 A.3d 705, 720–30 (Conn. 2012) (discussing scientific evidence showing 
unreliability of eyewitness identification and holding that expert testimony to that effect is 
admissible). 
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should be subject to scrutiny, just like the construction of the lineup, show 
up, or photo array. 
Computerized face-recognition presents the same legal issues as other 
identification techniques long used in criminal cases. The law for face-
recognition accordingly tracks the law developed for the other 
technologies. Suggestiveness is the key concern, accompanied by other 
facts that cast doubt on human witness identification. 
1.  Suggestiveness 
All identification involves comparisons of crime scene data with data 
obtained later from the defendant. Crime scene data typically is 
imperfect: only partial fingerprints; only a slight amount of DNA; only a 
brief glimpse at the robber, whose hoodie partially concealed his face; 
surveillance imagery was out of focus, grainy, and the robber had his head 
partially turned. In contrast the later-acquired data—fingerprints, DNA 
specimens, or images—are as nearly perfect as the investigators want to 
make them. 
Traditional identification based on appearance usually involves a 
witness to the crime who testifies, at the trial of the defendant, that the 
defendant is the person who robbed her. Like any identification, this 
involves a comparison of what was seen or photographed at the time of 
the crime with the later appearance of the defendant. The identification 
may be flawed for one of three reasons. First, the initial perception of the 
perpetrator may have been limited because the perpetrator was wearing a 
disguise, because the victim could not see him clearly, or because the 
victim’s emotional state prevented the perpetrator’s appearance from 
registering fully.228 Second, the image that the defendant presents in court 
may be different from the image presented at the time of the crime 
because of changed facial hair, substantial weight loss or weight gain, or 
other physical changes. Third, the witness’s recollection of the image 
from the time of the crime may be imperfect because memory fades with 
time and, more importantly, because later experiences compete with the 
original perception. It is this third source of the error that attracts the most 
litigation over eyewitnesses’ identifications. A defendant claims that the 
witness has seen many other faces since the crime and that this naturally 
blurs the clarity of her recollection. The defendant will cross examine to 
adduce anything that might give a later facial image particular 
significance to the witness, thereby causing the witness to conflate the 
earlier-in-time image with the later one. This is the concept of 
suggestiveness. Suggestiveness would occur, for example, if the witness 
 
 228. See Guilbert, 49 A.3d at 715–16 (discussing expert testimony on effect of stress in 
reducing reliability of witness identification and that that accuracy of identification may be 
adversely affected by such factors as the length of time during which the eyewitness was able to 
observe the person, lighting, distance, and whether the eyewitness was paying attention). 
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got only a momentary view of the robber before she was knocked out. 
During the brief time she saw the robber, she was so terrified she thought 
she might faint. It was dark. The robber was wearing a hoodie pulled tight 
over his forehead, cheeks, and chin. Later, investigators bring a suspect 
into an interview room and put the witness on the other side of a one-way 
mirror through which she can see the suspect. The interview room is well 
lit, and the witness is allowed plenty of time to examine the suspect. An 
investigator tells the witness: “We’re almost certain this is the guy. Do 
you recognize him?” The image of the suspect in the show up is going to 
be burned into the witness’s mind much more clearly than that of the 
actual perpetrator. The witness goes to the court. The suspect is at the 
defense table, and the witness identifies him, based more on the show up 
than on what she saw during the crime.  
The hypothetical presents an extreme example of suggestiveness, of 
course, but the possibilities for suggestiveness are endless. The police 
rush out from the crime scene and bring somebody back that they 
apprehended nearby and present him to the witness; the police organize 
a lineup or a photographic array in which one of the faces is different 
from all the others; the police show the witness a computerized face-
match and tell the witness it is the product of a computer algorithm and 
artificial intelligence. Once a witness has picked out a subject in a lineup, 
show up, or photo array, she is not likely to go back on her word at trial.229 
So suggestiveness of the pre-trial technique undermines the reliability of 
the in-court testimony.  
In Bernal v. People,230 the Colorado supreme court explained the 
analytical framework for evaluating the admissibility of identifications 
from photo arrays: 
This standard [for suggestiveness, under Simmons v. 
United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968)] has developed into a 
two-part analysis. First, a court must determine whether the 
photo array was impermissibly suggestive, which the 
defendant has the burden of proving. If this burden is not 
met, no further inquiry is necessary. Second, if the 
defendant’s burden is met, the burden shifts to the People to 
show that despite the improper suggestiveness, the 
identification was nevertheless reliable under the ‘totality of 
the circumstances.’ It is important to note that these two 
steps must be completed separately; it is only necessary to 
reach the second step if the court first determines that the 
array was impermissibly suggestive.  
In evaluating whether a pre-trial photo identification 
procedure is impermissibly suggestive, a number of factors 
 
 229. Wade, 388 U.S. at 229. 
 230. Bernal v. People, 44 P.3d 184, 191 (Colo. 2002). 
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may be relevant. These include the size of the array, the 
manner of its presentation by the officers, and the details of 
the photographs themselves. Although courts have held that 
a photo array with as few as six pictures is not per se a due 
process violation, courts have recognized that the size of a 
photo array, specifically the number of pictures in it, is a 
factor affecting the weight a court gives to the irregularities 
in the array. The more pictures used in an array, the less 
likely it is that a minor difference, such as background color 
or texture, will have a prejudicial effect on selection.  
In contrast, when relatively few photographs are used in 
an array, minor differences such as background color, make 
a picture stand out and can repeatedly draw a witness’s eyes 
to that picture. 
Id. In Sanchez, the court noted: 
Common sense dictates that slight irregularities are more 
likely to ‘jump out’ at a witness when reviewing a single 
sheet of paper with only six photographs on it than at a 
witness reviewing a large mug book containing hundreds of 
photographs. Upon continued inspection, the witness may 
begin to believe that the ‘oddball’ picture was taken under 
different circumstances than the others. This fact can suggest 
a number of things to the witness, the most dangerous of 
which is that the similar pictures were taken together to form 
a pool or control group, and that the one picture that stands 
out is the suspect. 
Thus, the fewer photographs used by the officers in a 
photo array, the closer the array must be scrutinized for 
suggestive irregularities.  
When the number of photographs shown has not been so 
small as to make the presentation itself unfairly suggestive, 
and there is nothing in the officials' manner of presentation 
that renders the procedure surrounding the array suggestive, 
the principal question is whether the picture of the accused, 
which matches descriptions given by the witness, so stood 
out from all of the other photographs as to ‘suggest to an 
identifying witness that [that person] was more likely to be 
the culprit.’ ‘In other words, the array must not be so limited 
that the defendant is the only one to match the witness's 
description of the perpetrator.  
The police do not have to provide a photo array 
containing only “exact replicas” of the defendant’s picture; 
all that is required is that the “photos are matched by race, 
approximate age, facial hair, and a number of other 
characteristics.” Thus, a photo array in which the individual 
characteristics of the accused, such as race, stand in stark 
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contrast to the other photographs is impermissibly 
suggestive. [S]imply being of a different race or ethnic group 
from others placed in a lineup does not necessarily make the 
lineup impermissibly suggestive, especially where . . . the 
other individuals had roughly the same characteristics and 
features of the accused.231 
Suggestiveness is very difficult to avoid in witness identification. If a 
prosecutor asks for witness identification in court without having done 
anything to prepare the witness,232 the mere fact that the defendant is 
sitting in the defendant's place at the defense table is highly suggestive. 
If, on the other hand, as a prudent prosecutor would do, the witness has 
been prepared by a lineup, show up, or photo array, the faces included in 
the lineup, photo array, or show up may be suggestive under any one of 
a nearly endless number of theories.  
If the witnesses told investigators that the perpetrator had a beard and 
only one person with a beard is included in the lineup, show up, or photo 
array, that suggests that the one with the beard is the perpetrator. On the 
other hand, if everyone in the lineup, show up, or photo array wears a 
beard, that is suggestive that being bearded is an indication of guilt. 
While suggestiveness could be eliminated in theory by assuring that 
all the candidate images look exactly the same, or as close to that as 
possible, that would defeat the effort to obtain witness identification. To 
be sure, the defense might like such a result, because it would show that 
any effort to single out the defendant is unreliable since so many other 
people look like him. 
The likelihood of a reliable identification in a lineup, show up, or 
photo array is increased in proportion to the number of candidate images 
included; if a witness is shown only two faces, the implication is strong 
that the perpetrator is one of the two, creating a 50-50 chance of 
misidentification, if the witness is uncertain. To have integrity, all of 
these out of court procedures must allow for the possibility that the face 
of the perpetrator is not included. 
Three traditional techniques for pre-trial witness identification are 
common: lineups, show ups, and photo arrays. In a lineup, multiple 
individuals are presented to the witness at the same time, and the witness 
is asked to pick out the perpetrator. In a show up, one individual is 
presented to the witness, and the witness is asked if that individual is the 
 
 231. Id. at 191–92 (all alterations except the first in original, internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
 232. For a prosecutor to do this, the prosecutor must have extremely low risk aversion; the 
risk is enormous that the witness may not make a convincing identification. This conclusion flows 
from the author’s experience with the importance of preparation for trial. 
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perpetrator.233 A photo array is similar to a lineup in that multiple subjects 
are presented to the witness, but they are presented through photographs 
rather than being physically present. 
In Williams v. Bauman,234 the court of appeals summarized the 
constitutional limitations on lineup identification: 
[U]se by the police of an identification procedure may at 
times pose due process concerns—but it does so “only when 
law enforcement officers use an identification procedure that 
is both suggestive and unnecessary.” Perry v. New 
Hampshire, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S. Ct. 716, 724 (2012). Even 
then, suppression of the evidence is warranted only if, on the 
totality of the circumstances, “improper police conduct 
created a ‘substantial likelihood of misidentification.” Id. 
(quoting Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 201, 93 (1972)). 
“The ‘corrupting effect of the suggestive identification’ must 
be weighed against factors indicating that the eyewitness 
identification is reliable, including “the opportunity of the 
witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the 
witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of his prior 
description of the criminal, the level of certainty 
demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the 
crime and the confrontation.” Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 
U.S. 98, 114 (1977).235 
Footnote 26 in Wade quoted a law review article proposal for 
safeguarding the reliability of lineups: 
• Give suspects the right to counsel during 
any lineup or during any confrontation.  
• Require that a victim or witness give a description of 
the suspect before viewing any arrested person. A 
written record of this description would be required, 
and the witness would have to sign it.  
• Make available any record of a suspect’s description 
to defense counsel for use in testing the accuracy of 
the identifications made during the lineup and during 
the trial. 
• Requirement for at least six persons in addition to the 
accused in a lineup, and these persons would have to 
be of approximately the same height, weight, 
 
 233. E.g., What Are the Rules for Police Lineups?, supra note 33 (defining lineups and show 
ups). 
 234. Williams v. Bauman, 759 F.3d 630, 638 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 235. Id. at 638–39. 
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coloration of hair and skin, and bodily types as the 
suspect.  
• Requirement that all subjects be dressed alike. If 
distinctive garb was used during the crime, the 
suspect should not be forced to wear similar clothing 
in the lineup unless all the other persons are similarly 
garbed.  
• Complete written report of the names, addresses, 
descriptive details of the other persons in the lineup, 
and of everything which transpired during the 
identification. 
• Limiting voice identification tests by having each 
person in the lineup repeat identical innocuous 
phrases, and it would be impermissible to force the 
use of words allegedly used during a criminal act. 
• Prohibiting the police from suggesting to any viewer 
that one or more persons in the lineup had been 
arrested as a suspect.  
• Requiring multiple witnesses making an 
identification, to do so separately and be forbidden to 
speak to another witness until all of them have 
completed the process. 
• Requiring the use of movie cameras and tape 
recorders to record the lineup process in those states 
which are financially able to afford these devices.  
• Exclude evidence obtained as the result of a violation 
of these requirements.236 
In Perry v. New Hampshire,237 the Supreme Court rejected an 
argument that a show up violated due process. Although the defendant 
was standing next to a police officer in an apartment parking lot, the 
witness spontaneously looked out her window and identified him as the 
person she saw preparing to break into cars. The police did not arrange 
for her to look at the defendant or tell her to look out the window of her 
apartment at the parking lot. They simply asked her if she could identify 
the person she had seen. The Court held that the Due Process Clause did 
not come into play because there was no state action; the police did not 
arrange the show up. Thus, the evidence was admissible, even though the 
witness was unable to identify the defendant later from a photo array.  
 
 236. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236 n.26 (1967) (quoting Murray, The Criminal 
Lineup at Home and Abroad, 1966 UTAH L. REV. 610, 627–28). 
 237. Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228 (2012). 
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The Court characterized several kinds of suggestive identification that 
are constitutionally suspect, specifically: 
[p]olice-designed lineups where “all in the lineup but the 
suspect were known to the identifying witness, . . . the other 
participants in [the] lineup were grossly dissimilar in 
appearance to the suspect, . . . only the suspect was required 
to wear distinctive clothing which the culprit allegedly 
wore, . . . the witness is told by the police that they have 
caught the culprit after which the defendant is brought before 
the witness alone or is viewed in jail, . . . the suspect is 
pointed out before or during a lineup, . . . the participants in 
the lineup are asked to try on an article of clothing which fits 
only the suspect.”238 
In Simmons v. United States,239 the Supreme Court explained how the 
reliability of in-court identification can be undermined by the procedures 
used to present photo arrays: 
It must be recognized that improper employment of 
photographs by police may sometimes cause witnesses to err 
in identifying criminals. A witness may have obtained only 
a brief glimpse of a criminal, or may have seen him under 
poor conditions. Even if the police subsequently follow the 
most correct photographic identification procedures and 
show him the pictures of a number of individuals without 
indicating whom they suspect, there is some danger that the 
witness may make an incorrect identification. This danger 
will be increased if the police display to the witness only the 
picture of a single individual who generally resembles the 
person he saw, or if they show him the pictures of several 
persons among which the photograph of a single such 
individual recurs or is in some way emphasized. The chance 
of misidentification is also heightened if the police indicate 
to the witness that they have other evidence that one of the 
persons pictured committed the crime. Regardless of how 
the initial misidentification comes about, the witness 
thereafter is apt to retain in his memory the image of the 
photograph rather than of the person actually seen, reducing 
the trustworthiness of subsequent lineup or courtroom 
identification.240  
 
 238. Id. at 243 (quoting Wade, 388 U.S. at 233). 
 239. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968). 
 240. Id. at 383–84 (footnotes omitted) (rejecting challenge to identification based on a photo 
array). 
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The same logic for photo arrays applies to show ups and lineups. In 
United States v. Hargrove,241 the court of appeals rejected a post-
conviction claim that eyewitness identifications made from a photo array 
were unduly suggestive.  
Hargrove contends that because he was the only officer 
depicted in the photo array with a beard and glasses, his 
photo stood out from the others to such a significant extent 
that witnesses were predisposed to select it over the others. 
We disagree. First, his photo does not stand in such stark 
contrast to the others in the array, which all depict black CPD 
officers of similar age with short hair and some degree of 
facial hair. Second, the glasses and beard were not 
suggestive of anything given that none of the Alsip officers 
had told investigators that any of the four men at the 
apartment were bearded or wore glasses. See United States 
v. Moore, 115 F.3d 1348, 1360 (7th Cir.1997) (rejecting a 
claim that a photo array was unduly suggestive because the 
defendant was the only person depicted with a ‘notched 
eyebrow’ because only one of several eyewitnesses had 
described the suspect as having a distinctive eyebrow); 
United States v. Gibson, 135 F.3d 257, 260 (2d Cir.1998) 
(“[B]ecause [the defendant] did not establish that [the 
eyewitness] told police the perpetrator wore a goatee, 
portraying [the defendant] with a goatee would not be 
suggestive.”). Accordingly, the photo array was not unduly 
suggestive, and it was not error to admit the Alsip police 
officers’ identifications of Hargrove.242 
In United States v. Clayborne,243 the district court thoroughly 
reviewed arguments of suggestiveness of a photo array, including 
academic studies and the “Yates Memorandum,” and rejected all of 
them.244 
Williams, Perry, Bernal, and the other cases cited in this Section 
articulate the appropriate legal framework for evaluating witness 
identifications that begin with computerized face-matches. The defendant 
should be able to question the reliability of the identification by 
scrutinizing, through cross examination, how the face-recognition system 
produced the image or images presented to the witness. If only one image 
is presented, and the witness is told it is the image selected by a computer 
as being the image of the perpetrator, the virtual show up is ipso facto 
 
 241. United States v. Hargrove, 508 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 242. Id. at 450–51. 
 243. United States v. Clayborne, 425 F. Supp. 3d 1047, 1048 (E.D. Wis. 2019) (denying 
motion to suppress witness identification). 
 244. Id. at 1052–62. 
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suggestive. Whether the witness adds any significant independent 
corroboration is questionable. Reliability of the identification depends 
entirely on the reliability of the software and its algorithms. Even if the 
witness is not told that the single image was produced by a face-matching 
program, presentation of a single image is inherently suggestive. 
On the other hand, if the witness is shown multiple faces generated by 
the computer system, they will resemble each other (if the face-matching 
system is any good at all), and the suggestiveness sometimes present in a 
conventional lineup photo array is reduced. 
In the computer face-matching context, if the witness is shown one 
facial image and told that the computerized face-matching program 
picked that one out, the suggestiveness is obvious. That is worse than if 
the witness is shown the single image without being told how it was 
selected. Likewise, if the witness is shown five faces, and told that a 
particular one is the product of a computerized face-match, the 
suggestiveness is similarly high. 
If, as is more likely, the witnesses are shown five or ten faces and told 
the computer program selected all of them were selected by the computer 
program as possible matches, the implication is strong that one of the 
arrays must be the perpetrator. 
If, on the other hand, a computerized matching program is used to 
select one or more of the images presented to the witness, and the witness 
is not told that any of them came from the system, use of the technology 
has not contributed to suggestiveness. Indeed, if a computerized program 
has any statistically significant reliability at all, the likelihood of accurate 
identification has been increased materially. 
The holding in Wade suggests one approach to enhance the reliability 
of computerized face-matching: allow the defendant’s counsel to 
participate in the computer run that results in face-matches. Of course, 
some that adaptation of this basic principle would be necessary. Before 
running the face-match program, investigators do not know who the 
suspect is, and therefore cannot identify a suspect’s lawyer, even if he has 
one at that point. So, the program could be run and then those resultant 
suspects who survive post-match screening would be notified that they 
are targets of an investigation. They would be entitled to have their 
counsel scrutinize the results of the face-matching process, perhaps 
involving no more than disclosure of the fact that it was done. 
Mere disclosure might not do defense counsel much good, however, 
unless the scope of criminal discovery entitled him to obtain more 
information about the face-matching algorithm and how it was used or 
unless the operation of the face-matching algorithm was fair subject 
matter for cross examination at trial. 
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2.  Adjudicating Suggestiveness 
Evaluating suggestiveness requires defense counsel access to the 
procedures that may have been suggestive. This can begin with defendant 
representation by counsel at lineups, show ups, or photo arrays under 
Wade. But many such procedures occur before a defendant is identified 
as a suspect; indeed, their purpose is to identify suspects. No counsel is 
going to be present under Wade in such circumstances. In light of this, 
the important questions are: (1) whether the defendant is entitled to a pre-
trial hearing on a motion to exclude eyewitness identification because it 
has been tainted by identification procedures; and (2) whether the details 
of the identification procedures are admissible into evidence if the 
testimony is allowed. 
The law is reluctant to approve sideshows unnecessarily litigating the 
details of investigatory procedures that, in the end, did not matter.245 In 
People v. Wharton,246 the New York Court of Appeals held that a “Wade 
hearing” was unnecessary, because the identification was made by a 
skilled law enforcement officer shortly after the time of the crime. 
Improper suggestiveness was unlikely.247 
Some courts use the term “Wade hearing” more narrowly than others. 
To some, it refers to a hearing to determine whether a defendant had a 
right to counsel at a pre-trial identification procedure. Others, probably 
the majority, use the term to refer to any hearing of the admissibility of 
possible suggestive pre-trial identifications. 
State v. Henderson248 is, perhaps, an extreme example of an elaborate 
pre-trial procedure. There, the New Jersey Supreme Court appointed a 
special master to evaluate the reliability of eyewitness identifications. 
The special master heard testimony by seven experts and produced more 
than 2,000 pages of transcripts and hundreds of scientific studies.249 The 
resulting decision overruled earlier caselaw and overhauled New Jersey 
law on witness identification.  
When defendants can show some evidence of 
suggestiveness, all relevant system and estimator variables 
should be explored at pre-trial hearings. A trial court can end 
the hearing at any time, however, if the court concludes from 
the testimony that defendant’s threshold allegation of 
 
 245. See State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 873, 924–25 (N.J. 2011) (expressing concern about 
adverse effect on judicial resources of allowing pre-trial hearings in too many cases; unreliability 
arising from estimator variable more appropriately addressed by cross examination and jury 
instructions). 
 246. People v. Wharton, 549 N.E.2d 462, 462 (N.Y. 1989) (affirming conviction). 
 247. Id. at 463. 
 248. 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011). 
 249. Id. at 877. 
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suggestiveness is groundless. Otherwise, the trial judge 
should weigh both sets of variables to decide if the evidence 
is admissible.250 
The court gave examples of the kinds of proffers that should lead to 
“Wade hearings.”251 
In Henderson,252 the New Jersey supreme court specified the order of 
proof to enable a court to decide whether to exclude eyewitness 
identification testimony. In doing so, it suggested nine “system-variable” 
questions and thirteen “estimator” questions to decide a motion to 
exclude.253 The same questions provide a useful template for questions at 
trial intended to impeach eyewitness identification that is admitted. In 
other words, all is not lost if a “Wade hearing” is unavailable. The 
challenges that would have been made at the “Wade hearing” can and 
should be made in cross examination at trial. 
In declining to mandate pre-trial review of suggestive identifications 
not arranged by the police, as a matter of Sixth Amendment law, the Perry 
Court pointed to other protections against erroneous eyewitness 
identifications: 
These protections include the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to confront the eyewitness. See Maryland 
v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990) (“The central concern of 
the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the 
evidence against a criminal defendant.”). Another is the 
defendant’s right to the effective assistance of an attorney, 
who can expose the flaws in the eyewitness’ testimony 
during cross examination and focus the jury’s attention on 
the fallibility of such testimony during opening and closing 
arguments. Eyewitness-specific jury instructions, which 
many federal and state courts have adopted, likewise warn 
the jury to take care in appraising identification evidence. 
See, e.g., United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 558–59 
(C.A.D.C. 1972) (per curiam) (D.C. Circuit Model Jury 
Instructions) (“If the identification by the witness may have 
been influenced by the circumstances under which the 
defendant was presented to him for identification, you 
should scrutinize the identification with great care.”). See 
also Ventris, 556 U.S., at 594, n.* (citing jury instructions 
that informed jurors about the unreliability of 
uncorroborated jailhouse-informant testimony as a reason to 
 
 250. Id. at 878. 
 251. See id. at 921–23 (offering examples of proffers that would warrant a Wade hearing). 
 252. 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011). 
 253. Id. at 920–22; see id. at 896–910 (identifying eight “system” variables under the control 
of investigators and ten “estimator” variables outside their control to be considered in evaluating 
reliability of witness identification based on lineups, showups, and photo arrays). 
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resist a ban on such testimony); Dowling, 493 U.S., at 352–
53. The constitutional requirement that the government 
prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt also 
impedes convictions based on dubious identification 
evidence. 
State and Federal Rules of Evidence, moreover, permit 
trial judges to exclude relevant evidence if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial impact or 
potential for misleading the jury. See, e.g., Fed. Rule Evid. 
403; N.H. Rule Evid. 403 (2011). See also Tr. of Oral Arg. 
19–22 (inquiring whether the standard Perry seeks differs 
materially from the one set out in Rule 403). In appropriate 
cases, some States also permit defendants to present expert 
testimony on the hazards of eyewitness identification 
evidence. See, e.g., State v. Clopten, 2009 UT 84, ¶ 33, 223 
P.3d 1103, 1113 (“We expect ... that in cases involving 
eyewitness identification of strangers or near-strangers, trial 
courts will routinely admit expert testimony [on the dangers 
of such evidence].”).254 
The opportunity to cross examine based on pre-trial identification 
procedures or to exclude trial testimony based on those procedures 
depends on the defendant’s knowing about the procedures. In New York, 
a statute requires the state to give pre-trial notice to the defendant of its 
intent to introduce eyewitness identification.255 After receiving such 
notice, the defendant may request a “Wade hearing.”256 
Other discovery rules extend discovery to pre-trial tests and 
experiments in a way that would include computerized face-matching 
runs. The federal discovery rules require the government to disclose to 
the defendant the results “of any scientific test or experiment” if the 
“material is material to preparing the defense or the government intends 
to use the item in its case-in-chief.”257 The 1966 Advisory Committee 
notes say that “scientific tests or experiments” include fingerprint and 
handwriting comparisons.  
 
 254. Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 245–47 (2012). 
 255. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 710.30(1) (McKinney 2019) (governing “testimony regarding an 
observation of the defendant either at the time or place of the commission of the offense or upon 
some other occasion relevant to the case, to be given by a witness who has previously identified 
him or her or a pictorial, photographic, electronic, filmed or video recorded reproduction of him 
or her as such”). 
 256. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 710.30(2) (McKinney 2019); see People v. Boyer, 846 N.E.3d 461, 463 
(N.Y. 2006) (describing and applying CPL 710.30; reversing conviction for failure to afford a 
Wade hearing). 
 257. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(F). 
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ABA Criminal Justice Standards for Discovery require the 
prosecution to disclose to the defense, “[a]ny material, documents, or 
information relating to lineups, show ups, and picture or voice 
identifications in relation to the case.”258  
The recently revised Virginia criminal discovery rules entitle a 
defendant to obtain, on motion:  
written reports of autopsy examinations, ballistic tests, 
fingerprint analyses, handwriting analyses, blood, urine and 
breath tests, other scientific reports, and written reports of a 
physical or mental examination of the accused or the alleged 
victim made in connection with the particular case, that are 
known by the Commonwealth’s attorney to be within the 
possession, custody, or control of the Commonwealth.259 
The results of a computerized face-matching run would qualify as an 
“other scientific report,” and it would have been run “in connection with 
the particular case,” so a Virginia defendant can obtain this material. 
3.  Wanted Posters 
Computerized face-recognition systems can be used to create wanted 
posters—either of the conventional paper design or in a digital form, 
posted on the Internet. Wanted posters sometimes raise issues as to 
whether they are a sufficient basis for probable cause for an arrest or 
reasonable suspicion for a Terry260 stop. 
In United States v. Hensley,261 the Supreme Court concluded that:  
if a flyer or bulletin has been issued on the basis of 
articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that the 
wanted person has committed an offense, then reliance on 
that flyer or bulletin justifies a stop to check identification, 
to pose questions to the person, or to detain the person briefly 
while attempting to obtain further information.262  
 
 258. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DISCOVERY AND TRIAL BY JURY, 11–2.1(a)(vii) 
(AM. BAR ASS’N 1996), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_ 
justice_standards/discovery_trialbyjury.pdf. 
 259. VA. R. CRIM. P. 3A:11(b)(2)(D). 
 260. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–22 (1968) (holding that an investigatory “stop and frisk” 
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The Court reviewed the record and concluded that specific and 
articulable facts supported issuance of the wanted poster.263  
In the face-recognition context, the outcome-determinative question 
would be whether the generation of a matching image constitutes 
“specific and articulable facts” justifying the content of a wanted poster. 
The most permissive possibility is that the mere existence of the 
computerized match satisfies the test. A more restrictive possibility is that 
the standard must be tested by evidence about the reliability of the probe 
image, the appropriateness of the enrolled database, and the robustness 
of the face-matching algorithms. 
F.  Challenging Scientific Methods of Identification and the Experts 
Presenting Them 
Case law involving fingerprint and DNA evidence helps frame the 
analysis of computerized face matching differently from conventional 
witness identification. While the suggestiveness concepts analyzed in the 
preceding two Sections provide support for the defendant’s right to access 
to pre-trial computer face-identification procedures, it offers only partial 
guidance as to the content of the challenge, once access is available. As 
those Sections explain, suggestiveness can be adapted to a case in which 
in court witness identification is central to the prosecution’s theory. The 
fingerprint and DNA law gives more guidance as to exactly what can and 
should be probed in terms of the science and the implementation of the 
scientific identification procedures. 
1.  Expert Witnesses 
Fingerprint and DNA identification cases provide the guide for the use 
of expert testimony to present computerized face-matching evidence or 
to defend its use with witnesses in the pre-trial context. 
One district court explained the order of proof: 
Before a witness may testify as an expert, a district court 
must make three express findings. First, the court must find 
that the proposed witness is qualified to offer expert 
testimony. Second, the court must find that the witness has 
applied reliable principles. Third, the court must find that the 
witness's testimony may help the jury understand evidence 
or determine a fact at issue in the case. So long as an expert 
meets these threshold considerations, the expert may testify; 
it is up to the jury to determine the weight to give that 
testimony. Shaky but admissible evidence is to be attacked 
by cross examination, contrary evidence, and attention to the 
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burden of proof, not exclusion. The proponent of the expert 
testimony bears the burden of establishing its admissibility 
by a preponderance of the evidence.264 
2.  Voir Dire 
The first step in introducing scientific evidence through expert 
testimony is to establish the expert’s qualifications. In Mulder v. State, 
for example, the Nevada Supreme Court held that a witness offered by 
the defense did not qualify as an expert.265 During the prosecutor’s voir 
dire examination, Doulder revealed that the IAI listed him as an expert in 
questioned documents, not fingerprints. Doulder was listed as an IAI 
fingerprint expert in 1950; although he is no longer listed, he testified, 
“Fingerprints haven’t changed from 1950 to now. They are the same.” 
Additionally, the prosecutor elicited testimony that although Doulder had 
testified about fingerprinting in recent trials in Las Vegas, the presiding 
judges in those trials refused to determine that he was a qualified 
fingerprint expert. Doulder admitted that ninety percent of his work is in 
questioned documents and only ten percent deals with fingerprints.266 
3.  Admissibility of Science 
Scientific opinion testimony is not admissible unless it meets the tests 
of Frye267 or Daubert.268  
In Allen v. State,269 the court reversed a conviction for sexual battery, 
kidnapping, and burglary, because expert testimony on DNA evidence 
was wrongfully admitted. The witness had ten-years’ experience in the 
field of DNA analysis, had testified as an expert more than two dozen 
times, and had a master’s degree in pharmaceutical science with an 
emphasis in forensics DNA and serology.270 She did not, however, 
demonstrate expertise in statistical probability.271 Defense counsel 
properly objected on the grounds that the witness had “not been qualified 
 
 264. United States v. Wells, No. 3:13-CR-00008-SLG, 2019 WL 3229912, at *1 (D. Alaska 
July 17, 2019) (internal quotations and footnotes omitted). 
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as an expert in statistical probability.” At this point, it was the state’s 
burden to prove that the expert was qualified, and not Allen’s burden to 
show that she was not. See Brim v. State, 695 So.2d 268, 272 
(Fla.1997); Hudson v. State, 844 So.2d 762, 763 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) 
(“[T]he state must prove by a preponderance of evidence that an expert 
testifying about DNA statistical and population genetics analysis must 
demonstrate ‘sufficient knowledge of the database grounded in the study 
of authoritative sources.” (quoting Murray, 692 So.2d at 164)). 
Because the record does not reveal the statistical methodology used to 
calculate the DNA population frequencies in this case, or Ms. Whitten’s 
qualifications to present this evidence, we reverse Allen’s conviction and 
sentence and remand this case to the trial court for a limited evidentiary 
hearing similar to the ones ordered in Gibson and Miles. On remand, the 
trial court is to (1) assess Ms. Whitten’s competence to present the 
statistical evidence; and (2) clarify the exact methodology and database 
used for her calculations. If requested and depending on the methodology 
and database used, the trial court should also conduct a Frye hearing to 
determine the general acceptance of the employed statistical techniques 
and database. See Roberts v. State, 841 So.2d 558, 560 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2003). If following a hearing, the court determines that there was a 
sufficient basis for admitting the DNA evidence presented at trial, the 
court should reinstate the conviction and sentence. If the court 
determines, however, that the DNA evidence was not presented by a 
qualified witness, then it should grant a new trial.272 
4.  Specific Challenges to Comparisons 
Reception of computerized face-matching evidence can benefit from 
following principles developed for fingerprint-matching evidence. 
Fingerprints have been around much longer than DNA or computerized 
face-recognition as a form of evidence. Validation of fingerprints 
confronted courts long before digital computers. The criminal justice 
system established the need for a certain number of landmarks to validate 
a fingerprint comparison. Now that computerized fingerprint comparison 
is feasible and in common use,273 the same determinants of reliability 
should be subject to probing cross examination. It should not matter that 
the computer has identified a “whorl” rather than a human expert doing 
it. The factfinder needs to know how the computer program went about 
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identifying that artifact of the fingerprint.274 This is especially important, 
given the limitations of automated fingerprint matching systems.275 
Automated fingerprint matching produces the same kinds of results as 
computerized face-matching. It outputs some potential matches with an 
assessment of probabilities of actual match.276 Traditional automated 
fingerprint matching uses only ridges on fingerprints.277 The research 
frontier is to automate searching based on fingerprint minutiae as well. 
That kind of composite matching would significantly improve 
accuracy.278 
The Illinois intermediate court explained how automated fingerprint 
searching and matching works in People v. Slover:279 
A fingerprint examiner conducting an AFIS search on a 
latent print scans an image or a tracing of the print into the 
computer; isolates its high-quality area; pinpoints its “core”; 
orients it along a vertical “axis”; locates the “points,” or 
“points of minutiae,” or “points of comparison”—areas 
where a ridge ends or bifurcates; identifies the print's pattern 
type; and identifies, if possible, which finger on which hand 
made the print. Computers are unable to identify the core, 
axis, points, pattern type, and finger; an examiner must 
provide this information to the computer executing the 
search. Identifying the pattern type and finger narrows the 
scope of the search so only a corresponding subset of AFIS’s 
60 million prints is searched. AFIS employs an algorithm or 
algorithms selected by the examiner to compare the latent 
fingerprint to those stored in its database based on the 
relative locations of the core, axis, and points. It assigns a 
score to each searched print reflecting the relative likelihood 
 
 274. See Moses, supra note 29, at 6-25 to -26 (describing algorithms for ridge identification 
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(2007), http://defensewiki.ibj.org/images/a/ac/Reeves_William_Fingerprints_2007_01_9_amp_ 
10_Dowdy.pdf [https://perma.cc/AJN8-GM96] (transcript of direct and cross examination of 
fingerprint expert). 
 275. See Anil K.  Jain et al., Biometrics: Fingerprint Matching, COMPUTER, at 36, 44 (Feb. 
2010), available at http://biometrics.cse.msu.edu/Publications/Fingerprint/JainFpMatching_ 
IEEEComp10.pdf [https://perma.cc/D43G-MWAN] (summarizing limitations of automated 
fingerprint matching systems; human experts still outperform them); Moses, supra note 29, at 6-
11 (assessing accuracy of AFIS as 70–80%). 
 276. See Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS), TEX. DEP’T PUB. SAFETY, 
https://www.dps.texas.gov/CrimeLaboratory/AFIS.htm [https://perma.cc/V4FT-KPLM] (last 
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of matching it to the latent print. No matter the quality or 
quantity of the information submitted or the likelihood of 
obtaining a match, AFIS provides a list of the 10 highest 
scoring stored fingerprints, along with a computer image of 
each print and identifying information on the person to 
whom the print belongs, such as his or her name, sex, race, 
and age. The examiner compares computer printouts of the 
10 potential matches to the latent print to determine whether 
any of the stored prints can be positively eliminated as a 
match; if a print cannot be eliminated as a possible match, 
then the examiner requests its original to be sent from a 
central facility for further comparison.280 
Conflicting testimony about the results obtainable from a set of latent 
fingerprints caused the court to deny a motion for further testing: 
[T]he trial court heard testimony by the State’s and 
defendants’ experts debating the “suitability” of the 
guardrail fingerprint for AFIS testing. Kenneth Moses, an 
expert for defendants, was director of Forensic Identification 
Services, an independent forensics laboratory in San 
Francisco. Moses testified he studied the ISP’s standards for 
AFIS comparison of latent fingerprints and concluded the 
guardrail print was suitable to be run through AFIS. He 
opined the print came from the upper part of a thumb. From 
an image of the print provided to him by defendants, Moses 
identified 13 points—the ISP’s guidelines recommend that a 
minimum of 8 be identified. Although the core was not 
visible in the available portion of the print, Moses 
recommended running the print through AFIS two or three 
times with different estimations of the core’s location and 
the axis’s orientation. These estimations would be “a lot 
more than guess[es]” as they would reflect Moses’s 
experience examining thousands of fingerprints. 
Mary McCarthy, the State’s expert, was the latent print 
training coordinator for the ISP. She testified she determined 
the guardrail print was unsuitable for AFIS testing. She 
could definitively identify only about six points on the print. 
Other possible points were unclear or obscured and would 
have been cropped out if she were going to search for the 
print in AFIS. Further, some points seemed so high up on the 
finger that, McCarthy opined, they were unlikely to be 
included in any fingerprint stored in AFIS’s database. She 
explained stored fingerprints often omit the fingertip due to 
the finger’s curvature. McCarthy testified she was unable to 
determine the core’s location and the axis’s orientation and 
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to identify the pattern type. Her training taught her not to 
guess the location of points or the core, the orientation of the 
axis, or the pattern type. McCarthy explained latent 
fingerprints with no identifiable pattern type should not be 
searched in AFIS. She testified Moses’s proposed method of 
conducting multiple searches using different estimations of 
the core and axis was contrary to her training.281  
This controversy over computerized fingerprint matching suggests 
one approach for challenging computerized face-matching. The 
challenger would focus on the probe image, the analogue of the guardrail 
print in Slover. A challenge based on a relatively small number of 
discernable features in the probe image is analogous to the claim that the 
number of points in the guardrail fingerprint was inadequate. 
In United States v. Rivas,282 the court of appeals described expert 
testimony and cross examination with respect to a fingerprint match: 
Rottman had been working as a forensic scientist for the 
Illinois State Police for approximately twenty-three years at 
the time of trial and had identified persons through 
fingerprint comparison tens of thousands of times. He 
explained that he compares fingerprints using the ACE-V 
side-by-side comparison technique. (“ACE-V” is an 
acronym for Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, and 
Verification and is “the standard method for determining 
whether two fingerprints are from the same person.” United 
States v. Herrera, 704 F.3d 480, 484 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(describing method in detail); see also United States v. 
Saunders, 2016 WL 3213039, at *5 (7th Cir. 2016)). 
Rottman explained that when comparing prints, he places 
the latent (unidentified) print next to a known print. Looking 
through a magnifying glass, he looks at the latent print for a 
point or group of points that stand out and then looks to see 
whether the same point or points are present in the known 
print. Rottman continues to look back and forth between the 
two prints, identifying individual points or characteristics as 
well as the overall flow of the ridges and pattern and shapes, 
until he arrives at a conclusion. After this explanation, the 
government asked that Rottman be permitted to offer expert 
testimony pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 in the 
area of fingerprints and fingerprint evidence. The defense 
responded that it had no objection other than to make the 
testimony subject to cross examination. 
Specific to Rivas’s case, Rottman testified that he 
developed a latent partial print from the 9 millimeter 
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handgun found in the storage unit, photographed the print, 
and then lifted it. He then conducted a side-by-side, ACE-V 
comparison of the latent print to a known partial fingerprint 
of Rivas. After doing so, Rottman concluded that the latent 
partial print on the gun belonged to Rivas. Rottman showed 
the jury images of both the latent and known prints and 
walked the jury through ten points of comparison. He 
testified that he had found seventeen points of comparison 
between the latent and known partial prints and that they 
made him “totally certain” that the partial print on the gun 
was from Rivas. 
The defense cross examined Rottman regarding his 
development of the partial fingerprint from the gun and also 
about his side-by-side comparison. During the cross 
examination, Rottman acknowledged the conclusion of a 
2009 National Academy of Sciences report published by the 
National Research Council that it was not possible to have a 
zero error rate in fingerprint analysis. Rottman further 
acknowledged that he was not aware of any studies 
validating the reliability of the ACE-V method. The defense 
also attempted to cross examine Rottman regarding a 
different fingerprint examiner’s conclusion in a separate 
case, that of Brandon Mayfield. The government objected, 
and the trial court sustained the objection. As a result, Rivas 
was not allowed to introduce evidence of Mayfield’s 
erroneous identification through the ACE-V method of 
fingerprint analysis.283 
The court rejected the argument that limiting the cross examination 
violated the Sixth Amendment. The witness was not involved in the other, 
erroneous, identification.284 
Rivas suggests the importance of being able to access and thus being 
able to cross examine based on the details of the process used for 
comparison, whether human or computerized. 
In Narrod v. Napoli,285 the district court denied a habeas petition 
alleging unconstitutional limitation on cross examination of a fingerprint 
expert. The court quoted the prosecution's acknowledgment of the 
limitations of automated fingerprint matching: 
The prosecutor objected, stating that SAFIS “has never 
passed a Frye test in terms of being admissible in court,” that 
there was no foundation for the testimony, and that “SAFIS 
is a tool that’s used to give fingerprint examiners possible 
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prints to then make a comparison from. It is not a tool that’s 
used to make identifications. It’s just simply not reliable. We 
[the prosecution] can never come into court and say, oh, this 
is his fingerprint based on results from SAFIS.”286 
The current state of the art for computerized face-matching is like the 
state of the art for AFIS. Proponents of computerized face-matching use 
it as an intermediate step for witness identification, just like proponents 
of automated fingerprint matching use it as a shortcut for further analysis 
of fingerprints by human experts. That does not mean, however, that the 
involvement of computerized face-matching is inadmissible in the cross 
examination of a human who has seen the computer-generated results. 
The possibility of suggestiveness exists, whether the comparison involves 
fingerprints or faces. 
5.  The Less Human Involvement, the Greater the Reliability? 
Judge Posner, in United States v. Herrera, offered a detailed 
explanation of fingerprint matching and compared it with DNA 
matching: 
Visual comparison consists of discerning, visually 
“measuring,” and comparing—within the comparable areas 
of the latent print and the known prints—the details that 
correspond. The amount of friction ridge detail available for 
this step depends on the clarity of the two impressions. The 
details observed might include the overall shape of the latent 
print, anatomical aspects, ridge flows, ridge counts, shape of 
the core, delta location and shape, lengths of the ridges, 
minutia location and type, thickness of the ridges and 
furrows, shapes of the ridges, pore position, crease patterns 
and shapes, scar shapes, and temporary feature shapes (e.g., 
a wart). 
At the completion of the comparison, the examiner performs 
an evaluation of the agreement of the friction ridge 
formations in the two prints and evaluates the sufficiency of 
the detail present to establish an identification (source 
determination). Source determination is made when the 
examiner concludes, based on his or her experience, that 
sufficient quantity and quality of friction ridge detail is in 
agreement between the latent print and the known print. 
Source exclusion is made when the process indicates 
sufficient disagreement between the latent print and known 
print. If neither an identification nor an exclusion can be 
reached, the result of the comparison is inconclusive. 
Verification occurs when another qualified examiner repeats 
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the observations and comes to the same conclusion, although 
the second examiner may be aware of the conclusion of the 
first.287 
The court compared fingerprint analysis with DNA analysis: 
The methodology requires recognizing and categorizing 
scores of distinctive features in the prints, see Davide 
Maltoni et al., Handbook of Fingerprint Recognition 97–101 
(2d ed. 2009); Federal Bureau of Investigation, The Science 
of Fingerprints: Classification and Uses 5–86 (2006), and it 
is the distinctiveness of these features, rather than the ACE–
V method itself, that enables expert fingerprint examiners to 
match fingerprints with a high degree of confidence. That’s 
not to say that fingerprint matching (especially when it 
involves latent fingerprints, as in this case) is as reliable as 
DNA evidence, for example. Forensic DNA analysis 
involves comparing a strand of DNA (the genetic code) from 
the suspect with a strand of DNA found at the crime scene. 
The comparison is done with scientific instruments and 
determines whether the segments are chemically identical. 
Errors are vanishingly rare provided that the strands of code 
are reasonably intact. As we explained in United States v. 
Ford, 683 F.3d 761, 768 (7th Cir.2012), 
What is involved, very simply, in forensic DNA analysis 
is comparing a strand of DNA (the genetic code) from the 
suspect with a strand of DNA found at the crime scene. See 
“DNA Profiling,” Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
DNA_profiling [https://perma.cc/9VZV-E7MV] (visited 
May 31, 2012). Comparisons are made at various locations 
on each strand. At each location there is an allele (a unique 
gene form). In one location, for example, the probability of 
a person's having a particular allele might be 7 percent, and 
in another 10 percent. Suppose that the suspect’s DNA and 
the DNA at the crime scene contained the same alleles at 
each of the two locations. The probability that the DNA was 
someone else’s would be 7 percent if the comparison were 
confined to the first location, but only .7 percent (7 percent 
of 10 percent) if the comparison were expanded to two 
locations, because the probabilities are independent. 
Suppose identical alleles were found at 10 locations, which 
is what happened in this case; the probability that two 
persons would have so many identical alleles, a probability 
that can be computed by multiplying together the 
probabilities of an identical allele at each location, becomes 
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infinitesimally small—in fact 1 in 29 trillion, provided no 
other comparisons reveal that the alleles at the same location 
on the two strands of DNA are different. This is the same 
procedure used for determining the probability that a 
perfectly balanced coin flipped 10 times in a row will come 
up heads all 10 times. The probability is .510, which is less 
than 1 in 1000. 
Chemical tests can determine whether two alleles are 
identical, but a fingerprint analyst must visually recognize 
and classify the relevant details in the latent print—which is 
difficult if the print is incomplete or smudged. “[T]he 
assessment of latent prints from crime scenes is based 
largely on human interpretation . . . . [T]he process does not 
allow one to stipulate specific measurements in advance, as 
is done for a DNA analysis. Moreover, a small stretching of 
distance between two fingerprint features, or a twisting of 
angles, can result from either a difference between the 
fingers that left the prints or from distortions from the 
impression process.” National Research Council, supra, at 
139.288 
His motivation for the comparison was to show that DNA evidence, 
though newer, and therefore potentially more controversial, is more 
reliable than fingerprint evidence, which depends more on human 
analysis. The same point can be made, based on similar comparison, 
between conventional eyewitness identification prompted by lineups, 
show ups, and photo arrays and computerized face-matching. The Posner 
analysis suggests that computerized face-matches may be more reliable 
than conventional pre-trial identification techniques. 
In State v. Jenkins,289 the court expressed doubt about the use of DNA 
matching to identify a defendant because of weak testimony introducing 
it, drawing analogies to usual examinations supporting automated 
fingerprint matching.  
There was no testimony at trial as to who generated the Defendant’s 
DNA profile that was uploaded into CODIS, who uploaded the 
Defendant’s DNA into CODIS, how CODIS maintained this information, 
or any records concerning the use or operation of CODIS. Although the 
State argues it was admitted for the effect on the listener, rather than the 
truth of the matter asserted, there is no question that the testimony was 
probative of the Defendant’s identity, a crucial element of the offense.290 
Computerized DNA matching systems match only certain strands of 
DNA, typically those related to appearance and demographic 
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characteristics rather than sex. That virtually all the genealogical DNA 
search products use autosomal testing, excluding sex chromosomes. A 
rich source of cross examination is to probe how the search algorithm 
designer selected the chromosomes to be matched, and what the 
implications would be if other chromosomes had been searched as well. 
Scrutiny of the elements of DNA matching provides a good model for 
scrutiny of the elements of computerized face-matching. In particular, the 
Supreme Court noted the standardization of the points of comparison in 
DNA analysis.291 Challenges to computerized face-matches can be based 
on deviation from generally accepted practice for comparison of facial 
features—the elements of a face vector.292 
V.  CHALLENGING COMPUTERIZED FACE-RECOGNITION EVIDENCE 
This Section offers analysis of, and strategies for, dealing with hearsay 
and Confrontation Clause issues when face-recognition results are 
offered as evidence. The focus is on whether limits should be imposed on 
the use of face-recognition programs. 
A substantial amount of literature exists about presenting and 
challenging fingerprint and DNA evidence. The literature includes many 
sample cross examination questions.293 Section V.C adapts a set of 
questions from the fingerprint and DNA fields and adds to them, as 
appropriate, to capture the important ingredients of face—one unknown-
to-many knowns—recognition technology.  
A few articles exist on evidentiary issues with face-recognition.294 
They are useful starting points, but they do not go nearly far enough, 
focusing too much on human inputs in running the programs, and not 
enough on the critical design decisions that determine how the programs 
work.295 
A.  Expert Testimony 
If an eyewitness identifies the defendant, expert testimony is not 
involved; the witness is a fact witness with personal knowledge.296 This 
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is so, even if the identification was prompted by the output of a 
computerized face-matching system.  
If, on the other hand, testimony is offered as to the results obtained 
from a computerized face-matching system, expert testimony ordinarily 
is required. An argument is possible, however, that a lay witness is 
competent to testify as to routine use of a face-recognition program, and 
the inputs and outputs pertinent to a particular run of the program. Federal 
Rule of Evidence 701 allows fact-witness testimony “rationally based on 
the witness’s perception,” “not based on scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge . . . .”297 
When lay testimony is based on a computerized face-match, however, 
the same authority permitting expert testimony in “Wade hearings” over 
the suggestiveness of lineups, show ups, and photo arrays justifies 
allowing expert testimony on the reliability of face-matching algorithms 
and data. 
1.  Voir Dire: Qualifying Experts 
The first step, according to the language quoted from Wells, is to 
establish the expert’s qualifications. 298 When experts on computerized 
face-matching are proffered, two possible levels of expertise may be 
relevant to qualification. The less demanding level of qualification would 
be shown by someone with experience in using commercial face-
matching products, who can testify that a particular probe image was 
submitted to a system, which produced certain results, in the standard 
way of operating the system.299 The more demanding level of expertise 
would be met only by showing that the expert understood the detailed 
workings of the face-matching system, including the training database 
used to develop its algorithms, the statistical techniques used to develop 
its matching algorithms, the contents of the enrolled database, and how 
the probability assigned to possible matches were developed.300  
Challenges and controversies depend on who gets called into court to 
vouch for the match resulting from use of a particular product in a 
 
 297. FED. R. EVID. 701(a) & (c). 
 298. United States v. Wells, No. 3:13-CR-00008-SLG, 2019 WL 3229912, at *1–2 (D. 
Alaska July 17, 2019). 
 299. Testimony to validate other types of automated systems is a useful guide. See, e.g., 
People v. Rekte, 181 Cal. Rptr. 3d 912, 917–920 (Ct. App. 2015) (reviewing testimony regarding 
reliability of automated traffic enforcement camera). 
 300. “We were trained to avoid getting into these type of lines of testimony by deferring to 
a manufacturer because it opens you up to look stupid if you don’t fully know something. For 
example, I could testify about how I was trained and operated equipment/software but if asked 
how it worked, I would refer the inquirer to whoever the manufacturer. Most of the time, attorneys 
won’t call the manufacturer because it is expensive but if they do, the manufacturer is in the best 
position to defend their systems.” Beaver, supra note 26. 
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particular case. A representative from the police laboratory has 
knowledge, and probably expertise, on how to run a particular program 
and the routine for maintaining the chain of custody for a particular face 
to be matched. Rarely, however, would such a witness know the details 
of the algorithms in the face-matching program. A challenger of a 
computerized face-match should be entitled to that information to expose 
the kinds of problems identified in the majority opinion in Melendez-
Diaz301 and by Justice Kagan’s dissent in Williams.302 
In United States v. Wells,303 the district court considered the 
admissibility of expert testimony by an expert on computer forensics, 
video/photographic analysis, and surveillance setup. It held that the 
witness was qualified as an expert, because his background covered the 
techniques of video and photographic analysis, even though he 
demonstrated no particular expertise in images of automobiles, as 
opposed to faces, or other types of objects.304 It also held that the expert 
sufficiently referenced the methods and principles on which he relied and 
demonstrated a rational foundation for his assertions that the 
government’s expert evidence was flawed.305 
2.  Application of Reliable Principles: Frye or Daubert 
The Allen case illustrates the arguments that should be made by the 
defendant when computerized face-matching evidence is offered. The 
expert vouching for the evidence must demonstrate detailed knowledge 
of the data used to develop the face-matching algorithms, the quality of 
the probe image, the contents of the enrolled database, the algorithms 
used to match the images, and the probability that each reported match is 
a good one. Given appropriate testimony about the analytical principles 
discussed in Section II, it should not be difficult to meet either the Frye 
or the Daubert standards. 
3.  Authentication 
Federal Rule of Evidence 901(9) requires authentication of 
computerized face-matching evidence, by describing it and “showing that 
it produces an accurate result.” In colloquial terms, authentication 
requires showing that a piece of evidence is what it purports to be. If a 
photograph is offered into evidence purporting to be the photograph of 
the perpetrator of a crime, the authentication requirement requires 
evidence linking the photograph to the crime. In the case of computerized 
 
 301. See supra text accompanying note 145. 
 302. See supra text accompanying note 166. 
 303. No. 3:13-cr-00008-SLG, 2019 WL 3229912 at *1 (D. Alaska July 17, 2019). 
 304. Id. at *5. 
 305. Id. at *6. 
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face-matching, that requires establishing: (a) the connection between the 
probe image and the crime scene; (b) the connection between the probe 
image and the reported match or matches; and (c) the connection between 
the reported match or matches and the defendant. Step (c) can be 
accomplished by the factfinder at trial. Step (a) can be established by 
showing that the probe photo came from surveillance video at the crime 
scene or by showing that the probe image was developed from witness 
descriptions of the perpetrator. Step (b) requires scrutiny of the face-
matching databases and algorithms.306 
In People v. Beckley,307 the court rejected the admissibility of a 
photograph and gang roster downloaded from the Internet because the 
lack of authentication. The court summarized the requirement for 
authenticating a photograph: 
A photograph or other writing may be authenticated by 
the introduction of evidence sufficient to sustain a finding 
that it is the writing that the proponent of the evidence claims 
it is including . . . two kinds of evidence . . . . It is well 
settled . . . that the testimony of a person who was present at 
the time a film was made that it accurately depicts what it 
purports to show is a legally sufficient foundation for its 
admission into evidence. In addition, . . . authentication of a 
photograph may be provided by the aid of expert testimony, 
as in the Doggett case, although there is no one qualified to 
authenticate it from personal observation. In People v. 
Doggett (1948) 83 Cal. App. 2d 405, 188 P.2d 792, the Court 
of Appeal upheld the admission of a photograph showing the 
defendants committing a crime. Because only the victim and 
the defendants, none of whom testified, were present when 
the crime took place and one of the defendants took the 
photograph, there was no one to testify that it accurately 
depicted what it purported to show. The People, however, 
produced evidence of when and where the picture was taken 
and that the defendants were the persons shown committing 
the crime. Furthermore, a photographic expert testified that 
the picture was not a composite and had not been faked. The 
court held this foundation sufficiently supported the 
photograph’s admission as substantive evidence of the 
activity depicted. (Id. at p. 410, 188 P.2d 792.) [A] 
photograph may, in a proper case, be admitted into evidence 
not merely as illustrated testimony of a human witness but 
as probative evidence in itself of what it shows.308 
 
 306. These steps are derived from a logical dissection of the requirements of FED. R. EVID. 
901. 
 307. 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 362 (Ct. App. 2010). 
 308. Id. at 366 (some internal quotations and citations omitted). 
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This reasoning supports using surveillance video as the probe image 
for a face-matching computer system. 
B.  Principles for Defendant Access to Face-Recognition Technology 
The standards for testing expert testimony on computerized face-
recognition developed in Section V.A cannot be applied unless the 
defendant has access to the relevant details forming the basis for an 
expert’s conclusions. When a computer generates photographs matching 
a probe image, the result is an out of court statement. When the match is 
introduced into evidence, it is offered to prove the truth the matching 
asserts—that the matching photograph matches the image of the 
perpetrator. Denying cross examination implicates the Confrontation 
Clause. 
Trying to codify all the details of rules of procedure and rules of 
evidence is undesirable. Trial judges should be left a large degree of 
flexibility to use their own experienced judgment to manage the trials of 
particular cases. Accordingly, this Article does not suggest a statute or a 
model rule for cross examination of computerized face-recognition 
evidence. Rather, it offers some general propositions for judicial 
consideration. 
• If the witness identification was substantially 
influenced by an image produced by a computerized 
face-recognition system, the defendant 
presumptively should be entitled to cross examine 
the witness about how she was influenced by the 
computer-generated image or images and to cross 
examine expert users of the computerized face-
matching system. 
• If the expert users and proponents of the 
computerized face-match are ignorant as to the 
content of the algorithms used to make matches and 
how machine learning was used to develop those 
algorithms, the defendant should be entitled to cross 
examine persons with such knowledge. 
The caselaw on “Wade hearings,” analyzed in Section IV.E.2, 
provides support for these two propositions. 
C.  Questions to Ask 
The defendant in a criminal prosecution must keep her eye on the ball. 
The purpose of challenging computerized face-recognition is not to score 
points in public policy debates over use of the technology. The point is to 
exclude identification evidence or to cause the factfinder to doubt its 
reliability. So, if face-recognition technology has been used, not as the 
2020] FACE-RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY 125 
 
primary identification evidence, but as a preliminary step in providing a 
foundation for subsequent human identification, the focus must remain 
on the reliability of the human identification. Typically, the defendant 
will challenge that reliability by arguing that the foundation for the 
identification was suggestive and therefore that it undermined the 
reliability of the identification. If the lineup or a photo array included only 
one black subject, then the witness said the perpetrator was black, that 
suggests that the only black subject was the perpetrator. Likewise, if the 
witness said the perpetrator was female and everybody in the lineup 
except one person is male, that is suggestive. The lineup and show up 
cases provide examples of how suggestions, such as these examples, can 
be established in closer cases. 
Construction of templates or model questions for cross examining 
computerized face-recognition evidence should be informed by sets of 
model cross examination questions for fingerprint and DNA evidence 
publicly available on the Internet. Accordingly, the following list of 
questions include links to pertinent parts of suggested questions for 
fingerprint and DNA evidence. 
1.  Limitations of the Technology 
Security Expert Clare Garvie makes three main criticisms of law 
enforcement agencies’ use of the technology: 
1. They use it ubiquitously and yet do not disclose when 
they are using it; 
2. They use it improperly, resulting in false 
identifications; and 
3. They obtain results that discriminate against darker 
skin probes and female probes.309 
Her criticisms are worth scrutinizing. The second assertion, inaccurate 
face-recognition, may undercut the reliability of a match offered into 
evidence, or involve suggestivity of a human identification based on a 
computerized match. 
Reliability depends on all the factors explained in Section II. An 
insufficiently diverse training database impairs the accuracy of the 
algorithms resulting from machine learning. Failure to use the best 
statistical inference methodologies likewise impairs the quality of the 
algorithms, regardless of how good the training database is. Poor quality 
probe images limit the reliability of efforts to match it with entries in an 
enrolled database. Images not included in an enrolled database cannot be 
selected as possible matches. 
 
 309. Garvie, supra note 49. 
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Suggestivity would occur if the investigators run a probe photo of any 
kind through a face-matching system, take only one of the matches based 
on the reliability score assigned to it by the system, and ask, “Did the 
perpetrator look like this?” The question for non-witness sources is “Do 
you know anyone who looks like this?” Presentation of the single image 
to a human witness is, indeed, suggestive. But this is not the equivalent 
of asking the face-recognition system, itself, “Do you know anyone who 
looks like this?” The human witness can accept or reject the computer-
selected image. 
If, on the other hand, the investigator shows only that photograph to a 
witness and tells the witness, “We ran the suspect through the world's 
best face-matching computer system, which has a 95% accuracy level. 
This is who that system says the perpetrator is. Do you agree?” That 
would surely be suggestive, and the human identification adds very little 
value to the identification made by the computer system. That does not 
mean, however, that the identification should be excluded from evidence. 
Rather, it highlights the importance of the defendant’s right—reinforced 
by the Confrontation Clause—to probe the details of the computerized 
identification. If the computerized system is reliable, the suggested 
human identification is reliable; use of the computer system does not 
increase the probability of error.  
Critics of the technology correctly observe that many probe images 
are of poor quality. The face-recognition system produces originals of 
enrolled images, usually of good quality. The witness looking at the array 
produced by the system has much higher-quality images to consider than 
if she looked at the probe image. This is not unusually suggestive, in 
itself. The witness is more likely to select one of the images rather than 
rejecting all of them, but that possibility is no different from a traditional 
lineup or photo array. The photo array provides a better basis for 
perception than the original glimpse at the perpetrator, which occurred in 
a time of stress, and usually was quite brief. That does not improve upon 
the original perception, however. 
Picking one of the exemplars may be difficult when they are all 
generated by the face-recognition program. If it is working well, the 
possible matches all resemble each other. But that is the opposite of 
suggestiveness. It may be a basis for challenging the reliability of the 
identification, not on the grounds of suggestiveness, but on the grounds 
of randomness. How did the witness choose among quite similar faces? 
Ms. Garvie reports use of a picture of the actor Woody Harrelson as 
the probe image for face-recognition as the basis for her “Garbage In, 
Garbage Out” title.310 Even the Woody Harrelson example, which seems 
quite irregular, may have some justification. First of all, it’s a reasonable 
 
 310. Id. 
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test of the system’s accuracy. If Harrelson’s photograph is used as a probe 
photo, the system should match it with a photo of Woody Harrelson. If it 
does not, that is a good reason to doubt the system’s reliability. 
That does not mean—hopefully—the law enforcement agency doing 
the match procures an arrest warrant for Woody Harrelson. Instead, the 
police are acting on a tip that describes the perpetrator as looking like 
Woody Harrelson. Using the face-recognition technique to identify 
people that look like Woody Harrelson is not unreasonable, if the results 
are used as the basis for further evaluation based on things like means, 
opportunity, and motive—the traditional indices of criminal involvement. 
The law enforcement agency should be given an opportunity to explain 
how it used the face-matching technology, why it used the probe image 
of Woody Harrelson, and what follow-up investigatory steps it took to 
identify the defendant. The identification of the defendant should not be 
rejected merely because face-recognition technology was used with a 
probe photo known not to be the perpetrator. 
On the other side of the case, the defendant should know about the 
role face-recognition technologies played, and the defendant should be 
able to elicit the information about the Woody Harrelson probe, on the 
results obtained, and how those results were used for further 
investigation. 
Similarly, there is nothing inherently outrageous about using an artist 
sketch as the probe image. The machine is being asked the same question 
as a human witness shown a traditional artist’s sketches: “Does this look 
like the perpetrator? Do you know anyone who looks like this?” 
2.  Face-Recognition Trial Tactics 
The proponent or opponent of computerized face-recognition 
evidence should be required to articulate methods and principles 
supporting a rational basis for a computerized face-matching expert’s 
conclusions. As Section II.B explains, the validity of computer matching 
depends on the representativeness of the samples used to generate the 
matching parameters through machine learning. A factfinder should be 
able to evaluate the appropriateness of the database, and thus the 
parameters.311 
Further, state-of-the-art machine learning algorithms for face-
recognition use a variety of statistical measures, usually in combination 
with each other. Omitting some of these statistical steps can produce 
misleading results. The factfinder should be made aware of the state-of-
the-art machine learning algorithms, the utility of each of the techniques, 
 
 311. See Transcript of Testimony at 69–70, United States v. Crawford, F2103-05 (D.C. 
Super. Ct. June 29, 2006), available at http://defensewiki.ibj.org/images/f/f9/Theisen_Budowle 
_Kittles_DNA_2006_06_29_Crawford.pdf [https://perma.cc/P57Q-38L2] (transcript of cross 
examination of DNA expert, concentrating on representativeness of database). 
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and how the party used these techniques in a particular product involved 
in matching a face in a specific case.   
Then, the factfinder needs to know the types of errors that face-
recognition programs can produce, and the available measures of the 
magnitude of likely errors. Any respectable computerized analysis uses 
statistical methods outputs of value that measures the statistical 
significance of its conclusion. Any face-match reported by such a 
program will be accompanied with a measure of probability that the 
reported match is valid. 
At minimum, the factfinder needs to understand the difference 
between a false positive and a false negative. A false-positive may lead 
to a wrongful conviction; a false negative may lead to releasing a guilty 
defendant. 
Reliability usually varies with the race, sex, age, and ethnicity of the 
subject, and it varies significantly with the quality of the images being 
compared. The factfinder should know the details of both images, in 
terms of the resolution,312 focus of the image, lighting intensity and 
direction, and any artifacts that might result in distortion.  
One defense counsel suggests focusing on the human decisions 
involved in use of automated face-recognition programs.313 
3.  Sample Questions 
The foregoing discussion pertains to face-matching in general. 
Specific questions to be asked in a particular case must depend on how 
the face-matching program has been used. A one-to-one use, for example 
matching an on-scene snapshot of a potential suspect against surveillance 
imagery should evoke quite different questions from a one-to-many 
match. Indeed, one-to-many matches are less likely to be involved as 
evidence at trial, and more likely to be subject to challenge as the basis 
for reasonable suspicion or probable cause in earlier stages in the 
investigation and prosecution. 
Effective counsel understands the limitations of face-recognition 
technology, such as the necessary resolution of digital images before it is 
reliable.314 They also understand the limitations on machine learning, 
 
 312. Measured by pixels per square inch. King Catoy, The Basics of Video Resolution, 
VIDEO4CHANGE (Aug. 21, 2020), https://video4change.org/the-basics-of-video-resolution 
[https://perma.cc/Z6HY-PKQH ]. 
 313. See Jackson, supra note 147, at 14, 17. 
 314. See People v. Carrington, B265888, 2018 WL 671903 at *11 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 
2018) (evaluating testimony on face-recognition technology as applied to surveillance video to 
deny new trial; testimony suggests need for 60-120 pixels between the eyes of a subject for reliable 
face-recognition). 
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such as the number of training images available and their quality.315 
In the interest of clarity, the following questions are somewhat open-
ended, more suitable for depositions than for actual cross examination—
for which skilled trial lawyers ask no question to which they do not 
already know the answer, and ask no question that cannot be answered 
by “yes,” or “no.”316 
Questions for an eyewitness identifying the defendant in court: 
• What did you use as the starting point for your 
identification of the defendant? 
• You used an array of photographs, didn’t you? 
• You looked at individuals assembled in a live lineup, 
didn’t you? 
• You picked the defendant out of one or more 
individuals presented to you by the police outside of 
a police facility, didn’t you? 
• Who decided what photographs to include in the 
photo array? Who decided whom to include in the 
lineup? 
• Who decided whom to include in the show up? 
Questions for the designer of the lineup, show up, or photo array: 
• How did you decide whom to include? 
• What sources did you use for the images or life faces 
you included? 
• What criteria did you use to pick someone for 
inclusion? 
Questions for proponent of face-matching algorithms: 
• Does your system use the Viola-Jones method for 
face detection?317 
• Why or why not? 
• Which of the following algorithms does your system 
use for feature extraction: 
 
 315. See generally Jackson, supra note 147. 
 316. E.g., Irving Younger’s 10 Commandments of Cross Examination, NEB. STATE BAR 
FOUND., https://www.nebarfnd.org/sites/default/files/2019-04/10commandments.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/DGP9-M9SF] (last visited Dec. 4, 2020). 
 317. See sources cited supra note 9. 
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o AlexNet; Matthew Zeiler network; DeepFace; 
DeepID system; VGGFace; or FaceNew 
• Why? 
• Are you familiar with IBM’s US Patent No. 
9,990,537, “Facial feature location using symmetry 
line”? 
• Describe its contribution to the state-of-the-art 
machine learning algorithms. 
• Which of the following statistical techniques does 
your system use? 
o Principal Component Analysis; Linear 
Discriminant Analysis; Independent Component 
Analysis; Discrete Cosine Transforms; Gabor 
Filters; or Markov Models 
• Why or why not? 
• Which of the following approaches does your system 
use? 
o Microsoft; IBM; or Face ++ 
• Why? 
• What other corresponding techniques does it use? 
• How do you know that your training database was 
representative of the relevant population, in terms of 
demographic characteristics? 
• Does your system make modifications to standardize 
face geometry? 
• How many landmarks does your system use to define 
a face? 
• What probe image did you use? 
• Describe its quality, in terms of resolution, 
orientation, lighting, and focus. 
• How many pixels represented the face, itself, in the 
probe image? 
• Describe the contents of the enrolled database you 
used. 
• Isn’t it true that the perpetrator’s image may not be 
in the enrolled database? 
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• What threshold does your system use to define a 
positive match? 
• What threshold does your system use to define a 
negative match? 
• Explain how your system’s confidence values arise 
from statistical decision theory? Are they, for 
example, based on standard error calculations? If so, 
on what parameters? 
• Did you compare the defendant’s fingerprints with 
the FBI database to corroborate the face-match? 
What results did you obtain? 
The questions that follow are adapted from a paper providing model 
cross examination questions for fingerprint examiners.318 
• How many characteristics did the program use from 
the defendant’s face? 
• You did not determine how many characteristics 
from the possible matches matched characteristics 
from Mr. ______, did you?  
• My client was identified solely based on a 
computerized face-match, wasn’t he? 
• He was identified based on photographs generated by 
a computerized face-matching program, wasn’t he? 
• The computer generates a list of candidates and ranks 
them according to how similar they are. Then you 
compare the defendant’s to the candidates. Isn’t that 
the way it works? 
• But as soon as you find one that you think matches 
you stop. You do not look at the rest to see if they 
match better, do you?  
• Here there were faces that the computer generated 
you never followed up on. So, you do not know if 
they are a better match?319  
• You start from the premise that every face has 
different characteristics, don’t you?  
 
 318. JENNIFER FRIEDMAN, MODEL CROSS EXAMINATION (FINGERPRINT EXAMINER) (Feb. 
2017), https://www.wispd.org/attachments/article/242/Cross-Examination%20Fingerprint%20 
Examiner%20(Friedman%20REV%202-17).pdf [https://perma.cc/NRT2-L3FU]. 
 319. See id. at 17–18. 
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• Do you know how many points or characteristics the 
average complete face representation has?  
• [Ask the proponent of the system to cite his source 
for his statement.] 
• So, the average full face has points or characteristics 
that could be compared, doesn’t it?  
• In this case, how many distinguishable points from 
the surveillance image were used? 
• Sometimes you know information about the case, 
like why the police believe someone is a suspect, 
isn’t that so? 
• How many possible matches did the computer 
program output? 
• How many of these did you show to the witness? 
• Why did you exclude the others? 
• Did you review the metadata for the candidate faces, 
such things as residence location, criminal history, 
and age? 
• Did those match with what you know from 
interviewing witnesses and other evidence from your 
investigation?320 
D.  Trade Secret Objections 
Rigorous cross examination about characteristics of commercial face-
recognition products may encounter trade secret objections. The details 
of the algorithms used by the programs may well constitute trade secrets: 
information that has economic value by virtue of not being generally 
known and, with respect to which, the owner has taken reasonable 
precautions to keep it secret.321 
Defense Attorney Kaitlin Jackson says that a challenger of 
computerized face-recognition will not be able to discover the algorithms 
used in the matching process, because they constitute trade secrets.322 
Whether these barriers are as high as Jackson says they are depends on 
the scope of privileges to resist a subpoena under Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 17. Most trade secret cases involve civil discovery, 
 
 320. See id. at 8–10. 
 321. See, e.g., HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., TRADE SECRETS FOR THE PRACTITIONER (6th ed. 2020) 
(defining and discussing trade secrets). 
 322. Jackson, supra note 147, at 21. 
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civil subpoenas under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45, or freedom of 
information act requests.323 
Three solutions to this problem are available. The simplest is to 
exclude evidence if its validity cannot be tested through cross 
examination.324 The second is to protect the cross examination from 
public disclosure. By closing the courtroom for that part of the trial and 
by issuing protective orders binding counsel, parties, and witnesses. Such 
measures frequently are taken to protect trade secrets in litigation.325 
Third, available only in some situations, is to recognize that trade secret 
protection is relinquished when one applies for a patent. The details of a 
patent are in the public domain. Even before a patent is granted or denied, 
patent applications are published.326 
In the other contexts, the power to compel testimony constituting trade 
secrets depends on balancing the interest of the trade secret owner against 
opposing interests present in a particular legal context. In Freedom of 
Information Act cases, the interest opposing those of the trade secret 
owner is the general public’s interest in knowing how their government 
functions.327 In the civil litigation context, the interest of the requester 
relates to the requester’s practical ability to make out a case or defense 
without the trade secret information.328 The interest basically is the same 
whether trade secrets are requested in discovery or in court. 
The interest of the trade secret owner is unambiguous: she will lose 
trade secret protection all together if the trade secret is disclosed to the 
public. In these several contexts, the interest of the trade secret owner can 
be protected by appropriate protective measures: prohibiting use or 
further disclosure by litigants and their counsel. Protective orders can 
impose these prohibitions during discovery. In the case of in-court trade 
secret disclosure, the testimony can be taken in camera or in a court room 
closed to the public, and any jurors can be prohibited from use or further 
disclosure. Reasonable measures to maintain secrecy is one of the 
 
 323. See PERRITT, supra note 321, §§ 4:9:5, 10:10.8 (freedom of information act requests); 
see generally Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Access to Algorithms, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1287 
(arguing in favor of access to algorithms behind systems for breathalyzer and DNA evidence; 
emphasizing FOIA protections). 
 324. See discussion infra Section IV.D.1 (regarding Confrontation Clause). 
 325. See PERRITT, supra note 321, § 10:10. 
 326. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A) (providing for publication of applications 18 months after 
priority date). 
 327. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 299 n.29 (1979) (describing tradeoff 
between public interest and effective functioning of government agencies).  
 328. See Ex parte Michelin N. Am., Inc., 161 So. 3d 164, 172–74, 182 (Ala. 2014) (granting 
writ of mandamus to protect trade secrets in products liability case; plaintiff failed to show 
necessity because of other ways to present case to jury; necessity means more than convenience 
and relevance). 
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elements of trade secret status, and such court-imposed limitations 
represent reasonable measures. 
In the criminal context, the interest in the trade secret is the same, and 
can be protected by similar judicial protective measures. 
The interests favoring disclosure are somewhat different, however. 
The scope of criminal discovery has long been limited,329 and remains 
limited, even with recent reforms to expand discovery.330 This suggests 
defendant interests in discovering trade secrets owned by third-party 
face-matching laboratories are weaker in the criminal context than in the 
civil context.331 Confrontation Clause applicability also makes a 
difference in the interest analysis, leaning in favor of access. If the 
inability to access the trade secrets infringes the defendant’s right to cross 
examine under the Confrontation Clause, his interests in obtaining access 
are correspondingly greater. Whether this is so in a particular case 
depends on the Confrontation Clause analysis of Section IV.D.1. 
VI.  LIMITING USE OF FACE-RECOGNITION BY LAW ENFORCEMENT 
A.  Considerations 
Section IV.D.1 focused on the analysis of and strategies for dealing 
with hearsay and Confrontation Clause issues when face-recognition 
results are offered as evidence. This Section addresses a different 
question: whether limits should be imposed on the use of face-recognition 
programs. If policymakers decide that the law should place limits on 
police use of face-recognition, the more logical way to do it is to limit 
searches of enrolled databases. Imposing limits on capturing images of 
faces runs headlong into the lack of any reasonable expectation of privacy 
in one's face, and against the long-standing practice of taking mugshots. 
Limiting the creation of enrolled databases is also undesirable, because, 
at least in some circumstances, they are quite valuable in identifying 
 
 329. See Jenks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a)–(b) (denying defense access to witness statements 
until after witness has testified at trial). 
 330. Compare FED. R. CRIM. P. 16, with FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b). See also United States v. Al-
Amin, No. 1:12–CR–50, 2013 WL 3865079 at *9 (E.D. Tenn. July 25, 2013) (observing that Rule 
17(c) permits discovery subpoenas only when ordered by the court and only when the returns 
come to the court); United States v. Williams, CR419-089, 2020 WL 86814 at *2 (S.D. Ga. Jan 
7, 2020); United States v. Durst, Criminal Action No. 15–091, 2015 WL 4879465 at *3, 4 (E.D. 
La. Aug. 14, 2015) (denying motion to quash Rule 17(c) subpoena and refusing to extend 
protective order to protect information not qualifying as trade secrets). 
 331. Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal 
Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1409–10 (2018) (arguing that trade secrets can be 
protected adequately in criminal proceedings by imposing conditions similarly to those in 
protective orders in civil cases); id. at 1403–09 (arguing that restricts on criminal discovery and 
subpoenas can adequately protect trade secrets without a separate privilege for trade secrets). 
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perpetrators of crimes, even if their use is limited. But even limiting 
searches of enrolled databases is undesirable because it forfeits a tool that 
makes identification more reliable and reduces false accusations. More 
specific requirements as to the characteristics of enrolled databases and 
searches of them is better policy than outright prohibitions. 
One attractive model for limiting face-matching searches is the federal 
Stored Communications Act.332 It is pertinent because it restricts database 
searches,333 for example, of databases of emails,334 and because the 
material to be searched is not protected by the Fourth Amendment, under 
Smith, because it is in the hands of third parties.335 So protections of 
stored electronic communications, like possible protections against 
certain face-match searches, are purely statutory. 
Of all the permutations identified in Section II.A and of all the law 
enforcement application described in Section III, the one most intrusive 
on reasonable expectations of privacy are many-unknown to many-
known searches. While a member of the crowd does not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his face, in the traditional sense, he 
may have a reasonable expectation of anonymity. That interest is 
eviscerated by effective crowds searching. 
So, the starting point for statutory limitation might be to prohibit many 
unknowns to many knowns searches by law enforcement without some 
kind of court order.336 Whether that court order should be a warrant 
depends on political judgment as to whether the well-developed probable 
cause standard is the appropriate one or whether a standard closer to 
articulable fact, as used in the Stored Communications Act, is 
preferable.337  
The prohibition could permit exceptions upon some kind of factual 
showing. One possibility is to require the law enforcement applicant to 
articulate a reasonable suspicion that a fugitive or subject of an arrest 
 
 332. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–13. 
 333. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (prohibiting unauthorized access to “wire or electronic 
communication” while it is in storage). 
 334. E.g., O’Grady v. Superior Ct., 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 89–90 (Ct. App. 2006) (holding that 
Stored Communications Act covers email). 
 335. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 
435, 443 (1976) (noting how police routinely access public domain or third-party services for 
facial recognition; they can enter a photo into an app which will search Instagram, Facebook and 
other social media to help generate leads).  
 336. On the other hand, court orders are not required for license plate searches. See Beaver, 
supra note 26 (“[L]icense plate readers . . . are basically a purely many unknown to many known 
check of license plates to detect possible crimes (stolen vehicles, expired plates, wanted subject 
owners, etc.). Where law enforcement would otherwise not know the person (car) was in the 
crowd, a reader allows law enforcement to detect it.”).  
 337. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (requiring “specific and articulable facts”). 
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warrant is in the crowd or stream. Another possibility is to require the 
applicant to establish that traditional means of detection and 
identification have proven unsuccessful, as is the case with wiretap 
warrant applications.338 The third possibility is to require the applicant to 
show that the purpose of the database search is to detect the presence of 
persons accused or convicted of serious crimes rather than petty 
crimes.339 
Meeting any plausible standard for approval of a database search is 
easier when a one- unknown to many-known search is proposed. In such 
a case, the police have the image of an individual captured from the 
surveillance recording or created from witness descriptions. Then, the 
link between the subject and a crime is evident, and any reasonable 
standard prerequisite to a database search should be established. 
Searching an enrolled database is not limited by the Fourth 
Amendment, because the subject whose probe image is being used has 
no reasonable expense expectation of privacy in the images in the 
database; those images belong to their subjects. Furthermore, the subject 
of the probe image has no property interest in the database. To be 
protected against governmental intrusion, the interest to be protected 
must be created by statute. 
Analogies can be drawn to the caselaw on access to historic cell phone 
tracking data, which the Supreme Court determined was protected by the 
Fourth Amendment in Carpenter v. United States,340 and Justice 
Sotomayor’s concurrence in United States v. Jones.341 
If many unknowns to many knowns become a routine tool of law 
enforcement purely out of efficiency, scans of every bus station, public 
building, and airport, would result in officers’ just pulling people out of 
the crowd when something pops up. The result would be a significant 
diminution in historically availability anonymity. The best policy might 
be a prohibition on routine tracking all the time. Law enforcement could 
turn on the tracking and matching only when some reason exists to 
suspect a particular suspect is present or that a particular crime is being 
committed—wanted for one thing, catch or something else.342 
 
 338. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (requiring application for wiretap to state what other 
investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they would be likely to fail). 
 339. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (defining offenses for which wiretaps are available). 
 340. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (holding that venturing into 
public sphere does not negate expectation of privacy in movements revealed by historical cell site 
data); United States v. Elmore, 917 F.3d 1068, 1074 (9th Cir. 2019) (applying Carpenter and 
finding no probable cause). 
 341. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (arguing 
that scope of Fourth Amendment should depend on breath of intrusion into subjects clothed with 
reasonable expectation of privacy). 
 342. Beaver, supra note 26. Beaver, supra note 47. 
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B.  Focusing on What Can Go Wrong 
The New York Times reported on a Detroit man who was arrested for 
a shoplifting incident he apparently had nothing to do with.343 The article 
played up the fact that face-recognition software played a role in his 
identification. Face-recognition algorithms played a role, but he was not, 
as the headline and lead implied, arrested based solely on the computer-
generated match. A loss prevention contractor for the store where the 
theft had occurred furnished surveillance video to the Detroit Police 
Department. The Police Department sent it to state police for use as a 
probe image for the state’s face-recognition program. The face-
recognition software reportedly generated a number of possible matches, 
including that of the arrestee. 
The police generated a six-person photo array and showed it to the 
loss prevention contractor. She picked the arrestee’s image from the 
array. It is not clear whether the array included only the possible matches 
generated by the computer program or whether it included images 
selected randomly or through other means. Nothing in the story suggests 
that the image corresponding to the computer-generated match of the 
arrestee received any special attention when the photo array was 
presented. The arrest thus was based on human identification, not on the 
computerized match. 
If the police had not been able to use face-recognition software, either 
because it was unavailable to them or because the law prohibited its use, 
they could have done one of two things. They could have terminated their 
investigation for lack of evidence. The surveillance video still would have 
been available, but the police would not have had any ready means to link 
the image in the surveillance video to an actual person. Or, they could 
have used traditional human methods to match the surveillance video 
with mugshots and other types of photographs of people who might be 
possible suspects. Generating a photo array in that way, they could have 
showed it to the loss prevention contractor, and she might have selected 
someone who did not commit the crime. 
Thus, taking face-matching technology out of the analysis, one can 
identify several specific sources of error. First, the quality of the 
surveillance image may have been so low that it lacked any utility as a 
starting point for identifying the perpetrator. Second, selection of images 
to include in the photo array may have been unprincipled, little more than 
random. Third, the human identification of one of the images in the array 
may have been unreliable. 
 
 343. Hill, supra note 93 (reporting on arrest of wrong man, based on identification of photo 
from “6-pack photo lineup” generated in part by face-recognition software supplied by 
DataWorks, NEC, and Rank One Computing). 
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A law prohibiting the use of computerized face-matching would not 
have eliminated any of these sources of error.  
The law could address the sources of error by prohibiting the use of 
photo arrays altogether. It could prohibit the inclusion of a photograph in 
an array absent some level of suspicion, including full probable cause, to 
include that particular photograph. It could prohibit the use of 
surveillance camera images as the starting point for investigation and 
identification, at least if they fail to meet certain conditions of quality. A 
law or regulation specifically disfavoring computer-generated face-
matching is appropriate only if empirical evidence shows that 
identification errors are more likely with the use of the technology than 
without it. 
C.  Draft Statute 
Section 1 Definitions 
Probe image: image of a person’s face that the user of a face-
recognition system seeks to a identify. 
Enrolled database: A collection of images of faces of known 
individuals used in face-matching programs to see if any of the enrolled 
images match a probe image. 
Training database: A collection of images of faces, expressed and 
organized for computer access, that present a wide variety of physical 
characteristics, enabling machine learning programs to develop 
algorithms for digital representation and comparison of faces. 
One-to-one matching: Use of face-recognition software to determine 
if a known face-matches a pre-recorded phase. 
One-to-many matching: a computerized face-match run in which the 
computer program seeks to match a single probe face against many facial 
images in an enrolled database. 
Many-to-many matching: a face-matching computer run in which the 
user seeks to match several probe images against many facial images in 
an enrolled database. 
Section 2 Prohibition on law enforcement use of face-recognition 
No agency or officer of government, including persons or entities 
possessing law enforcement powers, shall use computerized face-
matching technology except as provided in this act.  
Section 3 Privileges 
a. Any law enforcement officer may use one to one 
matching.  
b. Any law enforcement officer may search an enrolled 
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database with a probe image obtained from video 
surveillance at a crime scene. 
c. Any law enforcement officer or investigative agent 
may search an enrolled database with a probe image 
rendered by a sketch artist, or a sketch computer 
program based on a perpetrator description provided 
by witnesses. 
d. Anyone may use a teaching database to develop face-
matching software and hardware. 
Section 4 Judicial authorization  
a. A judge may authorize the use of computerized face-
recognition systems beyond the privileges conferred 
in section 3, based on an application by law 
enforcement officers or investigative agents making 
the showing required by subsection (b) 
b. the applicant for judicial order under this section 
must demonstrate by sworn testimony that: 
i. Other traditional investigative means to 
identify a criminal perpetrator have been tried 
and failed; 
ii. The applicant has reasonable grounds to 
believe that the source of the probe images to 
be used more likely than not contains the face 
of the perpetrator or of the subject of an 
outstanding arrest warrant or of a fugitive. 
iii. Any face-match results of persons other than 
the identified subject must be destroyed after 
the face-match program is run. 
Section 5 Report to Court 
Whenever an order authorizing interception is entered pursuant to this 
chapter, the applicant must report to the judge who issued the order 
showing what progress has been made toward achievement of the 
authorized objective and the need for continued investigation. Such 
reports shall be made at such intervals as the judge may require. 
Section 6 Discovery by Defendants 
Upon a criminal discovery request, the state must disclose any use of 
face-recognition technology as part of the investigation leading up to the 
arrest of a defendant. 
